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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims, first, to examme critically the idea and the practice of university 
autonomy in England and in Taiwan; second, to re-interpret the changing relationship 
between the government and the university, in both countries, by employing the notion 
of 'boundary'; third, theoretically and empirically to explore the relationship between 
university autonomy and funding; and, fourth, to explore the usefulness and 
applicability of the concept of 'contractual autonomy'. 
The argument of this thesis is that the relationship between university autonomy and 
funding of a given country cannot be understood simply in terms either of the resource 
dependence perspective, or of a judgement of the degree of uni versity autonomy against 
funding mechanisms. Instead, it must be interpreted in the context of government-
university relationships more generally, and of the context of the idea of university 
autonomy in that country. In other words, the government-university relationship and 
the idea of university autonomy, involve more than a financial tie. As a consequence, 
greater efforts on the part of universities to diversify their funding bases may well not 
enhance, or at least not directly, their autonomy. Through an extensive review of 
literature, and empirical study, the argument of this thesis is supported. 
The background of the study is sketched out in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 considers the 
theoretical framework concerning organisation theory and comparative higher 
education. Thereafter, there are explorations of the concepts of university governance, 
university autonomy, funding, and government-university relationships, and their 
practice in England and in Taiwan, covering chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. The methods of 
questionnaire and interview have been selected to allow this study to provide not only a 
broad but also an in-depth understanding of the empirical situations of university 
autonomy, and its association with funding, in both countries. Research methodology, 
and empirical findings, are presented, in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, respectively. Finally, 
there is a drawing-together of empirical findings and theory, for discussion, with final 
conclusions, in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 1 
The Background of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
The debates over whether universities should pursue knowledge just for its own sake, or 
should advance it for utilitarian purposes, reveal the long-existing contrast between the 
image and the reality of the university. In the nineteenth century, Cardinal John Henry 
Newman, articulated 'a vision of the university' which downplayed relevance, 
usefulness, and practicality. It would, instead, be dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge 
for its own sake and to the cultivation of the intellect of wealthy young men (Turner, 
1996, p. 282). In a real sense, however, as Scott (1995) observes, most Victorian 
universities were 'much grubbier functional institutions'. Newman's idea of the 
university did not find any firm ground on which to establish a base, even in his own 
country and in his time; needless to say, it will not be carried out in the twentieth 
century, when the universities are confronting even more worldly challenges. Adding to 
this impossibility of achievement of Newman's goal, are two key modem powerful 
forces that have transformed the modem image of universities. One is the intellectual 
achievement in natural science, and the other is the political force stemming from the 
rise of democracy and mass demand for higher education (The Economist, October 
1997). Both have complicated government-university relationships. Universities have 
involved more complex interests of disparate users, and taken on multiple missions, 
including those of think-tanks, and consultancy, in the research arenas and corporate 
classroom in education and training (Bargh et at., 1996, p. 161). 
It has largely been assumed that the crucial spirit and fundamental scholarly values 
which the Medieval university had, have been passed on to its modern counterpart, 
today. Hayhoe (1996) sums these ideas up, in the concepts of autonomy and academic 
freedom (p. 4). However, this established assumption towards university has been 
challenged. It becomes critical to understand how universities nowadays resolve the 
many doubts cast on their claim for university autonomy, as necessary conditions for the 
proper discharge of their functions (Robbins Report, 1963, para. 708-9; CEPES, 1993), 
rather than an ideology which is self-serving and even self-indulgent. In addition, 
scholars of higher education, like Neave (1988a) and Tapper and Salter (1995), suggest 
that the idea of university autonomy is changing and needs to be redefined. This study 
aims to explore the changing idea of university autonomy and, in particular, its 
relationship with financial matters. 
1.2 Background and The Problem Defined 
Briefly sketching out recent changes in Britain and Taiwan is useful as a lead-in to a 
statement of the reasons for doing this study, and of its objectives. Since the 1980s, the 
whole higher education scene in Britain has changed dramatically. Becher (1987) 
observes that quantitative differences and qualitative changes in higher education have 
already made it hard for the graduate of the pre-1960s period to recognise the 
contemporary landscape. It would be even harder for those who came across the 
continuing changing image of higher education in the 1990s, and many events which 
challenged the taken-for-granted government-university relationships. Government in 
the UK was beginning to adopt an active role in higher education policy-making. Its 
financial cuts in 1981 and 1983 were described as an attack on universities (Kogan and 
Kogan, 1983). The buffer principle, regarded as 'the most enlightened principles of 
state conduct toward universities' (Berdahl, 1959, p. 194), was being eroded, during the 
last days of the University Grants Committee (UGC) (Shattock and Berdahl, 1984), and 
its final replacement by the Universities Funding Council (UFC) in 1989. 
There are two overarching trends in the development of higher education -
massification and marketisation, identified by Bargh et at. (1996), under which a new 
policy and management environment for higher education in the UK has developed. 
How do the British universities perceive their autonomy, given the realities of 
massification and marketisation? A quick overview can be had in Eustace's study 
(1994), concluding, after reviewing four studies - Halsey (1992), Tapper and Salter 
(1992), Middlehurst, Pope and Wray (1991), and Becher and Kogan (1992), that the 
perception is a mixture of pessimistic and optimistic views. Although some hopeful 
signs prove that a vigorous culture of autonomy remains, or at least remained until 
recently, Eustace (1994) indicates that what is probably the most debilitating 
characteristic of academe in Britain today is, he found, a sense ofloss (p. 115). Besides, 
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a constructive view is offered by Tapper and Salter (1995) who argue that the idea of 
university autonomy in Britain has not disappeared, but 'has been reformulated' (p. 59). 
Further study of how university autonomy has been reformulated in Britain, is needed. 
In summary, all these changes provide a challenge to the established concepts of 
university autonomy, and of the British government-university relationship. More 
empirical study is needed. 
In the past decade, changes in Taiwan's higher education policy have also brought in a 
new era in the history of the development of the university. Since the 1970s, the 
government in Taiwan had had a strong belief in developing human capital, through 
education, in order to compensate for the shortage of natural resources, and to inculcate 
political ideology in the minds of its people. Seemingly fortunately, achievements in 
education created a so-called 'Taiwanese Experience' in economic prosperity, in the 
1990s, which has been admired by neighboring countries in Asia. However, some 
observers warned that the economic-oriented and centrally-controlled education system 
would become an obstacle to further development of itself, unless some attention was 
paid to the pursuit of excellence and diversity in education, as was happening in 
neighboring countries. 
Such an awareness was revealed in the concerns of the issue of university governance. 
The government had tried to control the development, and even management, of the 
university, at a time when the latter's contribution to economic growth was seen as a 
major function of the university. The distortion of the nature of a university made it 
hard for the universities in Taiwan, national or private, to develop their own identities, 
or to embrace the traditional university values of academic freedom and university 
autonomy within such a context. 
The government has now promised to grant the universities more autonomy after the 
revision of the University Act in 1994, and the emergence of the Interpretation No. 380 
of the Council of Grand Justice in 1995. The latter formed a set of checks and balances 
on the Ministry of Education (MOE) and established the principle that those powers 
which were not granted by statutes to the MOE, fell within the scope of university 
autonomy. Moreover, since 1995, a new trial funding scheme has been implemented, to 
encourage national universities, which were completely dependent on public funds, to 
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begin diversifying their funding in order to reVive their moribund operation and 
developments. Several national universities were willing to participate in this trial, 
partly because, through it, they assumed that they could have greater financial autonomy 
to fulfil their own missions. With the passage of the revision of the University Act, the 
emergence of the Interpretation No. 380, a new funding scheme and the policy of de-
regulation, a new picture is becoming apparent that the realisation of academic freedom 
and university autonomy seem not too far away in Taiwan. 
By contrast with the situation in the UK, where the idea of university autonomy has 
been thoroughly explored, the idea of university autonomy in Taiwan had been suffering 
from a long-period of neglect. It has been argued that there was no idea of university 
autonomy in Chinese tradition (Hayhoe, 1996). Nevertheless, as Neave - who proposed 
the notion of 'boundary' (1982) to reinterpret the government-university relationship 
and the idea of university autonomy - argues, 'autonomy is contextually and political 
defined' (1988a, p. 31). This argument validates the idea of a study on university 
autonomy in any group of countries; of course, this includes Taiwan. The boundary, 
between the government and the university, set by the political and social context, can 
be discussed, studied and compared. Now is an appropriate time to explore the idea and 
practice of university autonomy in Taiwan, and offer it a contextual definition. 
Statements - like 'the higher the proportion of university income that comes from non-
government sources, the greater their freedom of action' (UGC, 1984), 'it is in the 
interests of universities ... to look for increased levels of funding from private 
sources ... (since) such private income can enhance considerably the independence of 
individual institutions' (White Paper, 1991, para. 14), or, 'generating their own income 
is the way for universities to realise their autonomy granted by the University Act' 
(MOE, 1995), have often been mentioned in government documents in both countries. 
Also, there are academic arguments regarding the relationship between university 
autonomy and funding. For example, academics, like Archer (1984), Caglar (1993), 
and Goedegeburre, et al. (1994), argue that institutional autonomy can be enhanced or 
protected through diversifying university funding bases. Kerr (1995) believes that a 
single main source of university funding means a single source of control, which risks 
turning an influential relationship into a really dangerous partnership, and can easily 
threaten university autonomy (p. 56). 
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In spite that the arguments, above, are not backed by empirical studies, they are often 
treated as given, and suggest that the relationship between university autonomy and 
diverse funding is straightforward. The researcher, however, doubts about their 
adequacy for explaining the experience of higher education in certain countries, like 
Taiwan. The present study hopes to provide empirical data to explore, more deeply, an 
understanding of the relationship between university autonomy and funding in England 
and in Taiwan. 
Another mam reason for choosing England and Taiwan as case studies is the 
researcher's accessibility to the former and her familiarity with the latter. StUdying 
higher education in Britain provides the researcher a chance to gain access to the key 
people, seminars and lectures, and much information pertaining to changes in higher 
education. Ph.D. training and this accessibility of sources and other material sharpen 
the sensitivity of the researcher in understanding why the changes can be so radical, in a 
system with such a long tradition of university autonomy. On the other hand, recent 
changes in higher education in Taiwan contrast, albeit interestingly, with those in 
England. The researcher's familiarity with Taiwan clearly increases the feasibility of 
this study. In addition, most of the - reasonably plentiful - research regarding the idea 
and practice of autonomy in England has focused on historical analysis, but has seldom 
included any empirical work. This study, it is hoped, will provide British scholars with 
the chance to see their own situation from a Taiwanese perspective. With regard to 
Taiwan, this study will be the first empirical study, to explore the contextual definition 
of university autonomy and the relationship between university autonomy and funding. 
Thus, this comparative study of the two contrasting systems hopes to shed some light on 
the contextual factors involved in understanding the concept of university autonomy and 
government-university relationships, and then the relationships between university 
autonomy and funding. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
I}. Critically to examine the idea and the practice of university autonomy in England 
and in Taiwan. 
II}. To re-interpret the changing relationship between the government and the 
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university, in both countries, by employing the notion of 'boundary' . 
III). Theoretically and empirically to explore the relationship between university 
autonomy and funding. 
IV). To explore the usefulness and applicability of the concept of 'contractual 
autonomy' for understanding university autonomy. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Based on the objectives of this study, the following research questions will be addressed 
in this study: 
For achieving Objective I.: 
1.1. What is the idea of university autonomy as it has developed in England? 
1.2. What is the idea of university autonomy that is developing in Taiwan? 
1.3. What is the empirical pattern of the practice of university autonomy in England and 
in Taiwan? 
I.4. What are the similarities and differences in terms of the idea of and the practice of 
university autonomy in both countries? 
For achieving Objective II: 
II.l. What changes occur in the boundaries between the government and the universities 
in England and in Taiwan? 
II.2. What are the similarities and differences III changes m government-university 
relationships (boundaries) in both countries? 
For achieving Objective III: 
IlL 1. What implications do funding changes have for university autonomy in England 
and in Taiwan? 
IIL2. What are the similarities and differences in the relationship between university 
autonomy and funding in both countries? 
For achieving Objective IV: 
IV. 1. How far do universities in both countries view the applicability of 'contractual 
autonomy' to a description of the autonomy which they have now? 
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The argument of this thesis is, in brief, that the relationship between university 
autonomy and funding of a given country cannot be understood simply in terms either 
of the resource dependence perspective, or of a judgement of the degree of university 
autonomy against funding mechanisms. Instead, it must be interpreted in the context of 
government-university relationships more generally, and of the context of the idea of 
university autonomy in that country. In other words, the government-university 
relationship and the idea of university autonomy, involve more than a financial tie. As a 
consequence, greater efforts on the part of universities to diversify their funding bases 
may well not enhance, or at least not directly, their autonomy. 
The background of the study has been sketched out in this chapter. Chapter 2 considers 
the theoretical framework concerning organisation theory and comparative higher 
education. Thereafter, there are explorations of the concepts of university governance, 
university autonomy, funding, and government-university relationships, and their 
practice in England and in Taiwan, covering chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. The methods of 
questionnaire and interview have been selected to allow this study to provide not only a 
broad, but also an in-depth, understanding of the empirical situations of university 
autonomy, and its association with funding, in both countries. Research methodology, 
and empirical findings, are presented, in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, respectively. Finally, 
there is a drawing-together of empirical findings and theory, for discussion with final 





In this study two main types of theory on organisations and on comparative higher 
education, fonn the theoretical framework for exploration of the relevant concepts 
concerning university governance, university autonomy, funding, and govemment-
university relationships, and their practices in England and in Taiwan. The main 
purpose of the examination of organisation theory is to identify what organisational 
characteristics of universities can claim autonomy, if Kogan (1984) simple assertion that 
university autonomy 'is supported by beneficial myths ... to the social and individual 
good if institutions are allowed, on the whole, to go their own way' (p. 72, italics 
added), needs further explorations. Since the study is a comparative study on higher 
education in two countries, the second main area of theory should be, and is simply, the 
theories of comparative higher education. 
2.2 Organisation Theory 
Organisation theory aims to understand the type, structure, nature and characteristic of 
organisations. There are two distinctive aspects of organisation theory: one focuses its 
attention within an organisation, and the other emphasises the relationship between an 
organisation and its environments. Some organisation theorists, like Blau (1974), have 
contributed to the former. Blau (1974) detailed informal processes within organisations, 
as well as the formal structure of general organisations, in his book, On the Nature of 
Organizations. Some organisation theorists, like Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), 
emphasised the interaction between an organisation and its external context, when 
exploring the dynamic nature of organisational behaviour and the process of change. It 
seems reasonable that the Blau-like aspect of organisation theory should be the base for 
other organisation theorists to explore how an organisation might interact with its 
environment. The second aspect of organisation theory, however, helps to trace the 
reasons for, and explanation of, interaction between an organisation and its 
environment, back to the nature of an organisation. 
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Likewise, the understanding of universities can be approached along two dimensions. 
On one dimension, the internal structures of universities are researched. Inevitably, they 
share some characteristics of general organisations, as described by Blau (1974). Also, 
the differences between universities and general organisations are often mentioned. 
Familiar descriptors, such as an open system, or 'a loosely coupled system' (e.g. Cohen 
and March, 1974; Weick, 1976; Baldridge et at., 1978), or a community (e.g. Massy, 
1994), are used. However, such general descriptors need further explorations so as to 
yield understanding of the complexity and uniqueness of a university. 
Though Blau (1974) does not treat universities as unique organisations, he recognises its 
complexity, with varying conditions of academic life influencing the orientation of 
faculty members to work in their disciplines, and to their own institution. By contrast, 
Clark (1983b) indicates the uniqueness of universities - knowledge and the three basic 
elements - work, belief, and authority - which have provided some insulation for a 
university from external control and 'strengthened hegemony over certain tasks and 
functions' (p. 3). Thus, he insists that understanding of higher education systems, is 
required for a 'retreat', to some degree, from general organisational theory in order to 
identify the university's own ways of dividing work, promoting belief, and distributing 
authority, as well as its own ways of changing. More directly, academics, such as 
Neave and van Vught (1994), argue that institutional autonomy is singled out as a 
defining characteristic of universities. 
However, it cannot be denied that there are more and more challenges to the arguments 
for taking the organisational uniqueness of universities as a claim for university 
autonomy. First, the legitimacy of pursuit of knowledge and truth as justifications of 
universities is questioned in the post-modernism society. As Barnett (2000) argues, 
'knowledge and truth ... no longer supply a firm framework for the university' (p. 47). 
Second, increasing external demands are waiting for universities to respond. If 
universities were self-indulgent, they would be seen as part of problem, rather than part 
of solution. The contexts which universities operate are more complicated than ever. 
This leads to the second dimension - understanding the context in which universities 
operate, which has been recognised as another important access to understanding of 
universities themselves. As Archer (1979 and 1984) stresses, the shape of an 
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organisation cannot be cut from where it originated and the context with which it 
interacts. In relation to higher education systems, Becher and Kogan (1992) echo 
Archer's statement (1979) that the shape of a higher education system is 'as much a 
consequence of historical accretion and continuing transactions across institutional 
boundaries as it is of long-term rational planning' (p. 2). 
Thus, in addition to understanding what distinctive features of an organisation make a 
university claim its autonomy, it is necessary to explore the contextual meaning of 
university autonomy through examining the contexts in which a university system 
operates. Among organisation theories, the resource dependence perspective and the 
concept of boundary are selected because they are more relevant to understanding the 
relationship between the university and environmental agents. 
2.2.1 Resource Dependence Perspective 
Resources always playa crucial role in all organisations. The importance of resources 
has long been studied in organisation theory. In resource dependence perspective, the 
work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and the work of Archer (1979) have many points in 
common, but the latter focuses merely on educational institutions. The points from the 
former have often been cited. Pfeffer and Salancik identify three major criteria (pp. 46-
51) which are critical in determining the importance of resources to an organisation. 
The first one is the extent to which the organisation requires it for continued operation 
and survival. The second is the extent of discretion over the allocation and use of a 
resource possessed by other social actors. While an environment is dense with 
organisations and interest groups with a variety of laws and norms, discretion over 
resources given to the focal organisation is rarely absolute. More commonly, there are 
degrees of shared discretion. The third determinant is whether an organisation has 
access to resources from additional sources, that is, the extent to which the focal 
organisation can substitute sources of a given resource. 
Pfeffer and Salancik's perspective has thrown a light on why organisations need to 
interact with their environment and how they react to organisational environment. 
Unlike other organisation theorists on higher education, however, they do not treat a 
university as a special type of organisation. Despite this, their idea has been adopted by 
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academics, like Slaughter and Leslie (1997), to explain the relationship between the 
university and its resource-providers, since this perspective suggests that the resource-
dependence relationship between universities and the government, conditions the 
realisation of the idea of university autonomy. 
Regarding the relationship between resources and autonomy, Blau (1964) has argued 
that one party may be or become the subordinate of the other because of its dependence 
on it for the supply of resources or services. By the same token, Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) hold the view that those who provide resources to organisations have the 
capability of exercising great power over those organisations. Arguably, Slaughter and 
Leslie (1997) suggest that resource dependence theory can be simplified into one well-
known phrase, 'he who pays the piper calls the tune' (p. 68). Thus, it is understandable 
that an observer, holding the resource dependence perspective, would deny 'the validity 
of the conceptualization of organizations as self-directed, autonomous actors pursuing 
their own ends', and, instead, argue that 'organizations are other-directed, involved in a 
constant struggle for autonomy and discretion, confronted with constraint and external 
control' (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 257). 
However, such a denial confronts two challenges. One concerns denial itself on the 
aspect of 'self-directed' or 'other-directed', and the other is from empirical examples. 
When Pfeffer and Salancik deny the validity of the conceptualisation of organisations as 
self-directed, they may make a blunder in employing Weick's conception (1969) to 
argue that an organisation 'enacts' rather than 'reacts to' its environment, since the 
events in the environment do not present themselves to an organisation 'with neat labels 
and interpretations'; rather, an organisation gives meaning to them (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978, pp. 72-74). This means that an organisation is able to interpret the 
signals before it acts. If this is the case, an organisation, to some extent, is 'self-
directed' rather than 'other-directed'. Instead of arguing that it is either 'self-directed' 
or 'other-directed', it might be better to argue that organisation can be 'context-aware'. 
The previous argument can be enlightened by reviewing debates over the issue of 
whether university refonn is more effective when it is initiated from within or from 
without. While academics, for example, Russell (1993), argue that the university is an 
organisation with distinctive features, they are likely to argue that if universities want to 
be refonned effectively, this reform should be initiated from within, rather than from 
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without. In fact, it is clear that there are opposing views about such statements, for 
example Hamilton (1853) who had observed, at the end of the nineteenth century, that 
'universities, like other corporations, can only be reformed from without' (cited in 
Lyons, 1983, p. 113). 
Is autonomy gained from constant struggles? Historically, the European medieval 
universities were granted autonomy, but they were not necessarily involved in a 
constant struggle for autonomy because two forces - the church and the state, fought 
each other for them. Second, there are examples that demonstrate that those who 
provide resources to universities may not seek to exercise control over universities, as 
shown in the establishment of the buffer principle in the funding mechanism in the UK. 
Third, in contrast to the second point, there are also some examples that demonstrate 
that those who exercise control over universities may not be those who provide 
resources to universities. Such examples include the private universities in Taiwan, 
which have been controlled in many respects by a government that is not their main 
resource-supp li er. 
Resource dependence perspective may help to explain part of the possible relationship 
between universities and resource suppliers since the relationship between universities 
and resource suppliers is not necessarily the - linear - one that those who supply 
resources to universities, are those who have control over them. Involved in the 
relationship are, also, other social, cultural, and political factors . Thus, the resource 
dependence perspective is not cogent enough to explain some exceptional cases, where 
universities are given abundant resources and discretion, by one dominant resource 
supplier, and at the same time, forming a contributory factor in realising the idea of 
university autonomy. An example can be seen in Archer's analysis of British 
universities during the period 1945 to 1964, highlighting how British universities 
avoided the inherent contradiction between university autonomy and funding by 
arriving at a better bargaining position, 
.... industrialists were convinced of their need for research and manpower 
services. .. the state... endorsed expansion... on the assumption that this would 
automatically strengthen the economy ... Academic expertise had never been more 
sought after and private finance flowing to the universities reached new peaks in 
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the 195 Os... the academic could finally afford the luxury of a conscience -
forgoing particular transactions without threatening their own survival and giving 
priority to intellectual considerations in development decision. (Archer, 1984, pp. 
149-150) 
With the function of strengthening the economy of the nation, the British universities, 
particularly the 'old' universities, were given the discretion of governing themselves, by 
government. This probably gave them the possibility to seize the chance to accumulate 
necessary capital, both physical capital and 'academic capitalism' in Slaughter and 
Leslie's words, to cushion themselves against changing government funding, and to 
claim, or to continue to claim, autonomy through the 1980s. By contrast, with the same 
purpose of strengthening the economy of a nation, the development of the university in 
Taiwan was completely controlled and directed by central government. Consequently, 
university autonomy has been neglected for a long period. However, rather than being 
mainly a contribution to the maintenance of university autonomy, government funding 
in Taiwan has been mainly an element, and a crucial one, for the survival of national 
universities. The differences between two countries stem from differences in context 
factors, and this leads in to the discussion of the concept of 'boundary', below. 
2.2.2 Concept of Boundary 
Drawing the boundary around a social system is a perplexing problem, because of its 
complexity, it rarely being clear what is to be included and excluded. Not only are 
organisations not neatly bundled, but also their contextual factors can alter over time. 
Despite the difficulty, some organisation theorists, like Haberstroh (1965) and Downs 
(1967), suggest that drawing organisational boundaries can be treated as a matter of 
analytical convenience. This suggestion, treating the boundary drawing as an 
'analytical convenience', is useful, when comparing the government-university 
relationships in England and in Taiwan. 
The boundary is 'where the discretion of the organization to control an activity is less 
than the discretion of another organization or individual to control that activity' (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978, p. 32). Compared to other education institutions, universities are 
more able to claim autonomy, since their activities, centred on disseminating, extending 
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and advancing knowledge, are less susceptible to be controlled by the government, or 
other social actors. However, two challenging points arise. First, on one level, 
knowledge is the lifeline of a university, but this lifeline needs a range of inputs to 
maintain it. Thus, when the development of knowledge is increasingly conditioned or 
guided by the availability of resources, universities have to re-interpret their boundaries 
with the external environment, even though the boundaries between universities and 
external environment are rarely clear-cut. 
Second, advanced development and widespread utilisation of information technology, 
proliferation of knowledge, and the rise of post-modernism thinking, have enlarged the 
number of participants beyond the university, in defining what knowledge counts as 
important. If Mayor's description (1993) that the modem universities, 'like Alice in 
Wonderland, have to run very fast indeed in order to stay where they are (p. 6)' is true, 
how do universities respond to these challenges or how do they transform themselves in 
order to come to terms with the new situations? 
Several higher education theorists, such as Slaughter and Leslie (1997), Clark (1998) 
and Gibbons (1998), suggest that universities need to become entrepreneurial in order to 
gain the best chance in protecting their expertise and prestige, and to recover the lost 
autonomy at a time when mounting demands begin to dominate the capacity of 
universities to respond. Clark (1998) also argues that 'the new autonomy is different 
from the old' (p. 146). What is an entrepreneurial university? Based on open system 
theory and maintaining a state of creative equilibrium with the organisational 
environment, such a concept of the entrepreneurial university has been elaborated in the 
US (Davies, 1987). The concept of the entrepreneurial university means that the entire 
university, its internal departments, research centres, faculties and schools, should have: 
... a willful effort in institution-building that requires much special activity and 
energy ... An entrepreneurial university, on its own, actively seeks to innovate in 
how it goes about its business. It seeks to work out a substantial shift in 
organizational character so as to arrive at a more promising posture for the 
future. (Clark, 1998, p. 4) 
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However, should 'entrepreneurial' become one of the organisational characteristics of a 
university, in order to protect or maintain its autonomy? The responses to such 
arguments vary. For example, Becher and Kogan (1992) suggest that such a concept 
'does not fit comfortably within the dominant UK tradition', despite recent 
developments, such as science parks, technology transfer, and exploitation of 
institutional resources in the market place. It could be argued that a university might 
gain greater autonomy from the government, but meanwhile it might lose autonomy, to 
some degree, in the market place. Such a conclusion that the 'entrepreneurial' 
university is the key to recovery of the lost autonomy should be arrived at with caution. 
However, Clark's emphasis (1998) that the new autonomy is different from the old one 
is agreeable. In turbulent times, the university has to earn its autonomy rather than 
passively be given it. 
In a real sense, the 'boundary' concept has been adopted and applied in interpreting 
dynamic government-university relationships by many scholars, for example, Neave 
(1982 and 1988a), Tight (1992), Russell (1993), Tapper and Salter (1995), and Kogan 
(1996a). Among them, Neave has a particular insight and argues that no matter what 
model be, adopted to explain the government-university relationship and the concept of 
university autonomy, the concept of 'boundary' is involved. The notion of boundary 
suggests that government-university relationships are dynamic and undergo constant 
alternation and flux. It is regrettable that this concept has not received any deeper 
exploration, or sufficient attention. Clearly, the researcher's motive in exploring the 
'boundary concept' (see Chapter 6) is to seek a more comprehensive and contextual 
interpretation of the government-university relationship, to make the government-
university relationship in different countries comparable. 
2.3 Comparative Higher Education 
During the past two decades, the area of comparative higher education has begun to 
attract increasing attention from a considerable number of scholars, policy-makers, and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies. Issues such as university 
governance, the relations between the university and the government, university 
autonomy, academic professions, the students, and finance in different countries, have 
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been researched. Nevertheless, the development of research in this field was not too 
promising and the existing literature on higher education left much to be desired, as 
Clark said in the early 1980s, since most scholars with new perspectives, such as 
organisational theorists, political scientists and sociologists, came into this field, but 'all 
too briefly and soon to wander away' (1983b, p.1). 
Since the time of Clark's comments, a rich literature and set of ideas have developed, in 
the study of higher education. However, the development has been unbalanced, since 
most studies have focused on the developed countries. Higher education systems in the 
developing countries and emerging industrialised countries, have received much less 
attention. Since the early 1990s, however, part of research attention has been extended 
to the development of higher education in these countries. Comparative higher 
education has been recognised, more, as a significant approach to examining both 
national developments in the international context, and the widespread effects of 
globalisation. 
2.3.1 The Nature, Purpose and Problem of Comparative Study 
With regard to comparative study, the first question to be asked is on the nature of 
'comparison'. Comparison is a way of thinking. It is intellectual, as an old Chinese 
saying goes, 'by comparing with others, you can know anything that you do not know'. 
The study of Goedegebuure and van Vught (1996) reviews definitions of comparison 
from different disciplines. 
Almond (1966, p. 878), a political scientist, calls comparison, 'whether it be in the 
experiment, in the analysis of the results of quantitative surveys, or in the 
observation of process and behaviour in different contexts in the real world ... the 
very essence of the scientific method '. 
Smelser (1976), a sociologist, suggests that all scientific method is comparative. 
Geertz (1983, p. 233), an anthropologist, has observed that it is through 
comparison that whatever heart we can get to, can actually be reached. 
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From the definitions above, it might appear that social scientists share a broader 
agreement, that is, that all social scientific methods are comparative. However, 
Goedegebuure and van Vught (1996) argue that 'the terms comparative method and 
comparative studies usually are reserved for' a specific study. On the question of what 
the characteristics of such a specific type of study might be, the answer remains open, 
since 'the literature on comparative analysis offers no agreement on' it (Goedegeburre 
and van Vught, 1996, p. 371). 
It seems that agreement is decreasing rather than increasing. Holmes (1985) and 
Olivera (1988) observe that the consensus on comparative methods and theory 
disappeared during the middle of this century. According to Holmes (1985), the 
consensus on comparative methods until about the 1960s no longer exists (p. 344). The 
existing methodology, such as those of positivism, inductivism, cultural relativism, and 
phenomenological study, are challenged. Even Holmes' own 'problem-solving' method 
has been accused of creating 'an identity problem for comparative education' (Hurst, 
1987). Olivera (1988) observes that the theoretical consensus, emphasising that the 
contexts of the school - historical, social, cultural - were more important than what 
happened inside it, for understanding national systems of education, has disappeared in 
the middle of this century (p. 325). 
This thesis is not primarily concerned with arguments regarding methodological debates 
in the field of comparative education. However, it is important to adopt the comparative 
format for this thesis, because it is believed that, as Broadfoot (1977) argues, 'the 
comparative study of education is a context, rather than a discipline, which allows for 
the interaction of perspectives arising out of a number of social science disciplines' (p. 
133). (cited in Crossley and Broadfoot, 1992, p. 102) It has been argued that a proper 
comparative study can achieve desirable purposes, including, 1) to deepen one's 
understanding of our own education and society and one's appreciation of the 
differences within and between national systems in the international community; and, 2) 
to better understand the relationships between education and the broader social, 
political, and economic sectors of society. It should avoid merely transplanting other 
foreign systems into one's own country, since to do so is dangerous and ultimately 
doomed to failure, but it does help to understand a given education system in its own 
context. 
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While the usefulness and practicality of comparative study is emphasised, the misuse 
and abuse of comparative study should be carefully dealt with. Crossley and Broadfoot 
(1992) identify nine problems of research in this field. There is no need to detail them, 
but several main aspects are worth mentioning: 1) dangers of false comparison; 2) 
dangers of ethnocentric bias in the interpretation of findings combined with the 
difficulties of establishing cultural and contextual sensitivity; and, 3) the ethical issues 
and the dangers of cultural imperialism (Crossley and Broadfoot, 1992). If the 
comparative research succumbs to one of the dangers, the study will create 
misunderstanding rather than promoting mutual understanding and appreciation. 
2.3.2 Development and Research Trends in Comparative Higher Education 
From the accounts above, a comparative study can be recognised as a process of gaining 
knowledge about foreign education systems in order to gain a better understanding and 
appreciation of one's own system. Without question, the field of comparative higher 
education also promotes such a purpose. Altbach (1979) suggests that the emergence of 
this field is related to the expansion of higher education in the post-war era, and 
increasingly visible problems of higher education after expansion, for example, soaring 
costs, the tension between university autonomy and accountability, and the need to 
diversify higher education institutions in order to meet increasing demands for higher 
education. Clearly, seeking solutions for the above problems stimulated research on 
higher education. Although no country can solve problems by directly borrowing from 
the experience of others, one conviction for such research is that it can perhaps benefit a 
given country by an examination of different approaches to common problems in other 
countries. Given the usefulness and practicality of the research, the development of 
comparative higher education is heavily policy-driven or action-oriented (Bum, 1972; 
Altbach, 1979; Goedegebuure and van Vught, 1996). 
Clearly, the growth of research on comparative higher education is also stimulated by 
the increasingly important role of higher education, which is moving to the centre of the 
knowledge society, and represents a key locale of research production. However, one 
more important thing related to its emergence cannot be underestimated, that is, the 
financial support provided by national and international agencies, as happened with the 
development of other fields, such as comparative public administration and comparative 
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policy studies. Key resources, such as, research funding, journals, the establishment of 
research centres on higher education, became available and allowed this field to have a 
chance to grow. 
There were some earlier seminal comparative higher education studies during the 
emergence of this field, such as Flexner's Universities, American, English, Gennan 
(1930); Ashby's Universities: British, Indian, African (1966), and the like. One 
intriguing phenomenon remains. Although universities have existed for a long time, 
and devoted themselves to lots of research on many social areas in this century, research 
on universities themselves, until the late 1970s, was scarce. Even though there are some 
studies, for scholars, it was still a passing interest and did not attract widespread 
interests from social scientists, as Altbach (1979) and Clark (1983b) observe. 
Altbach (1979) is one of the important figures in this field, and provides the first 
synthesis of research trends and development of bibliography in this field. He has 
summarised several common limitations which appeared in the earlier writings in this 
field. First, they were descriptive in nature, reporting on visits to various higher 
education institutions. However, many of the comparative studies have been carried out 
by analysing secondary materials and the early scholars tended to avoid empirical work, 
because of its high expense and unsolved fundamental methodological problems, among 
other reasons. Second, they were aimed at instilling an interest in foreign education 
models for use in the researcher's own nation. Third, they were publicising refonns 
made in other countries and convincing sceptics that alternative educational policies 
could work. Promisingly, more recent research has gone beyond these limitations. 
Several international empirical research projects have been recently carried out in this 
field, to fill this gap, for example, the study of van Vught and his research team (1989) 
on governmental strategies and innovation in higher education curricula. 
Comparative higher education shares the multi-disciplinary nature of comparative 
education. Despite Clark's comments as earlier quoted, the research in this field cannot 
ignore the contribution made by other disciplines, such as history, sociology, political 
science, and economics. As Goedegebuure and van Vught (1996) suggest, both higher 
education studies and comparative higher education are subject to the methodological 
requirements inherent in these other disciplines, in order to understand the phenomenon 
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(pp. 390-1). The question merits attention - does such a multi-disciplinary nature make 
comparative higher education lack its own distinctive character, concepts or approach? 
Before relevant arguments of higher education scholars are investigated, it is useful to 
refer to the background of the development of comparative education, since the latter is 
also a multi-disciplinary field. Crossley and Broadfoot (1992) suggest that there has 
been a very vigorous methodological debate conducted within the literature in recent 
years (for example, Epstein, 1983; Albatch and Kelly, 1986; Thomas, 1990), and argue 
that comparative education has its own perspectives, concepts and concerns, as follows, 
Chief of these are respect for context (at both the macro, societal and micro, 
institutional levels) in the analysis of education; the examination of the 
international transfer of educational policy and practice; and for many, an 
emphasis upon the comparison of educational similarities and differences 
(between nation-states, within nations, across time or in a global framework). 
(Crossley and Broadfoot, 1992, p. 105) 
Comparative higher education undoubtedly shares the characteristics of comparative 
education, but with a distinctive research focus, which is, of course, issues of higher 
education. However, when the development of comparative education was already in 
its third phase in the late 1970s, that is, not only analysis and exploration of the 
contextual factors which give rise to the observable educational scene, but also the 
advancement of comparative education methods, comparative higher education 
remained at the stage of description, as identified by Kerr (1978) and Altbach (1979). 
Also, Teichler (1996) argues that 'higher education research has not been strongly 
involved in the methodological debate on comparative approaches'. In the 1990s, the 
observations of Altbach, Kerr, and Teichler still hold true in large part, according to 
Goedgebuure and van Vught (1996), 
... despite the common denominator 'comparative', comparisons very often are a 
second-order element at best. The vast majority of studies does not get beyond the 
descriptive stage, or at best does so only marginally. .. (Nevertheless) methodology 
and explanation at times do appear central in some studies ... But clarity of design 
and methodology still do not dominate the writings in comparative higher 
education studies. (Goedegebuure and van Vught, 1996, pp. 390-1) 
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Nevertheless, these two scholars believe that the development of comparative higher 
education has been gradually moving to the explanatory analysis, and faces fundamental 
methodological problems, such as the problem of equivalence, the problem of macro-
social cases, and the problem of the lack of independence (pp. 379-380). That these 
problems have arisen is not surprising to researchers in social science, since the research 
in this area is never as simple as the experimental method. The latter assumes that the 
difference in effects, as observed between the control group and the experimental group, 
is caused by the treatment. Teichler's view, outlined below, indicates that most research 
in this field can be exploratory, and be more productive in providing unexpected insight, 
smce, 
.. few comparative (higher education) research designs represent the ideal type of 
setting a research agenda of clearly defined hypotheses to be tested, and if they do 
so, the study mostly turns out to be too simplistic due to disregard of the complex 
context. (Teichler, 1996, p. 431) 
In concluding this section, Teichler's criticism of existing studies and his advice for the 
future work of comparative higher education should be reviewed. Two types of 
criticism of existing studies have been made by Teichler: first, they aim at analysing a 
small number of phenomena, and at testing causal relationships among a limited set of 
variables. Such an analysis tends to produce completely dissatisfactory results which 
are often regarded as trivial and misleading. Second, there is a too strong reliance on 
description and collection of curiosities, as well as on inductive processes of 
establishing concepts; and such studies are often criticised as being prone to a-
theoretical accumulations of unexplained facts. Teichler reminds researchers of taking 
'a position both to test their prior assumptions and to enrich their concept heuristically 
with the help of unexpected findings' (p. 450). After reviewing several comparative 
projects, Teichler (1996) still calls for more substantial empirical work. Thus, this 
comparative study on the relationship between university autonomy and funding in 
England and in Taiwan hopes (if possible) to contribute to the empirical aspect of study 
of comparative higher education. 
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In this comparative study, four main themes of higher education are identified as the 
bases for comparing similarities and differences between England and Taiwan, namely, 
university governance, university autonomy, funding, and the government-university 
relationship. The reasons for highlighting these four main themes are explained here, 
before moving to the next section. First, despite this argument that university 
governance is secondary in this thesis, there is a need to describe how the higher 
education systems are organised and governed, and to examine what implications the 
changes in governance culture have for government-university relationships. Second, 
the changing idea of university autonomy is the first central issue under investigation. 
Third, the present funding policies in both systems are different from those of the past, 
which may have important implications for university autonomy. Finally, as this thesis 
argues (see Chapter 1), the examination of government-university relationships should 
be involved in understanding the relationship between university autonomy and 
funding. 
Finally, notwithstanding that there are still vigorous debates concerning the relevant 
comparative methodology, for the purpose in hand, Bereday's four-step comparative 
methods (1964) - description, interpretation, juxtaposition and comparison, will be 
employed in subsequent chapters. However, the mode of comparison will be 
'illustrative comparison' rather than 'balanced comparison', because of the different 






Examination of the issue of university governance brings operational practices out into 
the open, and allows investigation of concepts and symbols relating to the organisation 
and running of universities. As Bargh et al. (1996) suggest, 
... how governance is conceptualized and operationalized within universities is 
closely connected to changing organizational and symbolic arrangements within 
the host society. (Bargh et al., 1996, p. 40) 
This chapter aims to examine and compare university governance in England and in 
Taiwan, and begins by exploring the concept of university governance, including: 1) the 
distinction between university governance and management; and, 2) the governance 
culture of the university. Next is an examination of university governance in each 
country, with further comparison of the following: first, against what background is 
university governance, discussed, as an issue? Second, what changes, if any, are 
occurring in the culture of university governance, and what are the implications for the 
debate on the government-university relationship and on university autonomy? 
3.2 Concepts concerning University Governance 
3.2.1 The Distinction between University Governance and Management 
It is common to assume that readers already know the differences between governance 
and management, in the context of higher education. Some scholars, therefore, do not 
make any attempt to identify any distinction before they proceed to discussion of the 
issue of university governance and management. However, there is a need for this study 
to clarify the distinction between governance and management, as, while the terms are 
distinguishable in English, they are 'semantically' the same in Chinese. Also, while the 
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concept of governance might be distinct from the concept of management for English 
universities, this has not been the case for Taiwanese universities, because the life of the 
latter was penetrated by government intervention. 
Examining the original derivation of this word 'management', makes it easier to clarify 
the difference between it and governance. 'Management' implies control, for the word 
'management' is derived from the Italian maneggiare (to control), and ultimately from 
the Latin manus (hand), to describe the process by which one person controls the 
actions of another person or a team (Farrington, 1994, p. 201). However, governance is 
a broader concept than that of management. University governance is defined as the 
manner in which university systems and institutions 'are organized and managed, how 
authority is distributed and exercised, and how both systems and institutions relate to 
governments' (Hannan, 1992, p. 1280). Also, university governance refers to 
conceptual issues of relationships between the government and the university (Becher 
and Kogan, 1992). 
The study of Bargh et at. (1996) offers a useful quotation from Tricker (1984, p. 7) 
which sheds some light on this issue. Tricker said that 'if management is about running 
business, governance is about seeing that it is run properly'. Management is often used 
to refer to institutional managerial behaviour, such as systematic planning, organisation 
and control to achieve organisational objectives through the efficient and effective 
operation of resources; university governance to refer to the relationship between 
central authorities and individual institutions. 
Although governance and management are conceptually different, and the difference is 
open to study, the two indubitably overlap operationally (Bargh et al., 1996, p. 38-9). 
Despite this operational overlap, as far as a university is concerned, an argument for 
autonomy conventionally means an argument for self-governance rather than self-
management. This might reflect certain assumptions, that a university should manage 
its own affairs, or run its own business, and that governments are willing to keep their 
distance. While no one would deny the right of governments to check whether or not a 
university has run its business properly, nonnally, this task is expected to be done 
through university governing bodies or trustees, rather than through direct governmental 
interference. Regarding government attitudes towards the university, it is assumed that 
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it is more proper for governments to take a supervisory, rather than a managing, role. 
3.2.2 Governance Culture of a University: Pattern, Role and Composition 
Through examination of the functions and composition of governing bodies, Becher and 
Kogan (1992) believe that various assumptions about the relationships between higher 
education and society can be revealed. More specifically, Bargh et al. (1996) argue that 
the nature of the relationship between universities and their paymasters, generally their 
government, shapes patterns of university governance. They suggest that, if the 
university-paymasters relationship is relaxed, the role and responsibilities of university 
governing bodies will be enhanced; but, if it is prescriptive, governing bodies are 
constrained, and the autonomy of universities becomes similarly constrained. Thus, 
understanding university governance starts to pave the way for detection of the host 
society's expectations of, and its interactions with, its universities, which influence the 
idea and practice of university autonomy. 
In the literature, one ofthe main keys to investigation of this issue is to locate sources of 
authority and the type of decision-making, from an organisational perspective. Among 
them, Clark's endeavour in the field of governance of higher education merits attention. 
After addressing some fundamental questions concerning authority, such as 'Who rules? 
How do the many academic groups articulate their interests?', Clark (1983b) identifies 
three main forms of authority in the higher education system, as well as four national 
modes of university governance. Three broad forms of authority in an academic 
organisation are rooted primarily in disciplines, enterprises and in systems as a whole. 
The four national modes are: the (European) continental mode (a combination of faculty 
guilds and state bureaucracy); the British mode (a combination of faculty guilds with a 
modest amount of influence from institutional trustees and administrator - in the form of 
the vice-chancellorship); the American mode (like the British, but a combination of 
weaker faculty guilds with stronger institutional trustees and administrator); and the 
Japanese mode (in leading national universities, it exhibits characteristic of the 
continental mode; in private universities, the American mode.) Clark's categorisation 
can be a valuable framework in seeing how different arrangements of authority affect 
the way that systems operate (p. 131). 
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No matter what models of university governance are identified and proposed, none is 
perfect enough to be applied directly, without modification, to explanation of university 
systems in any country. This leads this discussion to another classic argument among 
different governance models. For instance, based on the notions of community, 
position-based authority, and pluralist politics, several main models of university 
governance - the collegial model, the bureaucratic/ managerial model, and the political 
model, have been proposed. 
The collegial model of university governance is characterised by features such as: 
collective academic decision-making for common interests; a sense of academic 
community; the faculty being influential; self-governance; and, also, implicitly, having 
'little direct of government interference in the governance of higher education' (Tapper 
and Palfreyman, 1998). The authority of the collegial model resides in expertise and 
knowledge. By contrast, the bureaucratic/ managerial model emphasises features such 
as, 'stratifying power and authority according to assumed function and ability' (Becher 
and Kogan, 1992, p. 138). Its authority is legal-rational and position-based. Albeit 
implicitly, a political model of university governance is also observed by academics, 
such as Baldridge (1971). The model of governance is conceptualised as a political 
process in organisations marked by the presence of multi-interest groups whose views 
and values are competing - and are often contradictory - concerning a range of 
university issues. Individual models have their strengths and flaws, and embody values. 
While universities are recognised as highly academic and professional organisations, in 
the literature on university governance, the collegial model tends to be preferred, since 
its ideas are assumed to be more congenial to the traditional values of academic freedom 
and university autonomy than those embodied in the bureaucratic/ managerial model. 
Nevertheless, in reality, university governance is being increasingly exercised by 
managerial bodies/ bureaucracies, and by political forces (Rhoades, 1992, p. 1382). The 
classic arguments for favouring the collegial model, and disfavouring the bureaucratic 
model, have been well rehearsed. However, among the academic community, reasons 
for dislike of the bureaucratic/ managerial model of governance in higher education may 
be rational. For example, academics, such as Clark (1983b) and Becher and Kogan 
(1992), express their fear that such governance is likely to harm and distort the 
academic and intellectual nature of a university. 
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The emergence of a new regIme of bureaucracy/ managerialism in university 
governance, as Bargh et al. (1996) indicate, cannot avoid being interpreted as an 
evidence of a lack of trust between the government and the universities (p. 39). 
Interestingly, if 'governance models are a central element of the ideology and power' as 
Rohades (1992) suggests, the rise of managerialism reflects the reality that government 
authorities are becoming more interventionist towards universities, and more reluctant 
to leave their activities largely in the hands of either professionals or the market. 
Governments tend to impose more mechanisms to monitor how universities run their 
business. Then universities might spend more time coping with such bureaucratic 
requirements. The president of the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals 
(CVCP), Professor H. Newby, has given out an impression of how much volume of 
work and preparation can be involved in the current system of teaching quality 
assessments, and he supports universities' call for 'a lighter touch'. He said, 
... a single subject appraisal in an individual university often generates around 
150 box files of documents and requires several months' preparation. Multiply 
this 30 or 40 times for a typical university. (Guardian, January 25, 2000) 
Under the greater burden of management and accountability, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that university autonomy is constrained. However, the question as to how far 
the collegial model carries the 'real' idea of university into reality, deserves asking. If 
deeper thought is given to the question - which groups were continually excluded from 
the collegial model? The reasons above would be hard to justify. The study of Luke 
(1997) is worth reviewing, though her topic focuses on quality assurance and women in 
higher education. She observes that though quality assurance brings in certain negative 
consequences, it transforms the culture and management style of a regional university in 
Australia from being informal and pastor model to one with open systems of 
accountability and performance targets, which brings new opportunities for 'other 
groups previously marginalised and silenced' (Luke, 1997, p. 433). 
Thus, when the issue of university governance is seen as being related to the balance of 
power and seen in the context of new ideology in public service (Bargh et aI., 1996), it 
is seen to become more subtle and complicated than its definitions and models imply. 
27 
According to the observation of Bargh et al. (1996), in the new policy environment the 
roles and responsibilities of the governing bodies have been shifting from being more 
symbolic towards being 'real' - overseeing institutional objectives and ensuring that the 
institution is properly managed in order to fulfil its missions. This shifting is not 
unproblematic in itself, but has made governance 'sit uneasily between three 
constituencies' (Ibid.) - central government, producers (higher education institutions) 
and consumers (students, and employers), and deal with the diverse and potentially 
conflicting interests among them. Thus, in dealing with the classical argument, Bargh et 
al. (1996) suggest an alternative view that the shift of orgnisational culture of a 
university towards an entrepreneurial one, can make the tensions and contradictions 
between the collegial, bureaucratic, and political models less explicit, since the 
entrepreneurial university functions as a living organism, undertaking 'a continuous 
process of adaptation and change' (p. 33). 
The discussion now moves to examination of the assumption of the usefulness of the 
device of governing boards, or called 'board of trustees' for private universities, and 
'board of regents' for state ones, in the US. It should be noted that whether universities 
have such formal arrangements as governing boards or not, they all have governance 
issues to deal with. However, according to Clark (1983b), higher education systems 
with or without trusteeship will have different impacts on how the institution responds 
to external changes and demands. The device of governing boards refers to how the 
interests of various public constituencies or audience, have been articulated. In systems 
that do not have trustees, as Clark has analysed (1983b, p. 117), public interests are 
legitimately pursued through mainline governmental channels, which make the 
university more vulnerable when political power encroaches on the university. 
However, Clark's argument for the usefulness of governing boards faces inevitable 
challenges from those university systems with governing boards, but where the latter are 
under government control, where the trustees are there to channel, or even impose 
governments' will on universities. During the rule of Alexander III in the nineteenth 
century, for example, Russian universities lost their previous freedom and came under 
the heavy control of trustees (Verbitskaya, 1996). It also faces another challenges from 
those university systems without governing boards. In certain countries in Europe, 
university governance is weakly developed since universities are state institutions that, 
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in administrative terms, 'could not be distinguished from the rest of the government 
machine', but their universities, in practice enjoy 'considerably greater autonomy' 
(8argh et aI., 1996, p. 165). These examples suggest that Clark's argument needs 
further empirical testing. 
What roles do the governing bodies of universities play? What interests, among which 
parties related to the university, do they represent, especially when the governing bodies 
are entrusted with public funds? Some scholars, such as Ball (1994) and Deem et al. 
(1995), argue that the roles of governing bodies are 'steering at a distance', and 
represent interests from the government and themselves. Some scholars also pay 
attention to how governing bodies can act as a useful buffer for the universities, 
protecting institutional autonomy. In Gade's description (1992), governing bodies are 
'acting as both a bridge and buffer, interpreting the institutions to the outside world, 
ensuring that it is responsive to the needs of society while at the same time preserving 
its autonomy from inappropriate intrusion by that society'. Furthermore, the governing 
bodies of universities may be seen as the bodies with ultimate responsibility for their 
institutions, since they are well-placed to concern the viability of their institutions as a 
whole, compared with other groups in those institutions (Committee of University 
Chairmen, 1995) 
As far as the composition of governing bodies is concerned, there is neither a standard 
set pattern nor a standard size. In general, the members of governing bodies can be 
divided into two main categories, namely, external members and internal members. 
External members may include, and this is a growing trend, those with industrial, 
commercial, and even educational, backgrounds, and! or representatives of government 
authorities. Normally, internal members may include representatives of staff and 
students. In a broad sense, even though there are some legal or administrative 
prescriptions, the composition of governing bodies has been left, in some degree, to 
individual higher education institutions to organise for themselves. In his discussion of 
the government of higher education, Clark (1983a) raises one important issue 
concerning patterns of governance: 'What structures of governance help this or that 
function to operate well?', and 'What governance "fits"?' (p. 27). Clark argues that' fit 
is a matter of balance among alternative forms' of governance. This is the main thing to 
bear in mind, with other contextual factors, when comparing university governance in 
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different countries. 
3.3 University Governance in England: Development and Changes 
Concerning how English universities are governed, there are several useful studies and 
papers, such as Halsey and Trow's The British Academics (1971), Moodie and Eustace's 
Power and Authority in British Universities (1974), and Becher and Kogan's Process 
and Structure in Higher Education (1980, and 1992). However, some British scholars, 
Bargh et al. (1996) and Tapper and Palfreyman (1998), still found that there exists a 
gap, in the existing literature on the governance of British higher education, which 
needs filling. 
Thus, Bargh and her colleagues (1996) carried out 'the first full-length research-based 
study of U.K. higher education governance' (book jacket). Their book, Governing 
universities: Changing the Culture?, has a deeper and empirical analysis, of how the 
whole wider context influences university governance in England, since governance 
culture shifts manifestly from a collegial and consensual one towards a managerial and 
business-led culture. However, a more recent study, by Tapper and Palfreyman (1998), 
found that a collegial tradition in the context of mass higher education 'continues to 
flourish within particular layers or segments of an institution: within research teams, 
within departments, within faculties, and - of course - within colleges' (p. 157). 
After companng the UK to France and Sweden, Premfors (1980) concludes that 
government intervention in the area of institutional governance in the UK is limited in 
character, not only in the university sector, but also in the public sector (p. 88). 
However, such a picture has changed. Since the 1980s, all aspects of the context within 
which English universities exist, have demanded that they be more responsive, efficient, 
effective, and accountable. The governing bodies are no longer 'dignified' or merely 
'honoured' components of a university, but are the bodies charged with ultimate 
responsibility for all the affairs of their institutions. 
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3.3.1 Development of the University System, and Governance Patterns 
With regard to the university 'system' issue, scholars have different Views and 
interpretations. Eustace (1992) argues that higher education in the UK has never fully 
merited the description of 'system'. However, Clark (1983b) argues that 'British higher 
education moved firmly into a de facto national system ' by observing what elements 
exist in this system: (1) the Department of Education and Science (DES) took on some 
of the attributes of a continental ministry; (2) the University Grants Committee (UGC) 
accountability was relocated from the Treasury to the DES in 1964; and (3) having 
explicit national policies in higher education (pp. 128-9). Finally, non-university sector, 
undoubtedly, has been brought into the 'system' . 
Generally speaking, the whole system might conveniently be distinguished as having 
four levels: the central level, the individual institution, the basic unit and the individuals 
(Becher and Kogan, 1992). For the purpose of this study, regarding the issue of 
university governance, the first two components of this system are selected as the prime 
targets for discussion. 
The Central Level o/the University System 
The central level of the system involves 'the various authorities who are charged with 
overall planning, resource allocation and the monitoring of standards' (Becher and 
Kogan, 1992, p. 9). The central authorities range from ministerial departments to those 
quangos, which are authorised by central government, to deal with relevant matters in 
relation to higher education, such as the Funding Councils and the Quality Assurance 
Agency (QAA). Central government, therefore, formulates the framework policies and 
decides what levels of resources to assign for implementing those policies. Having 
formed the policy framework, the central government hands over authority to its 
principal quangos dealing with higher education funding and quality affairs. 
The Institutional Level and Its Governance Structure 
There are several different categories of universities according to their different 
historical development and foundation. The recent studies on higher education 
institutions in the UK use a demarcation between 'old' and 'new' universities (for 
example, Bargh et at., 1996), or 'pre-1992' and 'post-1992' universities (for example, 
31 
CUC, 1995). In this study, the 'old' universities refer to those having degree granting 
power before the provisions of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 came into 
force, also called 'pre-1992' universities; 'new' universities refer to those having degree 
granting power after the 1992 Act, also called 'post-1992' universities. Both pre-l 992 
and post-1992 universities share fundamental features, such as being legally 
independent corporations, and being bodies with charitable status. However, the 
differences of legal instruments and governance structure persist within and between 
pre-1992 and post-1992 English universities. 
The pre-1992 English universities can be grouped into several types: the ancient 
universities of Oxford and Cambridge; the federation of the University of London; the 
'civic' universities founded in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries; the 
group of universities established in the 1960s, and the Colleges of Advanced 
Technology which achieved university status following the Robbins Report of 1963. 
With a few exceptions, most of the pre-1992 universities are chartered corporations. 
The exceptions include: Oxford and Cambridge, which are governed by specific 
statutes; and the London School of Economics, which is a company limited by 
guarantee. Thus, generally speaking, the supreme governing body for pre-1992 
universities is a Council. 
The councils of the pre-1992 universities are executive governmg bodies. The 
composition of the councils differs, to some degree, one from another. According to 
Farrington's comprehensive analysis (1994, p. 168), the members can be categorised 
into 14 types. Basically, there are two broad groups: one is lay members, and the other 
non-lay members including staff and student representatives. Some appointments of lay 
members are made by the Court of individual universities, some by local authorities, 
and some by the council itself. They are generally chaired by the pro-chancellor. 
Significantly, membership of the university as a corporation extends to all staff and 
students (Bargh, et al., 1996, p. 24). The university councils are responsible for the 
university 'S finances and investments, for the management of the university estate and 
buildings, and for the oversight of teaching and research, and carry out their functions 
through committees. 
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The body in Oxford equivalent to the Council is called Hebdomadal Council, and that in 
Cambridge is called the Council of the Senate. These bodies do not include any lay 
element; therefore, most academics, like Halsey and Trow (1971) and Moodie and 
Eustace (1974), agree that the pattern of the government of both universities can be 
described as entirely one of self-government, and that government is in the hands of 
their academic members. This model, of academic self-government, has not been 
imitated by other universities, but the spirit of academic self-government has been 
rather influential, particularly during the 1960s. 
The post-1992 universities, the former polytechnics and higher education colleges had 
their diverse foundation backgrounds. However, most of them share rather similar 
histories in terms of their transformation from former polytechnics or colleges into 
universities. For example, the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) grants them the 
status of independent higher education corporation, and the 1992 Act allows them to 
have degree-granting power, and to use the title of university. The 'post-1992' 
universities are governed by the governing body. Boards of governors, limited to a 
maximum of 24 and a minimum of 12 members, are appointed under articles of 
government approved by the Secretary of State for Education. The majority (up to l3) 
must be 'independent' members, namely, those who are not members of staff or 
students of the institution or elected members of a local authority. Independent 
members having experience of, and having a capacity in, industrial, commercial or 
employment matters, or the practice of a profession, are preferred. The governing 
bodies in the post-1992 universities are not required to include staff and student 
representatives, but, as the CUC (1995) recommend, if they deal with exclusion of staff 
and student representatives, they need to do so with great care. Governing bodies were 
granted the power to award degrees by the 1992 Act, but by virtue of delegation from 
the governing body, the academic boards are responsible for the administration of any 
awards. 
In addition to size and composition, the manner of appointment of members of boards 
of governors, and corporation membership, differ between pre-1992 and post-1992 
universities. In the former, some of the lay or independent members of councils are 
appointed by the Court, some by local authorities, and some by the Council itself. 
Membership of the corporations extends to all staff and students. In the latter, however, 
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the independent members of governmg bodies are appointed under articles of 
government approved by the Secretary of State for Education. Corporation membership 
is confined solely to members of the governing bodies. Besides, more subtle 
differences exist in the culture of university governance between these two groups of 
universities (Bargh et al., 1996). 
3.3.2 University Governance in England 
3.3.2.1 Background to a Re-opening of University Governance as an Issue 
It is necessary to examine the background in which university governance has been 
brought forward, and re-opened as an issue, so as to explore the changing govemrnent-
university relationship. In the 1960s, it was regarded as axiomatic that efficient 
university government should be in academic hands. Thus, university councils, 
particularly their lay members, were relegated to the margins of university government 
(Bargh et al., 1996, pp. 6-7). Such a government pattern was also supported by the then 
Department of Education and Science (DES), which also tried to intervene in the 
governance pattern of the polytechnics and colleges, then controlled by the local 
education authorities (LEAs). Originally, governance in the public higher education 
sector was regarded as essentially settled by the dirigiste nature of the LEAs. 
Significantly, central government, notably in the Weaver Report (1965), required the 
LEAs to set up separate governing bodies for their polytechnics and colleges, and 
academic board, to grant them a greater degree of academic self-government insofar as 
the polytechnics and colleges could be fully accepted as higher education institutions. 
Central governmental intervention was clearly successful, through the introduction of 
the 1968 Education Act. Further, in 1978, the Oakes working group recommended 
creation of a body analogous to the UGC for local education polytechnics and colleges 
(Becher and Kogan, 1992). Thus, whether in the university sector, or, to some extent, in 
the public sector, institutional governance was characterised by the idea of academic 
self-government before the 1980s. 
The key moments at which institutional governance emerged as an issue, start with 
those of a series of key events in the 1980s, for both university and the public sector. 
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For the universities, academic self-government was openly challenged by such events as 
the 1981 university budget cuts, the UGC's interventionism, and the 1985 Jarratt Report 
introducing the new rhetoric of 'business' into higher education. The rule of the 
academics was broken when the provisions of the Education Reform Act 1988 came 
into effect. Subsequently, governing bodies of universities came to be considered as 
incapable of making their universities more responsive to social, and national economic, 
needs, and to operate in the market. The issue of university governance was brought 
into the open, for discussion. These issues also affected Cambridge and Oxford. In 
November 1987, the University of Cambridge established the Wass Syndicate, chaired 
by Sir Douglas Wass, to address the complaints that 'the lack of efficient procedures for 
policy making places the university at a disadvantage' (THES, January 30, 1998, p. 7). 
In 1994, the University of Oxford set up a similar commission, chaired by Sir Peter 
North, to examine, in-depth, Oxford's governance structure and how Oxford might be 
enabled to react flexibly to changing funding arrangements. The North Report was 
finally published in 1998. 
For the public sector, the key period, according to Bargh and her colleagues, was 
between 1983 when the National Advisory Body for Public Sector Higher Education 
(NAB) was established, so heralding the advent of central planning and the end of the 
local rule, and the Education Reform Act 1988, when the polytechnics and colleges 
were granted the status of independent corporations. Inevitably, in the process of the 
disengagement from local governments, institutional governance within the public 
sector was re-opened as a problematic issue, requiring solution, and new mechanisms 
were proposed to manage the key activities. Notably, the model of governance for these 
academic institutions was modelled on the governing board of NBS Trusts, Training 
and Enterprise Councils and other quangos (Bargh et al., 1996). The governors were 
expected to become agents of a change in culture, within the newly incorporated 
institutions. 
In the 1990s, the issue of institutional governance has been raised in England, reflecting 
major concerns, in the private and public sectors alike. As Bargh et al. (1996) observe, 
there are growing concerns 'with imperfections in the regulatory framework and some 
notorious corporate failures' (p. 22) in the private sector, which resulted in the 
formation of the Cadbury Committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance. 
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Similarly, in the public sector, the Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired by 
Lord Nolan (1995), was also established. As a result of mis-governance problems in 
1994 in certain universities, such as, Huddersfield University and Portsmouth 
University, the universities generally have been 'caught up in the eddies of this 
turbulence' of the governance issue (Bargh, et al., 1996), and were involved in scrutiny 
in the Nolan second-round inquiry. The Nolan Committee has suggested that the 
university governing culture is 'inextricably bound up with wider public policy', not 
immune from the whole society changes, whether it is political, social, cultural or 
economic (Nolan, 1995b, para. 4). 
The Committee of University Chairmen (CUC) in June 1995, issued four guiding 
principles to advise the members of governing bodies of universities. Although the 
guidelines of the CUC can be accepted or ignored, even rejected, by individual 
universities, at their discretion, they reveal to some extent the expectations of the 
collective representative bodies, regarding university governance in England. The 
contents of the CUC's Guide consistently convey the message that if the governing 
bodies can function well, especially in auditing, the universities can re-acquire much 
public confidence, which will help recover lost autonomy. A more important reminder 
for universities is that, according to Bargh et al. (1996), the CUC, like the Nolan 
Committee, favours 'a system of checks and balances that relies on voluntary self-
regulation by individual institutions rather than the imposition of national external 
legislation' (p . 85). 
3.3.2.2 Changing University Governance Culture and Implication for Government-
University Relationships and University Autonomy in England 
The question is often raised and debated - should the normal pattern for university 
government be lay-dominated, or "dOlmish dominion"? According to Bargh et al. 
(1996), since the 1960s the dominance of academic guilds has been, imperceptibly at 
first, then slowly, eroded, and lay-control has been the norm for most of the time and in 
most institutions (p. 6). They claim that Halsey's argument (1992) of "donnish 
dominion" being the norm, is misleading. 
The title of Halsey's book, Decline of Donnish Dominion (1992), implies that in the past 
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donnish dominion has been thought to characterise the British university, but now this 
dominion was declining. What does 'donnish dominion' mean? It is not difficult to 
understand the meaning of 'dominion' as 'authority to rule ' . It also, incidentally, 
implies another interesting meaning, that of self-governing territories of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, for example, the Dominion of Canada (Oxford Advanced 
Leamer's Dictionary of Current English). In the dictionary, 'don' means 'senior 
resident member of university staff' (at Oxford and Cambridge). The 'donnish 
dominion' - elements of academic freedom and institutional self-government from the 
traditional academic guilds of Oxford and Cambridge, where the academics held self-
governance to be appropriate to their professional status - had been brought to other 
universities (Halsey and Trow, 1971). Moodie and Eustace (1974) and Eustace (1982), 
argue that, by 1970, with the extension of the jurisdiction of the senate, it is indisputable 
that the century had witnessed a substantial move towards internal academic self-
government in all major areas of decision-making. Even up to the 1990s, Eustace 
(1994) still believed that the academic government has become a strong governance 
culture and firm article of belief in British universities (p. 87). 
Having contradictory arguments as regards the same issue is not unusual. For example, 
while some scholars, like Griffith (1990) and Russell (1993), point out that university 
autonomy in England was eroded by the abolition of the tenure system in 1988, Tapper 
and Salter (1995) argue that the decline in the autonomy of the dons has been matched 
by 'an actual enhancement of the autonomy of the universities as institutions' (italics 
added, p. 59). Instead of seeking evidence as to argue which one was the norm, it is 
suggested that "self-government" has been widely, and still, exercised, but may not be 
exercised by academics, but by the managerial team at institutional level. The 
challenges to the previous governance culture, dominated by academics, have become 
powerful. This reality brought implications for government-university relationships and 
for the practice of university autonomy. 
The context within which English universities operate has become more demanding, in 
virtually every respect, since the 1980s. Besides the 1981 university funding cuts, of 
most importance is the publication of the Jarratt Report, which is an initial 
manifestation of universities' response to policy changes. In the post-Jarratt era, the 
language of business efficiency (Bargh et al., 1996) and new norms and values have 
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been introduced into universities (Becher and Kogan, 1992), which are more congenial 
to lay council members, and explicitly hostile to the collegial and professional values. 
It seems reasonable to expect that, when the culture of the 'donnish dominion' 
crumbled, the councils would reassert themselves. According to Bargh et al. (1996), it 
does not appear to have happened yet, or at least not on the scale anticipated. Instead, 
some power has been channelled into senior management teams headed by vice-
chancellors, whose role has been translated 'as leading scholar and primus inter pares 
into the style of chief executive' and the heads of departments have been identified as 
'holding a middle management role' (Becher and Kogan, 1992, p. 181) in the post-
Jarratt era. 
Regarding the rise of managerialism, being part of organisational . culture, academics, 
like Becher and Kogan (1992) and Bargh et al. (1996), have expressed arguments 
against the rise of managerialism since its characteristics are thought to threaten 
academic and intellectual values. Such fears and concerns have also been expressed by 
academics from the traditional collegial universities, Cambridge and Oxford. As the 
result of the 1989 Wass Syndicate Report, the vice-chancellor's office of Cambridge 
University became a full-time post of five years, with a possible extension to seven 
years. This represented a change to a long-established tradition whereby the vice-
chancellor's term of office was 2-years, the post was held by the head of a college, and 
was largely ceremonial. Since one of Oxford's strengths, the collegiate nature of the 
university, has been manifest, the North commission still unavoidably trod on the toes 
of the central university administration, by setting up a 25-member council as the main 
executive and policy-making body (THES, January 30, 1998, p. 7). 
Another change is easily overlooked. During the transition of the governance culture, 
according to Scott (1995), some power has been drained away to external agencies, 
notably the funding councils, or given that the funding council acts as a state agency, 
one may say, to the govenunent itself. Given that higher education institutions are now 
recognised as economic resources, the govenunent has taken an active and proactive 
role in the development of higher education policy, driven, now, by considerations of 
how to create national wealth. The elite values which stressed the cultivation of 
people's minds and advancement of their knowledge have been kept, but only as 
rhetoric in the various reports - the Dearing Report (1997) was one recent example. The 
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relationship between the government and the university is shifting from the fairly 
relaxed, towards the prescriptive. Facing such a demanding environment, the university 
governing bodies are reminded by government agencies not to take institutional 
viability for granted; instead, they should actively assume their responsibility for 
ensuring it. 
3.4 University Governance in Taiwan: Development and Changes 
Unlike in the English case, there are very few useful studies and papers, either in 
English or in Chinese, concerning how universities in Taiwan are organised and 
governed. The higher education system in Taiwan has been primarily and substantially 
influenced by the American model, particularly its organisational structure and 
curriculum design. However, the idea and values concerning the university governance 
are umque, since its wide context, and changes in it, have shaped the governance 
culture. 
3.4.1 Development of the University System 
There is a need for a brief overview of the history of the development of the university 
system in Taiwan. It seems clear that the system was being influenced by traditional 
Chinese higher learning and the foundation of modem universities in China. The 
history of traditional Chinese intellectual institutions went back over two millennia. 
The diversity of institutions ranged from the imperial colleges, in which the students 
prepared for their civil service examinations, to private academies, which struggled for 
intellectual freedom in certain historic periods, but were vulnerable to closure. As a 
result of a series of defeats in war at the end of the nineteenth century, the traditional 
Chinese classic curricula in higher learning were challenged, and the utilisation of 
Western knowledge, like science and technology, was promoted for inclusion in the 
curricula. The realisation of a modem university in China, in terms of academic 
freedom and university autonomy, came with the foundation of Beijing University under 
the presidential leadership of Tsai Yuan-pei (1917-1923). When the universities 
suffered much, from a series of civil and foreign wars, from the 1930s on, the university 
system lacked firm foundations on which to base and develop its idea of the university. 
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In the early years, the universities in Taiwan were primarily burdened with the mission 
'to train high-level personnel for constructing Taiwan as a base and bastion for the 
recovery of Mainland China' (Law, 1995, p. 324). Due to this special mission, two 
distinctive features were seen, in this system. First was rigid bureaucratic centralised 
government, which controlled all the direction of education development. The other 
main feature was politicisation, which marked the ruling political party's influence on 
almost all university affairs, such as administration, presidential appointment, 
curriculum design and students' extracurricular activities. 
During the 1980s, Taiwanese society was undergoing a crucial social and political 
transformation. The social movements for labour, women, education and environment, 
and so on, were emerging in the years of 1986 and 1987. A great deal of criticism was 
aimed at centralised control, and the people held frequent demonstrations and protests to 
demand more freedom and democracy. Real party politics structure started in Taiwan, 
when the opposition party, Democratic Progress Party (DPP), won an influential status 
through the election of 1986. Dramatically, the government in 1987 lifted the nearly 40-
year-old Martial Law, which had placed very rigid measures and restrictions on 
newspapers, foreign exchange and politically-sensitive issues. The trend of 
liberalisation and democratisation put pressure on the government to deregulate and 
depoliticise the higher education system. The University Act, finally, has faced its third 
revision since 1948. The newly revised University Act in 1994 and the subsequent 
Interpretation No. 380 of the Council of Grand Justice (see Appendix 1 for the case 
detail) can be seen as a chance, given to individual universities, to think about their 
governance. 
The introduction of the present university system 
The central authorities of the university system in Taiwan are very different from those 
in England. The central authorities responsible for higher education in Taiwan are more 
unified, and do not have any bodies as quangos. Most power and authority on higher 
education policy are primarily in the hands of the Ministry of Education (MOE), the top 
education authority. The organs of central government, therefore, formulate the 
framework policies, and decide what levels of resources to assign for implementing 
those policies through its bureaucracy mechanisms. 
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At the institutional level, there are two groups in tenns of their legal base and funding 
mechanisms. One is national universities and the other is private universities. The 
national universities are not legal entities and are heavily funded by the government. 
Technically, they are government agencies. By contrast, the private universities are 
self-financed independent corporations. However, due to the centralised control in the 
past, the distinction between national and private universities was blurred. 
3.4.2 University Governance in Taiwan 
3.4.2.1 Background to an Opening of University Governance as an Issue 
University governance before the mid-1980 was weakly developed. It never became a 
contested and debated issue. It never appeared as an issue during the previous two 
revisions of the University Act in 1972 and 1982. This never meant that the issue of 
governance for higher education was settled. Basically, the question of university 
governance in Taiwan had been completely overlooked. Some may argue that the issue 
had been raised, but the timing was not right and the whole environment did not support 
raising it. 
The national universities have neither governing bodies equivalent to those in English 
universities, nor independent legal status. Before 1994, they were controlled by the 
government. The university presidents were assigned by the ministry, and internal 
structures (academic and administrative) of universities were detennined by the 
government. The differences between university governance and management, 
mentioned in 3.2.1, were hardly present. As a result of the enforcement of the revision 
of the University Act in 1994, the central authority released some decision-making 
power to universities. The ambiguous status of national universities remained unresolved. 
Whether the government will tackle the problem of the ambiguous status of national 
universities by granting them a legal corporation status, has raised more serious 
concerns. The reason to raise this issue is its association with the discussion of the 
pattern of university governance, and its implication for university autonomy, in 
Taiwan, legally if not practically. 
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Daun's study (1997) provides two contrasting arguments among Taiwanese academics 
regarding granting national universities of legal corporation status. One of them is to 
argue strongly that, unless the universities are granted legal corporation status, it is 
impossible for Article 11 of the Constitution, regarding protection of academic freedom, 
to be realised. The other argument is that awareness of university autonomy should be 
raised, but that incorporating universities is not the only way to achieve it, since the 
practice of public law in Taiwan remains too problematic to resolve any conflicts, 
possibly, occurring between the university and the government. At present, pressures 
for granting legal corporation status to national universities, have grown, since national 
universities have been encouraged to generate their own income since the new funding 
scheme was implemented in 1995. It seems a matter only of time before such status is 
granted. 
Private universities in Taiwan are independent private corporations and have their own 
boards of trustees. In theory, private universities in Taiwan should have the same rights 
of any private corporation, which means that they are 'an ideal and legal person, 
intended to perpetuate the enjoyment of certain rights and privileges for the public 
benefit' and they also have 'legal existence as a person, with power to hold funds, to 
sue, and to defend' (Farrington, 1994, p. 27). However, for a long time that they had 
not been able to function as independent corporations, since the government completely 
controlled the development of the higher education system. The composition, rights 
and obligations of the boards of trustees, are strictly prescribed in the Private School 
Act. Thus, there is little room for them to choose how to govern and organise 
themselves. The size of the board of trustees has to be kept within the range from 7 to 
21. Among them, one third of trustees must have had experience in education. The 
rights of the board of trustees are to select and appoint the members of board, and to 
select, appoint or dismiss of university presidents, to examine annual reports, to raise 
funding, to review the budget, to run and manage the funds and financial audits, and the 
like. 
In the 1990s, chances arose, in the general social and political climate, for private 
universities to claim back their self-government. The revision of the University Act in 
1994, ensured that the university held the power of self-government. The private 
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universities were allowed to make final decisions on many of their own affairs, except 
certain issues which needed the MOE approval, or on which the universities chose to 
report to the MOE. 
3.4.2.2 Changing University Governance Culture and Implications for 
Government-University Relationships and University Autonomy in Taiwan 
Before university governance was raised as an issue, even though there were two 
distinctive types of universities, their culture of governance was unified because it was 
shaped by the dominant will of the central government. Thus, differences between 
national and private universities persisted in terms of their legal status, but not in 
practice. As earlier analysed, since the mid-1990s, universities in Taiwan, particularly 
for private ones, started to proclaim the right to govern themselves. The legal entity is 
starting to play an important role in forming different government-university 
relationships and university governance for national and private universities. Even 
though the government chooses, slightly, step back from direct exercise of authority 
over national universities, the latter are more vulnerable than private ones to 
government interference, since there is no proper buffer for them in situations where 
political forces encroach on university affairs. 
Central authorities are reminded to playa supervisory role concerning university affairs, 
and to consider the establishment of one independent body to be charged with resource 
allocation and quality monitoring. At the institutional level, in practice, universities 
have more say in their government after the passage of the revision of the University 
Act in 1994. According to Article One of the University Act, they are allowed to self-
govern within the legislation and regulations concerned. There are two specific features 
to be noted, in the gradual formation of governance culture, in which the mixed models 
(bureaucratic, political and collegial) become apparent at work among governance in 
both national universities and private ones, but with different impacts. One concerns 
democratic government; the other is to emphasise the importance of academic self-
government (for example, the implementation of the system of professorial rule). 
Democratic government, and an emphasis on academic self-government, can be 
observed in many ways, above all in the creation of a University Assembly, a new body 
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and the highest level of authority within the university to decide key matters, such as 
internal resource allocation, setting up institutional missions, and strategic plans. The 
members of this Assembly include the president, senior administrators, representatives 
of teachers, student union, non-academic staff, and other external members. Before 
1994, staff and students were excluded from participating in decision-making on 
university affairs. The new trend is much influenced by the democratic movement in 
the broader socio-political setting. The Assembly does not equate to, and cannot be 
expected to function as, a governing body, acting as a buffer to protect their autonomy, 
or, as 'two-way interpreters' between the university and its host society. Quite to the 
contrary, its efficiency and effectiveness are openly challenged by academics and senior 
university managers who worry that this so-called 'democratic' governance culture 
makes the university more like a political entity, with struggle for individual interests 
and power. In the past, the political model had been widely exercised through the 
government's bureaucracy mechanisms in appointing university presidents and 
curriculum control. While such central political control retreats, the political model at 
the disciplinary and institutional level is in operation, but easily disguised, in such so-
called 'democratic' governance culture. 
With regard to academic affairs, the collegial model has begun to appear with, for 
example, peer review in appointment and promotion of academic staff, selection of 
department heads, faculty deans and presidents. The representatives of academic staff 
are supposed now, to take at least one half of the seats of the Assembly. In addition, at 
least two thirds of representatives of academic staff need to be either associate 
professors or professors. The membership reflects the heavy involvement of academics 
in governing universities. On administrative affairs, there is a team of senior mangers 
who are led by the president, who is also a senior academic. Normally, the majority of 
this managing team are senior academics, too. In theory, collegial collective 
governance is assumed to be more congenial to academic values than bureaucratic 
governance model. However, the dangers caused by competing and contradictory 
interests among academics seem to become apparent, before any realisation of academic 
freedom and university autonomy through the practice of that model comes true. This 
situation merely reflects what Tapper and Palfreyman (1998) report - that the collegial 
collective governance 'can create the false impression of a collegial world in which 
social harmony reigns and individual competitiveness is conspicuous by its absence' 
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(pp. 147-8). Several university presidents in the interview of this study express their 
concern that any failure of institutional self-government can give a chance for external 
imposition to return. 
In summary, before the explicit departure point m 1994, discipline-based and 
institutional-based authority in university governance was very weak. The system-wide 
bureaucratic and political authority took entire responsibility, not only for supervision, 
but also for management of universities. Traditionally, there was no system-based 
collegial authority which could influence the central government's resource allocation 
and policy. Although the newly-made changes in the 1990s do not imply less 
intervention from the system-wide bureaucratic and political authority, there are more 
interactions between the central government and the institutional levels. Discipline-
rooted and institutional-based authority is starting to be exercised, in university 
governance. 
3.5 Similarities and Differences 
The stimuli for debating university governance as an issue are similar in England and in 
Taiwan. In both countries, apart from the systems themselves, such as, increasing size 
and complexity of higher education, the changes in the wider context have revitalised or 
initiated, debates on governance. The process in England has been a shift from the 
settled to the contested state, and towards a change in culture. In England, the collegial 
model has lost favour, and the manageriaV bureaucratic model is on the rise. The 
process in Taiwan has been a shift from the neglect of the issue, towards the contested 
state, and towards the emergence of the so-called 'democratic' but problematic 
governance culture, with more academic involvement. 
The distinction between university governance and management is much clearer in 
England than it is in Taiwan. This can be seen as one of consequences of university 
development and the degree of government involvement in the planning of the 
university systems in both countries. In England, universities existed long before 
government planning regarding the development of the university emerged. During the 
days of the UGC, the planning and development of universities was seen as an internal 
affair. The existence of an intermediate body between the government and the 
45 
university indicates, to some extent, that the central government was willing to keep 
distant from certain areas of university governance. 
By contrast, in Taiwan, the university system was developed within government 
planning, and burdened with social and economic missions. The government was 
involved in managing all areas of university affairs. A paradoxical example can be seen 
in the governance of private universities. The latter were legal corporations, but were 
heavily regulated as their national counterparts by the government. The contexts in 
Taiwan differ from those in England. The central education authority in Taiwan has 
frozen any possibility of the formation of bodies mediating between the government and 
the university. Even though intermediate bodies were established, the context they exist 
might turn them up to act as arms of government, consuming educational resources and 
adding another layers to the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
Another clear contrast between England and Taiwan is that, though the culture of 
academic self-government is strongly-rooted in England, it has just begun in Taiwan. It 
has been argued that such a governance culture is related to the development of 
universities and to their contexts. It is believed that a collegial model of governance 
was also widely exercised in the universities in the UK. Even up to the end of the 
1990s, Tapper and Palfreyman (1998) still believe that a collegial tradition continues to 
flourish within particular layers of an institution. Thus, it is difficult to understand why 
Rhoades (1992) argues that little evidence can be found in the literature of a collegial 
model of governance in operation in the post-1960s era, except in some selective US 
liberal arts colleges (p. 1379). The English universities might be the case which 
Rhoades might have forgotten. 
Bargh et at. (1996) argue that 'the pattern of university governance is shaped by the 
nature of the relationship between universities and their paymasters, generally the state' 
(p. 161). Their arguments are quite true of England, but the likely effects of that 
shaping can be either relaxed (e.g. before 1980s) or restrictive (e.g. in the 1980s and 
1990s). During the period of nearly 30 years before the 1980s, the universities in 
England were heavily financed by the government but with less control. Given a fairly 
relaxed government-university relationship, university governance largely remained as 
an internal issue. Since the 1980s, the government has taken an active role in the 
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policy-making regarding the development of higher education, though its 
implementations are carried out through the intermediate mechanisms. Given that there 
are changes in government-university relationships and challenges from wider contexts, 
members of governing bodies are reminded that institutional viability cannot any longer 
be taken for granted, and that they have to assume responsibility for making their 
institutions more responsive to social and economic needs. As Bargh et al. (1996) 
observe, governing bodies sit 'uneasily' between three constituencies - the central 
government, universities, and consumers. 
However, the arguments of Bargh et al. (1996) are less than complete in regard to 
Taiwan. Basically, it is true that the pattern of university governance is shaped by the 
government-university relationships, but the government may not necessarily be 
universities' paymaster, as shown in the case of private universities. While the 
government was dominant in defining the aims of universities, prescription 
characterised the governing culture in both national and private universities. Seemingly 
paradoxically, even though private universities have clear legal corporate status, and had 
less public funding support, they experienced a more prescriptive government-
university relationship than that for their national counterparts. For example, there were 
very rigid legislative provisions on composition and terms of reference of the board of 
trustees. In this situation, the activities of governing bodies were manifestly 
constrained. Alongside legislation, both types of universities have experienced a 
bureaucratic governance culture. Changes came with the enforcement of the revised 
University Act in 1994. The governing bodies of private universities are given greater 
latitude to run their own business. For national universities, due to their unclear legal 
status, their relationship with the government remains ambiguous, and remains an issue 
for future debate. 
Finally, if certain arguments of Becher and Kogan (1992) that functions and 
composition of university councils and governing bodies reflect various assumptions 
about the relationships between higher education and society (p. 83), are true, then the 
government-university relationship in England has reflected much more trust, than that 
in Taiwan. In England, such trust-based government-university relationships, which 
have been revealed in the giving to universities of block grants, and let alone their 
governance, have shaped the idea and the practice of university autonomy. 
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Undoubtedly, from the expenence of the English university, Lockwood (1987) 
concludes that university autonomy 'is normally used to refer to the extent of a 
university's freedom to use public resources in ways in which it thinks best'. However, 
keeping the greater demands from the wider context on university governance in mind, 
discussed in this chapter, the question whether a financial tie is the only element to 
determine the idea and practice of university autonomy in England deserves to be asked. 
Clearly, as shown in the discussion of university governance, Lockwood's conclusion 
does not fit the experience of universities in Taiwan, where a financial element may not 
be necessarily involved in government-university relationships. This does not imply 
that the issue of university autonomy in Taiwan will be simpler to explain than that in 






University autonomy has often been defined as the university's ' self-rule' (for example, 
Levy, 1980) or power to govern itself without external controls. However, if a 
definition is to match real-world situations, it must be more elaborate. This chapter 
aims to explore the concept of university autonomy, and what autonomy the universities 
in England and in Taiwan have within the boundaries, particularly within their legal 
frameworks. Two main aspects are covered in 4.2: first, the relations between 
university autonomy, academic freedom, and accountability; second, a search for 
possibilities of redefining university autonomy. In the latter aspect, the university is 
considered both conceptually, as an idea, and functionally, as an institution. Next, 
university autonomy in both countries is explored in 4.3 and 4.4, and drawing 
explorations ofthe two together, for comparison, in 4.5. 
4.2 Concepts concerning University Autonomy 
4.2.1 Relations between Academic Freedom, University Autonomy, and 
Accountability 
4.2.1.1 Definitions: Academic Freedom, University Autonomy and Accountability 
When and where was the concept of academic freedom born? Minogue (1973) and 
Russell (1993) indicate that the universities' claim to academic freedom is related to the 
universities' relations with the Medieval church. Minogue points out that the 
universities first grew in 'the soil of Christian religion' (p. 31). While the medieval 
church claiming its freedom was done with the aim of discharging its own spiritual 
functions, and of putting forward controversial or unpopular opinions, such claims were 
'treated as inseparable from its claims to jurisdiction autonomy' (Russell, 1993, p. 2). 
However, such connections with religion lost some significance as modem universities 
grow distant from, or indeed are not at all linked with, the church. More commonly, the 
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ideas of the Gennan university in the nineteenth century - freedom of teaching 
(Lehrfreiheit) and freedom of learning (Lernfreiheit), and the first constitutional 
protection of that academic freedom in 1850, are seen as essential parts of history of the 
concept of academic freedom. Thus, the concept of academic freedom has been infused 
with modem concepts, values, and meanings, and has thus kept its vitality. 
Despite world-wide recognition of the importance of the concept, what constitutes the 
essence of academic freedom has long been a matter of debate among academics. There 
is no absolute answer to this question. However, many academics offer their views. 
Andren and Johansson-Dahre (1993), for example, extract four items as constituting 
academic freedom, through summarising three significant documents, namely, the Lima 
Declaration (1988), the Magna Charta of European Universities (1988), and the Dar Es 
Salaam Declaration on Academic Freedom and Social Responsibilities (1990). The 
four items are: (1) academic freedom belongs to members of the academic community, 
that is, to researchers, teachers, students, also in some cases, to university 
administrators; (2) academic freedom can be defined as freedom of thought and 
expression; (3) a prerequisite of academic freedom is university autonomy; and (4) 
academic freedom is always linked to responsibility. Of these four points, points (1) 
and (3) still remain controversial: whether the academic community includes 
administrators and whether university autonomy is a prerequisite of academic freedom. 
However, while the issue of academic freedom involves the considerations of other 
issues, like human rights and the politics of knowledge, it is more complicated than this 
debate on what its essential constituents are. The gap between the ideal arguments of 
academic freedom and their practice in the daily academic life can be very ironic. The 
question of whether academic freedom is taken by someone as an excuse to stop others' 
(particularly those in the layers below them or different from them) practice of 
academic freedom deserves noting. There is always a possibility that academic freedom 
is misused or abused inside the academic community. 
University autonomy is seen as a necessity for universities to properly discharge 
universities' missions. One element common to most definitions of university 
autonomy, that the university governs its own affairs, without outside (inappropriate?) 
interference and external forces. However, the concept of university autonomy is more 
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complicated to define, due, as N eave (1988a) argues, to the fact that 'autonomy is 
contextually and politically defined'. Meanwhile, noting increasing external demands 
over universities, certain academics, like Jadot (1981, p. 75), Caglar (1993), and Kerr 
(1995), tend to claim that the degree of university autonomy depends, not only upon 
how much room for self-government is left to a university, but also upon how much 
ability a university has to fulfil its missions. Hence, imposing one set of criteria to 
measure university autonomy in different countries and claiming that the results are the 
reality of university autonomy, may be doubtful procedures. 
An alternative way to understand the practice of university autonomy is to identify what 
decision-making power universities have. Berdahl's distinction (1991) between 
procedural autonomy (the university'S power to determine the 'How' of academe) and 
substantive autonomy (the university'S power to determine the 'What' of academe) is 
useful in this context. He argues that if government constrains the university's power to 
determine the 'what' of academe, substantive autonomy of the university will be under 
threat, and this encroachment on substantive autonomy will more seriously damage the 
function of the university than on encroachment on procedural autonomy. 
Like Berdahl, other academics, such as Ashby (1966), Levy (1980), the Carnegie 
Survey in Higher Education (1982), Tight (1992), and McDaniel (1996), have their own 
formulations, recognising that the university affairs are multi-dimensional. (see 
Appendix 2) In the literature, four major dimensions of university affairs: academic, 
personnel (staffing), financial, and institutional governance, are identified. However, 
university autonomy on each major dimension is not a separate issue from that on the 
other dimensions, but is closely related to each of them. For example, though autonomy 
on academic matters is highly regarded as an essential part of university autonomy, its 
realisation relies on what resources universities have. Thus, both academic autonomy 
and financial autonomy can be 'the best guarantee of the intellectual freedom of 
academic staff' (Williams, 1995b). As Levy (1980) and McDaniel (1996) suggest, 
governments may attempt to control personnel selection so that they need not control 
ongoing academic, financial affairs and institutional governance. Under each 
dimension, certain fundamental areas of university affairs are developed as a basis for 
designing the research instrument ofthis study (see Appendix 3). 
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Trow (1996) defines accountability as a constraint on arbitrary power and the corruption 
of power, and a legitimate requirement of the universities to meet the obligations to 
report on their activities to the appropriate groups or authorities (p. 311). The 
'legitimacy' element in accountability gives itself a clear ground which is not to be 
confused with the term of 'control'. According to the analysis of Berdahl (1993), the 
call for greater accountability from universities in their national context, has been 
derived from three main historical events, occurring in the 19th century. First, the 
development and achievement of science and research in the German university led 
other governments to begin to see the direct link between universities, economic growth 
and military strength. Second, the passage of the Morrill Land Act in 1862 in the US 
broadened the university curriculum and made students more heterogeneous, and 
brought forth the notion of university as public service. Third, increasing sophistication 
in the art of statecraft led to widespread tightening of public practices of accountability, 
particularly those related to the expenditure of tax monies. 
In the current context of universities, not only continuity of these developments, but 
also their accentuation, can be observed. The assumption, underpinned by the idealist 
notion of the university, that 'the university should not be held accountable by anyone 
but itself' has been seriously challenged (Melody, 1997). On the contrary, it is clear that 
universities 'have increasingly been asked to justify their activities and account for their 
use of resources and their performance, not only to external financial bodies but also to 
other influential groups in society' (Sizer, 1992, p. 1306). Besides, the forms and 
process of activities of accountability have evolved towards diversity and complexity, 
ranging from internal self-regulation, performance indicators, external peer reviews of 
quality to producing certain documents, like financial statements, or codes of practice, 
and so on. Moreover, certain academics, such as Berdahl (1993, p. 170), Caglar (1993, 
p. 151) and Russell (1993, p. 36 ), suggest that the establishment of a buffer body is a 
suitable mechanism for achieving accountability, in the context of higher education. 
Regardless of how the forms and process of activities have evolved, the question of 
what extent of the accountability, particularly on teaching and research, should have, is 
left aside for most time. 
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4.2.1.2 The Relationship between University Autonomy, Academic Freedom and 
Accountability 
While some academics argue that the prerequisite of academic freedom is university 
autonomy, and that they are concomitant, some argue that they are related, but not 
necessarily concomitant. Interestingly, opposing views can also be found in the same 
book, Academic Freedom and University Autonomy, published by the CEPES in 1993. 
Some scholars, like Andren and Johansson-Dahre, argue that the prerequisite of 
academic freedom is university autonomy, or that university autonomy is a precondition 
for the exercise of academic freedom at the institutional level. But other scholars, like 
Caglar, argue that it is possible or desirable to have academic freedom without 
university autonomy, or vice versa. The latter argument is favoured among many 
scholars, including Ashby (1966), Berdahl (1990), Tight (1992), and Caston (1992). 
Some examples often used to support the latter argument include: (1) Oxford University 
in the early 19th century did not allow all of its members to practise academic freedom; 
(2) Prussian universities in Humboldt's time managed to safeguard academic freedom 
without being autonomous (Ashby, 1966, p. 290); and (3) German or Swedish 
universities are not autonomous, but offer academic freedom to their academics 
(Barnett, 1990, p. 143). 
However, a serious challenge comes from Barnett (1990), who argues that the above 
favoured argument is 'neat, but it does not work entirely' because: first, the lack of 
autonomy will show itself in some form or other; second, academic freedom requires 
academic autonomy as the two are closely interwoven in academic life; and, third, 
autonomy at any rate can be applied to an individual academic (pp. 143-4). Also, it is 
believed that, in practice, university autonomy and academic freedom enhance and 
support each other. Wasser (1990), for example, observes that the principles underlying 
the nineteenth century university in Germany, freedom of teaching and freedom of 
learning, were the consequences of significant autonomy allowed by the state. 
Besides, arguing the relationship between university autonomy and academic freedom, 
also, bears the 'context', in which the universities exist, in mind. As universities in the 
West were modelled on medieval universities, which were benefited from the church's 
claim for freedom in teaching spiritual matters and for self-government, they also, more 
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or less, inherited these two traditional values. But, when the East established its modem 
universities following the university pattern of the West, these two values seem to have 
had difficulty in being institutionalised in the Eastern context. Hayhoe (1996) found 
that this might be related to the degree of specialisation of knowledge and to the way in 
which knowledge had grown (pp. 12-3). Take the Chinese tradition as an example; it 
remained resistant to specialisation and the growth of knowledge more oriented toward 
to practice rather than to theory, right up to the 19th century. Any ideas, if different from 
the ideology of the ruling party, were likely to be interpreted, in the eyes of authoritarian 
governments, as direct threats to political and social stability. This is related to the 
Chinese tradition, in which the distinction between a theoretical critique based on 
specialist academic knowledge and directed political activism was weak and blurred 
(Hayhoe, 1996, p. 168). This is one of the rationales for most academics in Taiwan (see 
4.4.1), who tend to argue that the prerequisite of academic freedom is university 
autonomy, rather than arguing that one is possibly able to exist without the other. 
The arguments regarding relations between academic freedom and accountability 
inevitably occur when academics and governments assert what they think right. 
Academics assert the principle, among others, of free academic inquiry, seen as a 
necessity for universities and for society. Governments also have interests in higher 
education while the age-old principle of 'he who pays the piper calls the tune' is still 
effective. As Russell (1993) claims, 'any right to receive public money must carry with 
it a reciprocal duty, and where is a duty, there must be accountability for its 
performance' (p . 10). This is a good reminder from Russell 's claim (1993) that any 
serious discussion about the relations between academic freedom and accountability 
must begin from the recognition of a clash between two valid principles. 
With the advent of mass higher education systems and substantial public funds 
involved, therefore, governments, unquestionably, become more interested in knowing 
how, and how well, universities spend those funds. Gradually, governments, rather than 
academe, in practice, become the main influence on the definition of the nature and 
limits of institutional autonomy. This situation has caused more concern to many 
academics. While Berdahl (1993) suggests that autonomy and accountability are 
semantically compatible, he also observes that in practice 'usually when more 
accountability is required, less autonomy remains' (p. 165). While the university 
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community recognises that governments have the right to hold universities accountable, 
most of time the difficult question leaves open - where should the borders between 
autonomy and state intervention best be located. 
Another important point in the exploration of the relations between university autonomy 
and accountability is the theoretical one that where there is the one, autonomy, there is 
the other, accountability. For example, Russell (1993) and Caglar (1993) argue that the 
person who is to be accountable should be the one who takes the decisions. However, 
in practice, it cannot be denied that the universities in certain countries might experience 
things the other way round, that is, might not enjoy autonomy, but might have many 
accountability demands made upon them. 
Discussions of the issue of accountability and its association with freedom and 
autonomy do not suffice without mentioning the importance of university's self-scrutiny 
and self-critical capacities. Russell (1993) observes that universities' self-scrutiny is 
important for 'any claim to independence from outside scrutiny'; 'if that self-scrutiny 
should fall short, the risk that outside scrutiny might, however, unjustifiably, be 
reimposed would return' (p. 100). The same issue engages Kerr (1995), an American 
scholar. Given that several scandals occurred in the research universities in the US, 
showing that, they exist on the borders of temptation, Kerr (1995) insists that, if the 
universities' self-restraint proves inadequate, one consequence will be that 'greater 
external restraint will be imposed' (p. 51). 
4.2.2 Looking for Possibilities to Redefine University Autonomy 
4.2.2.1 Thinking of the University both as an Idea and as an Institution 
Facing increasing external demands as well as the need for internal self-critical and 
reflection, where can the justification for university autonomy be located? The answer 
is two-fold, lying in an investigation of both the university as an idea, and as an 
institution. For the former, it has been suggested that there do exist essential elements, 
and that there is the continuity in the view of what a university is, across centuries. 
While academics insist on calling for the search of the former, they tend, as Minogue 
(1973) suggests, to call for stopping 'the habit of seeing the university in functional 
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terms' (pp. 2-3), since a functional view hides the 'real' nature of universities. 
It is not difficult to collect a long list of publications on the idea, mission and function 
of a university, notably Newman's The Idea of a University (1852), Ortega y Gasset's 
The Mission of the University (1946), Jasper's The idea of the University (1946), 
Minogue's The Concept of a University (1973), and Barnett's The Idea of Higher 
Education (1990), to mention but a few. Each idea proposed has its devotees, 
supporters, and practitioners. As Kerr (1995) observes, these' competing visions of true 
purpose, each relating to a different layer of history, a different web of forces, cause 
much of the malaise in the university community today' (p. 7). However, should the 
university be, as Kerr repeats twice in his book The Uses of the University (1995), 'so 
many things to so many different people that it must, of necessity, be partially at war 
with itself'? 
Kerr's argument is quite appropriate, given the existence of debates on research, and its 
relations with teaching; on liberal versus vocational and professional education; and on 
what knowledge counts as important. The war is becoming increasingly vigorous with 
the rise of the challenges from post-modernist thinking. The consequences may not 
come to dilute or destroy, but, in tum, re-vitalise the reflexivity characteristics of the 
contemporary intellectual community. As Scott (1995) has observed, the rise of post-
modernism 'has, unintentionally, permitted the recovery of social forms of knowledge 
suppressed by the expert professionalized knowledge characteristic of modernity' (p. 
135). Indeed, the essential of higher education should be preserved and strengthened, 
but a monolithic view of them risks of closure. Thus, if essentials became kinds of 
ideology, the academic community will become their own enemy, hindering their claim 
for values of academic freedom and university autonomy. 
However, paradoxes emerge. While there are endless pursuit or proclamation, of the 
continuity of essential ideas, their fragility is seen in practice. The fragile life of the 
idea is, as Kerr observes (1995), that 'the "Modem University' was as nearly dead in 
1930 when Flexner wrote about it, as the old Oxford was, in 1852, when Newman 
idealized it' (p. 5). Also, Scott (1993) reminds that the strength of the idea, on its own, 
of the university, is easy to exaggerate, by mere incantation, and highlights a failure of 
attempts to isolate the idea of a university independently of considerations of its 
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institutional being. These prove that the views to claim that the university has survived 
over centuries by the strength of its core idea, and to despise its institutional 'ceaseless 
adaptation' in Scott's words (1993, p. 4), would be incomplete and prejudiced. Thus, 
Jaspers' belief that the secret to the university's longevity is the idea of a university 
committed to free intellectual communication, is challenged, though he had recognised 
that 'university as an institution' is the only way in which the idea might be 'incarnate' 
(Jaspers, 1965, pp. 83-88). 
Universities in the late twentieth century confront an unprecedentedly changing 
environment, and increasing external demands, which pressure them not to remain self-
indulgent about the idea, or ideal concept, but rather to explore idea of the university-
within-its-context. The idea of the university can not escape being redundant rhetoric in 
the 21 st century, unless its definition 'must be rooted in the institutional constraints that 
shape and intellectual imperatives that drive the modem university' (Scott, 1993, p. 23). 
Thus, university as institution is as important and essential as university as idea. From 
Scott's interpretation of the idea of the university, over centuries, the concept of 
university as idea and university as institution mutually enhance each other, and work 
out the continuity of the university. 
4.2.2.2 Redefinition of University Autonomy 
What relevance has thinking of the university both as an idea and as an institution, to 
the concept of university autonomy? The idea of the university, gives rise to academic 
freedom and university autonomy, irrespective of the diverse structures, missions and 
institutional types of higher education. Also, as Neave and van Vught (1994) argue, 
'the concept of autonomy is held to be quintessential to the activities of higher 
learning', irrespective of 'whether such a claim is symbolic or real, whether it is an 
expression of hope for the shape of things to come or presented as a protest against the 
present condition' (p. 7). 
However, from the point of view of the university as an institution, the issue of 
university autonomy needs to be re-examined with thought of practical institutional 
constraints, and of changing environments which are making it harder for universities to 
assert the idea. In a modem view, instead of passively waiting for attribution of an 
57 
autonomy the university is assumed to have by right, the university should go out to 
earn its autonomy. As Jadot (1981) and Clark (1998) argue, the degree of autonomy 
depends more upon the institutional ability to respond to the growing imbalance in the 
environment-university relationship, and to fulfil its missions than upon its traditional 
origins. While accepting that university autonomy is, certainly, constrained by practical 
constraints and by the university's ability to explore or exist in a new environment, this 
study suggests that there is a need to re-define university autonomy. University 
autonomy deriving its meaning from university as idea, is different from a derivation 
from university as institution. This study would term the former as 'traditional 
autonomy', and the latter as 'contractual autonomy'. 
There are two obvious main reasons for terming the former as 'traditional autonomy'. 
First, when academics explore the idea of the university, they are more likely to trace 
back the development of the university to its traditional origins. Second, a university 
which holds close to, and respects, idea, or ideal concept, of the university, arguably 
merits that autonomy which might allow it to realise the ideal. However, terming the 
latter as 'contractual autonomy' needs more explanation. 
Contracts in the context of higher education are not unfamiliar. Nowadays, the 
relationship between the university and the government, as Berdahl (1990) and Ferris 
(1992) observe, operates more on contracts than grants. Also, since the early 1980s, the 
development of contractual relationships between government and university can be 
seen as a significant development in the Western European countries. Neave and van 
Vught (1991 and 1994) employ the term of 'conditional contracts' to describe the 
government-university relationship, and propose 'conditional autonomy', which 
suggests that although the idea of autonomy permeates the inner life of academe, it is 
set within a series of contextual boundaries that vary enormously from country to 
country. However, it should be noted that contractual relationship is not a recent 
development. It has developed from the emergence of the university, since the latter has 
always had kinds of 'contracts', whether implicit or explicit, with 'its society and its 
support community in that society' (Trow, 1996, p. 310). 
Thus, 'traditional autonomy' and 'contractual autonomy' co-exist, but may manifest 
themselves to different extents and in different aspects of university life. Wheh the 
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universities have more opportunity to live up to their ideal, 'traditional autonomy' is 
enhanced. By contrast, while universities are contracted to realise 'traditional 
autonomy' in certain ways, the autonomy they enjoy is in fact 'contractual autonomy', 
reinforced by the formation of contractual relationships between them and governments, 
or other bodies in their environments. The latter process has been more common, in the 
last two decades. Undoubtedly, university status goes with autonomy. While 
'traditional autonomy' leads universities to claim what they assume is an inheritance 
from the university as idea, 'contractual autonomy' leads them to realise the practical 
limitation of 'traditional autonomy' and to earn their own autonomy in a modem sense. 
Both forms of autonomy, leave open the issue of 'the limit of the respective powers of 
the government and the university, and this limit has moved and keeps moving' 
(Cazenave, 1992, p. l371). 
The aim, here, is not to divide, arbitrarily, university autonomy into two forms. Some 
aspects of university affairs still remain in traditional form, while some aspects are 
probably moving towards contractual form. Both forms constitute university autonomy, 
as far as a given university can be said to possess it. It is absurd to argue that one form 
of autonomy will be better than the other. This debate is similar to that on centralisation 
versus decentralisation of educational administration. As F. Newman (1987) argues, a 
successful system depends on centralising (and decentralising) the right thing, rather 
than on the once-for-all choices of either centralisation or decentralisation. Moreover, 
university autonomy, of whatever form, is a matter of balance. It is also necessary to 
note that whatever the form of autonomy, its justification is its role in allowing full 
discharge of the university's mission and objectives. 
In the rest of this chapter, the relationships between university autonomy, academic 
freedom and accountability and the legal scope of university autonomy in England and 
in Taiwan, are examined, in 4.3 and 4.4, and the similarities and differences between 
them, are explored, in 4.5. 
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4.3 University Autonomy in England 
4.3.1 The Relationship between University Autonomy, Academic Freedom and 
Accountability 
Historically, as Hayhoe observes (1996), British university autonomy from the state had 
a strong tradition, but the influence of the church over matters such as curriculum, 
appointment of faculty, and recruitment of students, remained strong until the end of the 
nineteenth century. Due to the absence of the concept of the state as a distributive or 
regulative entity, at least until the First World War, and an assumption that the field of 
education is ill-served by state intervention, the British notion of university autonomy 
developed in a way distinct from that of other European countries (Neave, 1988a). It 
has two unique features; 
First, ... autonomy was individual and institutional, both of which were based on 
the individual Charter and the collegial style of self-government (Becher and 
Kogan, 1980). Second, while Charters secured in principle institutional 
autonomy, the 'zone of negotiation' between universities and government was not 
based on any detailed code of regulations. (bold added, Neave, 1988a, p. 38) 
Surprisingly now, but seen as rather normal at that time, the Robbins Committee 
believed that the danger of abusing academic freedom, was much less than the danger of 
trying to eliminate it by a general restriction of individual liberty. There has also been a 
strong belief among British academics that the affairs of the university should be in the 
hands of academics. During the days of the University Grants Committee (UGC), it 
was clear that the process of British policy-making on the university was dominated by 
a strong academic presence, for example in terms of membership of the UGC, and even 
of various research councils (Berdahl, 1990, p.l75). The opinion of the academic 
profession was relatively respected, and adopted, in the process of policy-making; and 
this has allowed the universities to hold their 'substantive autonomy', in Berdahl's 
words. Meanwhile, the block grants given on a quinquennial basis, with no post-audit 
from the Comptroller and Audit General (C&AG), provided nearly maximum 
procedural autonomy. Eustace (1994) argues that the existence of the UGC has been 
built upon belief in autonomy. At that time, the British government had a good 
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reputation, that of paying the piper but listening to the music. During the thirty years 
between 1945 and 1975, a golden age of academic freedom and university autonomy, 
underpinned by generous government funds with few demands, was created in Britain 
(Russell, 1993; Williams, 1995b). 
In the context of British universities, there has been a closer link between academic 
freedom and university autonomy, but since the 1980s, a need to distinguish one from 
the other has been emphasised. As Tapper and Salter (1995) argue, Neave's observation 
(1988a) about the closer link between institutional and individual autonomy has been 
less true now. Indeed, during the turbulent times, for the universities, of the late 1980s, 
it seemed difficult to assert both academic freedom and university autonomy at the same 
time. For example, the Croham Report in 1987 claimed that academic freedom 'is not 
threatened by the actions of a national funding body because it deals with universities as 
institutions and not with individuals within them' (para. 2.10). 
Another example can be seen in the debate over the abolition of the tenure system. The 
latter has been seen as a threat to academic freedom when there was not a system in 
which academics can 'question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas 
and controversial or unpopular opinions without placing themselves in jeopardy of 
losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions' (Academic Freedom 
amendment to Education Reform Bill, moved by Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, 19 May 
1988). However, according to Tapper and Salter (1995), the abolition of the tenure 
system has given universities greater, rather than less, institutional autonomy in the 
employment of their staff, and in related matters. Nevertheless, series of changes and 
government's taking an active role in the higher education policy in the past two 
decades, have made it harder for certain academics, for example, Griffith (1990), Millar 
(1992) and Russell (1993), not to interpret them as meaning that autonomy in British 
universities has been threatened or eroded, or even become a dead letter. 
4.3.2 The Legal Scope of University Autonomy 
No matter how autonomous the universities are, as Berdahl (1959) observes, they 'must 
operate in a legal and constitutional frame of reference without which their ordered 
existence would be impossible' (p. 109). However, it is not the aim of this study to 
explore the complete system of law governing higher education institutions. Instead, 
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the legal framework here means those on which the university was established, and by 
which the powers of the university were granted or abolished, rather than those general 
principles of law, such as on health and safety, sex and race discrimination, and the like. 
In other words, the legal scope of university autonomy is examined within the charters 
and statutes, and legislation specific to higher education institutions, such as the 
Education Reform Act 1988 (ERA), Further and Higher Education Act 1992 (FHEA) 
and Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 (THEA). 
Higher education institutions in England are diverse in historical background, and size, 
but share the following legal characteristics: legally-independent corporate institution, 
and charitable status (CUC, 1995). There are four forms of legal status of English 
universities, namely, royal charters (and! or individual Acts of Parliament), higher 
education corporation (under the Education Reform Act 1988), company limited by 
guarantee (under the Companies Acts), and charitable trust. What does a corporate 
body mean? A corporate body is a body of persons recognised by the law as having full 
legal personality distinct from its members, and a distinct legal entity which continues 
in existence as its members change from time to time, and enjoys certain rights and 
privileges, such as power to hold funds, to sue, and to defend (Farrington, 1994; Hart, 
1998). 
While a very small number of pre-1992 universities were established by a specific Act 
of Parliament, most of pre-1992 universities were established by a royal charter. What 
powers do royal charters grant to the universities? In the first part of the charter the 
powers the university shall have, are stated. After summarising powers given to several 
universities in their own charters, it is found that each university has more or less 
similar legal power, as shown in Table 4.1. 
However, there is a question which should be asked - how reliable a charter is to be as a 
guide to practice. This question also engages Moodie and Eustace (1976), who tend to 
argue that university charters are not legal fictions, when seen in relation to a 
university's true governance. They say, 
We know of no British university charter treated with neglect or contempt nor do 
we know of any that provide a completely reliable guide to practice ... Even if 
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charters are not fully reliable guides to practice, it does not follow that they have 
no importance. (Moodie and Eustace, 1976, pp. 3-4) 
Table 4.1 Summary of Powers Granted by Royal Charter to Universities 
Warwick University (as a reference) Leeds Bris- Read- Essex Buck-
U tol U ing U U ingham U 
1. to prescribe the requirements for Matriculation and the V V 
conditions of admission 
2. to grant and confer degrees, diplomas, etc. V V V V V 
3. to confer Honorary Degrees V V V V V 
4. With good cause to deprive person's degrees conferred V V V V 
by the U! to revoke any diplomas 
5. to provide such instruction as the U may think fit! for V V V V V 
research and for advancement! dissemination of knowledge 
in such manner as the U may determine 
6. to provide lectures! instruction for persons not members V V V V V 
of the U 
7. to accept exams passed and periods of study spent by V V V V V 
student at other Us or places 
8. to affiliate other institutions! departments! to recognise V V V V V 
selected members of the staff as teachers of U! to admit. .. 
9. to prescribe the disciplinary provisions to which students V V 
of the U shall be subject 
10. to co-operate by means of Joint Boards or otherwise V V V V V 
with other U for such conduct of exams as the U may 
determine 
11. to institute Professorship! Readership .. .Ito appoint V V V V V 
ipersons to and to remove them from such offices 
12. to institute and award fellowships! scholarships ... V V V V 
13. to establish! maintain! govern residence of the student V V V V V 
of the U 
14. To make provision for research! advisory services to V V V V 
enter into arrangements with such other institutions as the 
U may think desirable 
15. to demand and receive fees V V 
16. to take such steps expedient. .. for procuring V V 
contributions to the funds of the U! to raise money 
17. to act as trustee or manager of any property! legacy! V V V V 
endowment.. / to invest any funds 
18. to enter into agreement(s) with the Trustees of the V V 
University Foundation .. 
19. to enter into agreement of incorporation in the U of any V V V V V 
other institution ... 
20. subject to this Charter and the Statutes, to invest all the V V 
property! money ... and enter into engagements and to 
accept obligations and liabilities 
21. to do all such other acts and things whether incidental V V V V V 
to the powers aforesaid or not as may be requisite in order 
to further the objects of the U as a place of education! 
learning 
Source: Complied by the researcher from the charters of the UmvefSlty of WarwIck, the UmvefSlty of 
Leeds, the University of Bristol, the University of Reading, the University of Essex, and the University of 
Buckingham. 
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On the real powers granted to a university through its charter, caution is called for, at 
least regarding some aspects. First, from Table 4.1, it could be misleading to 
immediately conclude that all the powers the chartered universities have, come from the 
express powers of the charter since powers of such a university 'need not be spelled out 
in its charter or statutes' (Hart, 1998, p. 18). Second, there are some discrepancies 
among the rules and practices, since the rules in, or derived from, a charter, are not set 
in stone, but are 'open to variable interpretation, and thus amenable to development by 
processes of specification, amplification and elaboration which need not involve formal 
amendment' (Moodie and Eustace, 1976, p. 3). For example, Farrant (1987) attempted 
to investigate the extent to which the five desirable constituents of university autonomy 
- freedom to appoint; freedom to determine curricula and standards; freedom of 
admission of students; freedom to determine the balance between teaching and research; 
and freedom to determine the shape of development, identified by the Robbins Report 
(1963), existed in the late 1980s. While these five powers still remained in place at that 
time of Farrant's writing (1987), then why did he conclude in this way - 'if it were 
reconvened today, the Robbins Committee would almost certainly judge that the 
autonomy of each university on the UGC's list was both less than it had been in the 
early 1960s'? It can be argued that though the powers of the university remained intact, 
the room for the university to exercise those powers had become limited, and external 
pressures had become harder to ignore. 
Another recent example can be seen in the series of debates over the Teaching and 
Higher Education Act 1998. Section 26 of the Act gives the Secretary of State powers 
to compel higher education funding councils for England and Wales to impose 
conditions on university governing bodies as a condition of receiving grant, that is, fees 
are charged 'equal to the prescribed amount' which is that prescribed by the Secretary 
of State from time to time. Does this affect the powers of the chartered university to 
'demand and receive fees'? Farrington is not sure, but he observes that 'obviously the 
promoters of the bill intend that the charter power should be attenuated' (THES, 
January 23, 1998). This example demonstrates that the chartered universities, in theory, 
are able to exercise their granted powers to charge what they intend, but in practice, that 
power might be constrained, in a time when the universities depend upon government 
funding. 
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With regard to statutory universities, the majority of them in England, known as the 
post-1992 universities were established as higher education corporations under the 
Education Reform Act 1988. According to the provisions of the Act, they also have the 
following powers: 1) to provide higher and further education; 2) to carry out research 
and to publish the results of the research . . . in such manner as the corporation thinks fit; 
3) to supply goods and services; 4) to acquire and dispose of land and other property; 5) 
to enter into contracts; 6) to form or take part in forming a body corporate for carrying 
on any such activities; 7) to borrow such sums as the corporation may think fit; 8) to 
invest any sums; 9) to accept gifts of money, land, and other property and apply it, or 
hold and administer it on trust; and 10) to do anything incidental to the conduct of an 
educational institution providing higher or further education. (summarised from 
Sections 123 and 124 of the ERA, 1988) Compared with the past, when the 
polytechnics were under the control of LEAs, being an independent corporation has 
made them not only owner of their buildings and employers of their staff, but they also 
have more discretion over their use of funds. Subsequently, the Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992 enables them to have the power of awarding degree (Section 76), 
and acquire the title of university (Section 77). 
Is it appropriate to conclude that the universities in England enjoy autonomy to a high 
degree, from the power 'to do all such other acts ... in order to further the objects of the 
university as a place of education and learning', given to chartered universities, and 'to 
do anything incidental to the conduct of an educational institution providing higher or 
further education ' to post-1992 universities? In fact, the exercise of the powers granted 
by the charter and acts of Parliament are constrained by practical considerations. First, 
the control of granting of statutes is always asserted as the right of the government 
(Tapper and Salter, 1995). Thus, it is impossible for them to be changed without the 
consent of either the Privy Councilor Parliament, the state at large (Farrington, 1994, p. 
42). Second, as recipients of public funds, of course, the freedom universities have to 
exercise their legal autonomy is more limited than would otherwise be the case. For 
example, Section 134 (7) in the ERA and Section 68(2) in the FHEA 1992, empower 
the Secretary of State to give directions to the funding councils, even though the 
legislation prevents the Secretary of State from intervening directly in individual 
institutional affairs . 
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There are some differences in power between chartered universities and other 
institutions constituted by Act of Parliament or by registration. According to Farrington 
(1994) and Hart (1998), two differences, in theory, remain. First, chartered universities, 
generally speaking, have complete legal personality with all the powers that implies, 
and can do anything that an individual can do, but other corporate institutions can only 
do such acts as are authorised directly or indirectly by the statute creating it. Second, 
the courts do not possess power to revoke a charter by ordinary process, and the powers 
of dissolution given to the Secretary of State by Section 128 in the ERA, only extend to 
higher education corporations, not to chartered universities. However, the differences 
become blurred once one takes constraints of resources into account. As Hart (1998) 
observes, a tendency has become visible for chartered universities to see themselves as 
more circumscribed by external considerations than ever used to be the case, and to be 
less self-confident in terms of their perceived freedom to act (p. 19). While the room 
for exercising the legal powers of chartered and statutory universities is constrained by 
one condition - being a recipient of public funding, Lockwood's observation (1987) that 
university autonomy 'is normally used to refer to the extent of a university'S freedom to 
use public resources in ways in which it thinks best' (p. 154) remains true of English 
universities. 
4.4 University Autonomy in Taiwan 
4.4.1 The Relationship between University Autonomy, Academic Freedom and 
Accountability 
The concepts of academic freedom and university autonomy among Chinese scholars 
may not necessarily be different from those of western scholars. For example, in the 
early twentieth century, Chinese scholars began to claim, like their western counterparts, 
that a body supposedly a university, could be judged as truly being such, if it showed the 
traditional values of university autonomy and academic freedom. The original form of 
university in Chinese society, besides certain state forms of higher learning, comprised 
many private institutes (called Sue-yuan), in the Song dynasty, which were formed, and 
which became a place of gathering scholars, usually followed by a group of students 
devoted to the pursuit of truth and knowledge. Academic freedom was realised, albeit 
with a fragile life, earlier than the coming into being of the concept of university 
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autonomy. However, the Taiwanese perspective about the relationship between 
academic freedom and university autonomy is different from a western perspective. 
Most western scholars, such as Tight (1992) and Caston (1992), emphasise the 
distinctiveness of the concepts of academic freedom and university autonomy, seeing 
them as related but not necessarily concomitant, although Barnett (1990), additionally, 
suggests that such 'conceptually distinction' is sometimes problematic in practical life. 
While such arguments about the relation between academic freedom and university 
autonomy are acceptable, it does not mean that the existence, or validity, of other 
scholars' claim that a prerequisite of academic freedom is university autonomy should 
be rejected. In the context of higher education in Taiwan, most scholars tend to argue 
for the latter. For example, Wu (1968) argues that 'without university autonomy, 
academic freedom is vulnerable; without academic freedom, university autonomy is 
meaningless'. He believes that university autonomy can protect academic freedom. 
In recent years, many legal scholars, such as Lee (1995) and Daun (1997), tend to use 
the Constitutional principle, laws and administrative orders, to serve as a point of 
departure for discussing academic freedom and university autonomy. Although the 
Constitution of the Republic of China does not have any articles directly related to the 
protection of academic freedom and university autonomy, the interpretation of the 
Article 11 of the Constitution has been extended to academic freedom since the 
Interpretation No. 380 of the Council of Grand Justice was made. In order to protect 
individual academic freedom, university autonomy should be guaranteed on those 
matters related to research, teaching and learning (Lee, 1995, p. 271). Daun suggests 
that the purpose of university autonomy is to realise the Constitutional protection of 
academic freedom. Thus, that a prerequisite of academic freedom is university 
autonomy has become a consensus view among most academics in Taiwan. 
What background leads scholars in Taiwan to argue in this way? First, a telling point 
might be that of Hayhoe (1996), who observes that the development of university 
autonomy and academic freedom is related to the epistemological orientation and 
intellectual life of individual countries. Unlike the western context, the way of growth 
of knowledge through theoretical debates and logic testing and 'the distinctive lines 
between a theoretical critique based on specialist academic knowledge and directed 
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political activism' (Hayhoe, 1996) were absent in the Chinese context. For example, 
the ideas of Marxism and the subjects of political sciences were not allowed to discuss 
and teach on campus until the 1990s, since they were regarded by the government in 
Taiwan as direct threats to political and social stability. Thus, while western ideas 
matured, to form a system of knowledge, an epistemology which can be logically tested 
and challenged, Chinese ideas developed into a philosophy of being, which can be 
ethical, moral and political. When academics in the western university tried their best to 
fight for their ideas, academics in the 'state' university in Chinese tradition might 
confine themselves by not researching any issues which might be labelled as 
'politically-sensitive' . 
Second, during the earlier authoritarian age, political persormel were assigned on 
campus to help secure so-called 'national security'. While most university presidents 
and senior administrators were involved, whether consciously or unconsciously, in 
helping the government or the political ruling party to carry out certain political goals, 
political not academic criteria dominated universities' decision making in both teaching 
and research. Given such circumstances, it seems understandable that the scholars in 
Taiwan insist that university autonomy is a prerequisite of realisation of academic 
freedom since the 'state' was in practice penetrating all aspects of university life. 
Accountability of the universities III Taiwan also changes with changes in the 
government-university relationship (see Chapter 6). Before the 1990s, the requirements 
of accountability of the universities were very rigorous. This reality proved the 
existence of a superior-subordinate government-university relationship, and the 
weakness of the tradition of university autonomy. If Trow's argument that 
accountability IS III essence the same as, or determines, legitimacy, was taken into 
account, then the past circumstance of the Taiwanese universities would be better 
described as being controlled, than as being held' accountable'. There was no perceived 
need, even, to distinguish aspects of accountability, in terms of legality, efficiency and! 
or effectiveness. Caglar (1993) and Russell (1993) have argued that it is the one who is 
accountable is the one who is an autonomous decision-maker. The Taiwan case shows 
that this state of affairs may not pertain. Since the Interpretation No. 380 of the Council 
of Grand Justice was made in 1995, however, academics urge the government to 
conduct audits of the legality and efficiency of university operation, and to leave 
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academic matters in the hands of the university. Now, when courts deal with lawsuits 
associated with individual universities, such as cases to do with the grading of exam 
papers, they are likely to investigate whether the procedures for conducting operations 
have been appropriate, rather than seeking to investigate and judge the evaluations and 
assessments made by academics in a given case. 
In practice, due to the weakness of socio-cultural conventions supporting the practice of 
university autonomy, a culture of university autonomy in Taiwan can be seen, by certain 
evidence, to be superficial and not deeply-rooted. A number of in-depth reports have 
observed the consequences of the greater autonomy granted to universities, disclosing 
the chaotic and absurd situations occurring in university campuses, after 1994. One 
report, for example, entitled 'After the authoritarian power has gone, a power vacuum 
occurs' in the China News (April 23, 1996), revealed that 'a power vacuum' was filled 
by the 'political strategies' used by internal members of the university community. A 
university suddenly became a place to fight for individual interests rather than a place in 
which academic excellence could be pursued. The president of Academia Sinica, 
Taiwan's premier research institute, Dr. Lee Yuan-tseh, makes the criticism that certain 
universities do not deserve autonomy if they cannot restrain themselves. This situation 
made the claim that university autonomy has been argued as the protection of academic 
freedom remain as ideal. 
4.4.2 The Legal Scope of University Autonomy 
Unlike in England, there was no single statute directly to give a statement of what 
power universities have. The focus of the examination of the legal autonomy is not 
only on legislation specific to universities, such as the University Act, the Private 
School Act, the Educational Personnel Employment Act, and the Degrees Awarding 
Act, but also the administrative regulations. Thus, different illustration from Table 4.1, 
Table 4.2 identifies whether key areas of university affairs are regulated either by laws 
or by administrative regulations. If the areas are regulated by laws, it will specify to 
which party (the MOE, universities, or a mix) the power is granted. If the areas are not 
regulated by laws, it will specify which party is the one exercising that power in practice 
(see Note 1 of Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2 University Autonomy within the Legal Framework in Taiwan 
~s University Private Educational Degrees Other Actsl Act School Personnel Awarding Admin'tive (1994) Act Employment Act Regulations 
University Affairs (1997) Act (1997) (1994) 
1. Undergraduate Entry Qualifications VI 
u-
MOE1 
2. Number of Undergraduates MOE--U 
3. Selecting Postgraduate Entrants V/U-
MOE 
4. Number of Postgraduates MOE--U 
5. Setting Exams & Student Assessments U. 
6. Setting Degree Standards and Criteria V V MOE 
7. Awarding the Degree V/U. V 
8, Structure of Academic Courses V/U. 
9. Contents ofIndividual Courses U. 
10. Adding/ Discontinue Undergraduate programs U. 
11. Adding/ Discontinue Postgraduate programs U. 
12. Broad Research Priorities U. 
13. Direction of Specific Research Projects U. 
14. Ownership of Copyrights V 
15. Ownership of Other Intellectual Property Rights V 
16. Appointment of \Vice-chancellor/ Principal) V/U- V V 
P(eL;id~nt MOE 
17, Appointing Academic Staff VI U/MOE V 
18, Promotion of Academic Staff VI U/MOE 
19. Dismissal of Academic Staff V/U- V/U-
MOE MOE 
20, Appointment of Deans & Department Heads V/U. 
21. Appointment of Registrar V/U. 
22. Appointment of Personnel Director VI MOE 
23, Appointment of Finance Director VI MOE 
24, Drawing up Annual Budgets V 
25. Allocation Budgets within University V 
26. Setting Level of Undergraduate Tuition Fees V MOE-U" 
27. Setting up University Companies 3 
28. Borrowing Money from Capital Market MOE 
29. Determining Price of Commercial Teaching V/U- V 
MOE 
30. Determining Price of Research Contracts/ U. 
Projects 
31. Determining Salary Scales of Academic Staff V/MOE 
32. Determining Salary of Individual Academic Staff V/MOE 
33. Setting Annual Income Generation Targets MOE/U 
34. Defining Mission & Objectives of Institution V/U-
MOE 
35. Drawing up Strategic Development Plans U. 
36. Establishing/ Merging! Discontinuing V/U-
Departments/ Faculties/ Group Studies MOE 
37. Determining Internal Administrative Structure V 
Note: 
1. 'V': regulated by law; 'V/U': regulated by law which grants power to U; 'V/MOE': regulated by law 
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which grants the power to MOE; 'V/U--MOE': regulated by law which grants power to U, but U needs 
to report to or obtains approval from MOE; 'V/U/MOE': regulated by law which grants power to 
selected Us or to MOE; 'MOE': no legal but administrative regulations; 'MOE--U': no legal but 
administrative regulation within which U can determine that item; and 'MOEIU': national Us are 
regulated by MOE, but private Us have self-determination, 
2, Setting oflevel of postgraduate tuition fees is left to universities to determine. 
3. Although there is no legislation to prohibit universities from setting university company, universities 
are in practice not allowed to do so, but they can establish a university foundation. 
4. Compiled by the researcher. 
After the Interpretation No. 380 of the Council of the Grand Justice, one principle has 
been established. While the legislation grants powers to neither universities nor MOE, 
powers on matters related to teaching, research and learning, will be left to universities, 
regarding non-academic matters, the MOE will decide whether there is a need to issue 
administrative regulations - normally it does so. While Items 5, 9 to 13 in Table 4.2 
demonstrate the former part of the principle, Items 26, 27, and 28 illustrate the latter. 
However, the real situation is more complex than the principle. Several reasons can be 
proposed. First, exceptions can be identified. Item 6 (Setting Degree Standards and 
Criteria), for example, should be determined by the universities as the Act did not grant 
relevant power to the MOE, and it should belong within the scope of an academic 
judgement. However, the MOE issued a regulation that 'obtaining a bachelor degree 
should take at least 128 academic credits in four years'. It is obvious that universities 
are happy to follow this regulation, instead of accusing MOE of violating the principle, 
because they use it as an excuse to require the students to take at least 128 credits for 
graduation. 
Second, it is interesting to see the relationship between MOE and private universities in 
the matter of selecting and appointing presidents, and other matters not regulated by 
law. Despite constituting only one element in the degree of self-governance a system 
may enjoy, the presidential appointments, as Neave and van Vught (1994) argue, are 
usually treated with a high symbolic weight. There has been legislation - the Education 
Personnel Employment Act, explicitly defining educational qualifications needed for 
being a university president. The private universities are independent corporate bodies; 
in theory, they have legal existence as persons, with power to hold funds, to sue, and to 
defend. Paradoxically, the governing boards of such bodies are not allowed to 
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determine what candidate they need for presidents, and the selected presidents are only 
to be effective after obtaining approval of the MOE. From the summary in Table 4.2, 
legal independence of private universities does not effectively limit the regulating 
power of the MOE on them. 
Overall, universities obtain autonomy not because of legal corporate status, true only of 
the private universities, but because the MOE, the highest education authority of the 
state, tends to release certain powers it controlled before, to the universities. Daun 
(1997) observes that the scope of university autonomy is primarily dependent upon the 
will of the government (pp. 41-2). Real autonomy is granted to universities through 
three aspects: first, the change in the nature of government intervention - from heavy 
regulations towards deregulation; second, through revision of relevant Acts, and, third, 
the way of interpretation of the Constitution and Acts concerned. Lacking one of them, 
the effect of individual aspect on university autonomy can be attenuated; and, the effects 
of revision of Acts may not be profound, if the interpretation of provisions of the Acts is 
still dominated by the government. Indeed, certain articles in the Acts concerning 
universities were not modified in the revision, but, now, interpretation has been more 
beneficial to the universities. Therefore, the revision of the University Act in 1994 
grants certain powers to universities, but its effects are enhanced by the Interpretation 
No. 380 of the Council of Grand Justice in 1995. 
Another example is seen in Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of China 
which had stated that 'people have freedom in speech, instruction, writing and 
publication'. In practice, this was completely ignored, but interestingly, since the 
1990s, without any modification to the Constitution, cogent arguments have been put 
forward that this Article can be interpreted as an institutional protection of academic 
freedom. However, it remains true that, where interpretation is possible, the 
government view can still be dominant, but will confront with increasing influence and 
challenges from the side of universities. 
4.5 Similarities and Differences 
Definition of university autonomy is not straightforward. As Neave (1988a) and Tight 
(1992) argue, autonomy is contextually, socially, and politically defined, rather than 
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being determined on one set of fixed criteria. This also suggests that university 
autonomy is not something without limitation, nor something fixed; rather, it involves 
dynamic relationships between universities and the external main actors. Although 
similarities between England and Taiwan regarding university autonomy may not be 
evident at first sight, both countries share what Cazenave (1992) and Russell (1993) 
observe, that is, university autonomy can not be preserved, unless it involves self-
restraint in the government and the university. 
However, there are several interesting conceptual and practical differences regarding 
university autonomy, that merit attention. Government influence, until the beginning of 
the twentieth century, in the development of the idea of university autonomy, was absent 
in England, but it was always present in Taiwan. In other words, autonomy from the 
government was a tradition in England (Hayhoe, 1996), but government intervention 
was a tradition in Taiwan. The idea of university autonomy in England, as Tapper and 
Salter (1995) observe, was initiated from below, evolved to the idea that, once granted 
their resources the universities were responsible for spending them, then to the idea the 
universities need to make choices within boundaries prescribed by government. The 
idea of university autonomy in Taiwan was developed in a struggle with political and 
bureaucratic constraints, since the reality of the 'state' rather than the idea of university 
autonomy, was penetrating all aspects of university affairs. 
Concepts of academic freedom and university autonomy in Taiwan have been deeply 
influenced by western ideas. Many academics hold the view that if a university has no 
autonomy, it does not deserve the title of 'university'. But both sides of academics have 
different views about the relationship between academic freedom and university 
autonomy. Some English academics favour the argument that it is possible to have 
academic freedom without university autonomy, or vice versa. Also, as the Croham 
Report (1987) suggests, academic freedom in England is not threatened, since the 
actions of a national funding body deal 'with universities as institutions and not with 
individuals within them' (para. 2.10). By contrast, many scholars in Taiwan argue 
strongly that a prerequisite of academic freedom is university autonomy, or that 
university autonomy is a precondition for academic freedom. As mentioned in 4.4, free 
cultural debates over many aspects of society and politics occurred only with difficulty 
in the context of Taiwan's universities, while the distinction between a theoretical 
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critique, based on specialist academic knowledge, and directed political activism, has 
been blurred to some extent. In addition, in the past, university presidents and senior 
administrators became facilitators of government, or even the ruling political party, 
achieving certain political goals. Of course, this circumscribed academics' freedom, 
and consequently, most academics also confined themselves not to research into so-
called 'politically-sensitive' issues. All these historical events, and their implications, 
are a context for the view of academics in Taiwan, and help explain their tendency to 
argue that university autonomy is a prerequisite of academic freedom. 
While there is a gap between the legal and the effective scope of university autonomy, 
in both countries, and the relevant statutes in both countries are open to interpretation, it 
can be argued that the gap in the English case can be larger than that in Taiwan. The 
scope of legal autonomy in Taiwan has been confined as rigidly as possible by a 
complex network of legislation and regulation, as Table 4.2 suggests. In the English 
case, the powers of universities may not be necessarily listed in their charters and Acts 
of Parliament. This implies that there are two possible consequences - the exercise of 
the powers IS either greater or restricted by the context in which the statutes are 
interpreted. These two consequences have occurred in the experience of English 
universities. Before the 1980s, the scope of university autonomy rested more on 
conventions, so-called 'gentlemen's agreements' and on the notion of the 'facilitatory 
state'. These conventions, however, have been fading away with the changes since the 
1980s. Several pieces of legislation, and codes of practice from quangos, affect higher 
education. Concisely speaking, the situation for the English case shifts oven time from 
one of apparently greater autonomy than the legal instruments imply, to one in which 
autonomy appears more constrained in practice than the legal instruments imply. It can 
be seen that while the powers of university, legally, do not change much, as mentioned 
in 4.3, the latitude of the university to exercise them, has been gradually limited, by the 
fact not only that universities receive public funds, but also that the government takes an 
influential role in the development of higher education. On the former, Lockwood's 
observation (1987) that autonomy in England 'is normally used to refer to the extent of 
a university's freedom to use public resources in ways in which it thinks best' cannot be 
denied. On the latter, the question of whether it is still reasonable to assume that, when 
a university in England has the capability to reduce its dependence upon public funds, 
by generating income from other sources, it will have more room to exercise autonomy, 
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than a university which is primarily dependent upon government funds, anses. The 
empirical answers will be given in Chapter 8. 
Unlike in England, the idea of university autonomy in Taiwan has no chance of 
developing from academe ('the idea from the below' in the words of Tapper and Salter, 
(1995)). It rests on the notion of the 'interventionist state'. Rather, the scope of 
university autonomy in Taiwan tends to be defined within the legal framework, and very 
much depends upon the good will of the government. This implies that university 
autonomy in Taiwan continues to appear more constrained than the legislation 
concerned implies. For example, it would be misleading to claim that the revised Act 
gave the universities 'brand new' autonomy because, in truth, certain freedoms had been 
legally granted to universities, but due to many interfering factors, these had been no 
more than dead letters. In the 1990s, the universities have gained more autonomy, 
particularly in curriculum design and academic staff appointment, and in their own 
development, not just through revision of relevant Acts, but, more importantly, through 
a new way of interpretation of legislation, which is marked by the Interpretation No. 
380 of the Council of Grand Justice. 
The case in Taiwan has moved away from a subordination of the university to the 
government, and closer to a situation in which the government provides a legislative 
framework within which universities advance learning, education and knowledge. In 
other words, within the legislative framework, a fairly distinct, autonomous reserve is 
created, for the universities. However, the financial affairs are still subject to a lot of 
restrictions by statutes and by administrative regulations. All in all, the concept of 
university autonomy in Taiwan involves the legislative and political, apart from 
financial, elements. Given such circumstances, even though the government nowadays 
makes efforts to encourage national universities to generate their own income, the 
question on the extent of university autonomy, whether it has been extended or has not 
changed at all, calls for an empirical answer. 
In summary, the concept of university autonomy has a financial element in England, but 
in Taiwan involves a network of more complicated regulation, going beyond financial 
regulation. Thus, is it justifiable to hypothesise that there is a greater possibility, in 
England than in Taiwan, to increase universities' autonomy by generating their own 
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income? The conclusion here leads to the examination of the issue of university 
funding, which is assumed to be related to the enhancement of university autonomy. 





This chapter aims to explore university funding and to see what implication funding 
changes have, for university autonomy. In 5.2, crucial concepts concerning funding, 
which are considered to affect university autonomy, are addressed. Then, an overview 
of changes in financial data is presented, funding mechanisms are discussed, and what 
changes there have been in funding patterns, and if and how such changes affect the 
university ethos with respect to university autonomy in England and in Taiwan, are 
examined in 5.3 and 5.4. This sets up a platform for comparison of both countries, 
presented in 5.5. 
5.2 Concepts concerning Funding and Its Relationship with University Autonomy 
No matter how diverse university missions are, resources play an enabling role in 
allowing them to be realised. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue, the key to 
organisational survival is the ability to acquire and maintain resources, and no 
organisation is completely self-contained. Even though those which seem to be self-
contained, such as abbeys and temples, still need to recruit new members from the 
secular world. Such an argument is also true of universities worldwide. Since resources 
might exist in different forms, such as finance, expertise, power and authority, the key 
form of resources needed by universities from an external body is funding, which can 
provide universities with access to other resources. 
Certain notions usually employed to describe the relationship between resource-supplier 
and resource-receiver include the principal-agent problem in economic terms, and the 
adage of 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'. The norms and values of 'principal' and 
'payer' are dominant, while the value differences can exist, as between the resource-
giver and the resource-receiver. Again, one of China's adages 'Fu Chen Shi Lau Da', 
meaning 'he who pays rules', also corresponds to the dominant values of the one who 
pays CFu Chen'). Likewise, another basic economic truism, namely 'there is no such 
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thing as a free lunch' is well recognised by resource-receivers. While these notions 
above have already been widely accepted, doubts about their suitability for application 
to the relationship between funders, particularly governments, and universities, remain. 
Williams (1995a) asserts that payer-piper relationships are 'even less valid for higher 
education than they are for the skilled mechanic' (p. 175) since the expertise of the 
university professor deserves greater respect. Another situation is also likely to occur -
universities play the tune which is interpreted by governments as having been of the 
governments' own choosing, and then, the 'payer' may not need to insist on calling 
another tune. 
On the principal-agent problem in higher education, Williams (1995a) suggests that 
there are three credible claimants to legitimacy as principals in higher education, not 
merely limited to the resource-provider: 'One is the collective will of a society; the 
second is the particular wishes of individual consumers; and the third is authority given 
by knowledge and expertise' (p. 176). Williams' proposal of these three possible 
principals is useful in a review of the relationship between resource-provider and higher 
education, since the relationship is not merely a matter of money, but also involves with 
other crucial elements, such as expertise and knowledge. Clearly, whatever the payer-
piper theory, or the principal-agent problem, they still represent a simplification of the 
complex relationship between funders and higher education institutions. 
Among sources of finance, governments still playa dominant role in financing higher 
education in many countries. It is also true of the market-oriented higher education 
funding in the US, where public funding has, since 1980-1, remained at least 50% of the 
total recurrent income for public universities, and at least 19% for private ones 
(Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Thus, one of the main issues to be examined in this 
section is whether or not 'the inherent contradiction', in Scott's words (1995), should 
exist in the relationship between government funding and university autonomy. 
In addition, several financial trends have been identified, for example, a diminishing 
flow of public funding available to higher education in the form of block grants, and 
universities being encouraged to attract alternative funding streams to enhance their 
autonomy. The latter financial trend provides as evidence of a pushing of higher 
education closer to the market. However, as Slaughter and Leslie (1997) argue, 
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'substitutes often carry stipulations; they require performance of certain acts' (p. 71). 
The question of whether alternative sources of income have contributed to enhancing 
university autonomy, needs to be examined, not only theoretically, but also empirically. 
5.2.1 The Role of Government Funding 
The reasons for governments financing higher education can be looked at from 
traditional and modem perspectives. As Williams (1992a) argues, the traditional reason 
was three-fold: governments' desire for, first, influence and often control of an activity; 
second, for efficiency, and, third, for social equality (p. 136). While the education 
enterprise becomes larger than before, educational resources appear finite and limited, 
governments have become much more selective in their resource allocation criteria, and 
they start to see themselves 'buying' services from , rather than subsidising, 
universities. Universities have been encouraged to seek alternative sources of income. 
Demanding more contributions from students and their families, towards covering the 
costs of higher education, is an increasing trend. Under such circumstances, the 
financial picture is shifting from public towards private (market-driven). The modem 
argument for governments continuing financing higher education appears. On the one 
hand, as Williams (1992a) observes, governments have responsibilities to provide the 
core funds to keep higher education 'standing apart from society's changing fashions, 
and from the market' (p. 153), to foster good teaching and basic research to meet the 
claims of quality and equality and other national priorities. On the other, universities in 
approaching the twentieth-first century, have existed in an era when the growth of the 
'knowledge industry' is serving as a 'focal point for national growth', and the university 
is 'at the centre of the knowledge process', as Kerr (1995) observes. The 'beneficial 
side-effects' of universities, in the words of Minogue (1973), attract governments, 
particularly those in emerging industrialised Asian countries, to embrace them and 
invest in them. 
However, because of the role of government in many countries, remaining as a potential 
funder to higher education, government is an easy target for blame for the loss of 
university autonomy, when it changes the way by which it channels its funds to 
universities. Such blame is partly unfair to government, because no matter who the 
main funders are, the extent to which the university has autonomy over funds, is 
critically dependent upon the attitudes which the funders adopt to their use. Quite to the 
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contrary, as Slaughter and Leslie (1997) remind, the contribution to institutional 
autonomy made by government grants cannot be neglected, since the nature of 
government grants can be relatively unconditional, and their relative magnitude usually 
great, and their criticality for the institutional viability, high. 
Certain examples prove this. According to the study of Levy (1980), while the Mexican 
public universities received more than 90 percent of the total university income from the 
government, they remained highly autonomous in basic areas of decision-making. 
Thus, Levy concludes that 'the Achilles' heel' of autonomy of public universities may 
not be so vulnerable, after all, in the context of Mexico. Another example is 
universities in the UK where the dominant part of funding came from the government, 
while they enjoyed highly reputable autonomy, during the period 1945 to 1975. Clearly, 
at that time government funds were contributing, directly and indirectly, to protection of 
university autonomy from threatened action from industry. 
Funding mechanisms not only consist in allocating resources, but they also reflect the 
results of the system's historical genesis and of its evolution; in tum, they influence the 
working of a whole system (Cazenave, 1992, p. 1368), and reveal different institutional 
governance. According to Williams (1984), there are different ways in which 
universities may receive funds: while the funding is required from external political or 
bureaucratic agencies, the bureaucratic model of governance is dominant. While the 
funding is from institutional property, then collegial model of governance is 
underpinned. While the funding is required from students and other who consume the 
services, the market model of governance is evident. However, there is no real system 
of higher education which is financed as a pure bureaucratic, a pure collegial, or a pure 
market model. Nevertheless, there is a general assumption concerning the three main 
models, that is, the freedom of individual institutions is less under bureaucratic 
allocation model than other resources-allocation models (Williams, 1984, p. 88). While 
market forces have already informed the goals and aspirations of many institutions and 
faculty in the US, concerns on whether market forces can apply, and to what extent, to 
higher education still remain unsettled in many other countries. With regard to the 
objectives of higher education, some academics, like Becher and Kogan (1992), adopt 
more conservative views towards pushing higher education into the market. Indeed, as 
Williams (1992a) remarks, 'the market does work, but not perfectly' (p. 148) and it 
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requires intervention and regulation, particularly when continuity of funding is the key 
to good teaching and basic research in higher education institutions. 
Although funding methods may be named differently, there are several which are 
usually mentioned in higher education finance, for example, input-based, output-based 
budgeting, quality/ performance-based budgeting, contractual, and formula budgeting. 
Input-based budgeting means that higher education institutions receive their funds 
calculated on the basis of a funding formula that consists of the input factors, such as 
enrolment numbers, unit cost for different type of students and programmes, basic 
operation fees, and can include weightings of certain factors. Output-based budgeting 
considers factors such as numbers of students successfully recruited and completing 
courses. Not only as an input factor, student number can be used as an 'output' factor, 
for example, in the case where universities can not recruit enough students as funded, 
certain of their funds will be withheld. Normally, one common point for using student 
number as a funding factor is that, governrnents have certain controls over student 
intakes, or they will pay for a fixed number of students. Quality/ performance-based 
funding makes it explicit that a significant share of governrnent funds is allocated on the 
basis of institutional quality. 
Different formulae in use may be attributable to use of different combinations of the 
above-mentioned factors, but some differences may be attributable to historical reasons. 
Usually, the use of formula funding gives an impression that it is an effective and 
transparent way of resource allocation. However, as Williams (1992a) warns, its 
effectiveness can be reduced since increasing the complexity of formula may 'distort the 
signals that the formulae are intended to convey' (p. 129). 
Conceptually and operationally, contract funding has much in common with formula 
funding (Williams, 1992a). For example, the specifications of what the central 
authorities and the funding agencies want are indicated, and the institutions must meet 
these specifications if they are to obtain funds. However, two important differences 
between it and formula funding are, 
One is that formulae are usually applied retrospectively... whereas contract 
systems take future commitments... The other difference is that formulae are 
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normally open-ended standard price contracts... Contracting... is often a 
competitive zero sum game, because total public funding for higher education is 
determined by government before contract negotiations take place. (Williams, 
1992a, p. 129) 
Several countries, particularly, France and Australia and, to a lesser extent, the UK and 
Germany among them, have adopted contract funding as one element in financing 
higher education (for example, Williams, 1992a; Cazenave, 1992; Musselin, 1996). In 
practice, its symbolic meaning to the changing government-university relationship is 
more often mentioned than its real statistical impact. However, is Williams' observation 
(1992a) that the objective of the use of contract system in France is 'to increase 
institutional autonomy' (p. 129) closer to the reality? Musselin (1996), a French 
scholar, argues, differently, that the contract policy 'does not deal with less 
interventionism', but it has been seen as 'a new mode of intervention', introducing more 
bargaining relationships between the central administration and French universities (pp. 
11 & 15). With the context in which French higher education institutions exist in mind, 
Musselin (1996) concludes that the government-university relationships seem very 
dependent on the good will of the state, rather than implementation of any given policy. 
The use of block grants and earmarked funds is another issue to be discussed in 
examining the role of government funding. Traditionally, the block government grants 
are assumed to sustain a trusting relationship between the government and universities, 
and to underpin university autonomy. British universities, during the days of the UGC, 
were seen as the typical example of block grant funding. However, as Neave and van 
Vught (1994) remind, the block grant is 'not on its own the creator of immediate 
flexibility' (p. 290). The extent of its effect 'much depends on what proportion of the 
university budget it covers and on whether higher education institutions have the right 
to shift between different expenditure heads' (Ibid.). 
By contrast, earmarked funds, in the form of line-itemised budgeting, is also adopted in 
financing higher education. The nature of such funds conveys a lack of trust between 
the central authorities and the universities since 'the fear of corruption' is dominant in 
their relationship (Acherman and Brons, 1989). An example can be found in the 
funding of national universities in Taiwan, characterised by centralised control in recent 
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decades. However, to reconcile the interests of governments and those of academic 
community, both forms of funding, block and earmarked, are usually combined. From 
1945 onwards, the UGC, for example, adopted earmarked funds to promote the 
development of social sciences after the War (Becher and Kogan, 1992, p. 26). Thus, a 
shift in the percentages as between block grants and earmarked funds, carnes a 
symbolic indicator for observing the government-university relationships. 
5.2.2 The Role of Alternative Sources of Funding 
The contexts in which universities exist, change. In a mass system, 'everyone can 
demand some involvement or relationship' with universities, different from that in an 
elite system where 'most people most of the time did not think about what the university 
was doing' (Clark, 1998, p. 146). Besides, the conditions attached to government funds 
are increasing (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Several academics argue for enhancing or 
protecting university autonomy through diversifying university funding bases. For 
example, Archer (1984) suggests that an educational institution is vulnerable to the 
suppliers of resources, particularly for those institutions having only one dominant 
resources supplier. Also, Caglar (1993) argues that universities should diversify their 
sources of revenue, because 'the best guarantee of institutional autonomy is to have 
many sources of financing, rather than one, such as the national treasury' (p. 153). 
Higher education institutions are starting to ask whether it is time for them to earn their 
autonomy, or to recover the autonomy lost, by attracting more non-government funds. 
The sources of university income can be categorised in various ways: governmental 
versus non-governmental funds, public versus private funds, or the core funding versus 
supplementary funding. Clark (1998) categorises university funds into three main 
streams: first, the mainline funding stream is core funding from governments; second, 
the income is gained from competing for grants and contracts from other governmental 
agencies, such as research councils; and, third, income may come from diverse sources, 
such as, industry, student fees, and alumni fundraising. The importance of the third-
stream sources for a university becoming entrepreneurial, is emphasised by Clark 
(1998), who argues that such sources 'represent true financial diversification' and are 
especially valuable in providing institutions with discretionary money (p. 6). Such an 
argument indicates Clark's belief in Babbidge and Rosenzweig's maxim (1962) that 'a 
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workable twentieth century definition of institutional autonomy (is) the absence of 
dependence upon a single or narrow base of support' (cited in Clark, 1998, p. 7). 
The argument that university autonomy is enhanced through increasing second and third 
streams remains of doubtful force, however. First, no matter what the stream, the nature 
of funding, for example, the amount, conditional or discretionary, will still be 
considered in deciding either enhancing, or constraining, university autonomy. Second, 
the difference between discretionary funds and diverse funds should be noted. When 
universities are encouraged to attract alternative sources of income, Slaughter and Leslie 
(1997) remind that alternative sources of income 'often carry stipulations'. Thus, in one 
sense, diverse funding may not lead to enhanced university autonomy, while 
discretionary funds really matter in giving universities freedom. 
However, in terms of freedom of choice, universities with diverse sources of funding, as 
Williams (l992a) argues, are 'more genuinely autonomous' (p. 138), since they, 
theoretically, have a greater chance to have a choice in accepting or rejecting many 
different sources of funding than the one with one, or few sources of funding. For the 
latter, the choice does not exist. It will be imprudent to jump into a conclusion that 
there be a positive link between diverse funding and university autonomy. Instead, 
there is an important message behind the university's seeking out alternative sources of 
funding. That is because seeking alternative sources of income is not merely the 
outward behaviour of organisation, but the university needs to recast its inward 
perception of its culture and structure to meet more challenges and pressures than ever. 
In the process of diversifying funding bases, its positive effects on shaping university 
character may earn the university autonomy. 
Finally, certain points need to be noted in concluding this section. First, finance is not 
the only instrument for governments to influence and modify the behaviour of the 
university, but compared to others, such as authority and legislation, it can be more 
easily manipulated. Second, the inherent contradiction between funding and university 
autonomy not only refers to government funding, but also to other sources of income if 
they become dominant. Third, the activities of seeking alternative sources of income 
cannot be treated, though it occurs often, as a norm for all universities. In certain 
systems, universities are not allowed to generate their own income. Even they are 
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allowed to do so, another question of whether universities have discretion over the use 
of them arises. Thus, here, the final point is relative to the context by which the 
arguments regarding the relationship between funding and autonomy should take into 
account. 
5.3 Changes in University Funding in England 
The growing financial dependence of the university on government between 1945 and 
the mid-1980s, meant that funding gradually became a powerful tool available to the 
British government, for steering the systems and influencing institutional behaviour. 
F or example, the cuts in the early 1980s and a number of special initiatives which 
mitigated the worst effects of the former were, as Williams (1992a) observes, 
'forerunners of what came to be a more systematic policy of government to steer 
resources according to its own strategic priorities' (p. 9). Also, incremental government 
funding is no longer to be taken for granted as was once the case. In this section, 
relevant financial data of the past two decades, showing the changing patterns in 
England, are presented, and current funding mechanisms are introduced. The final part 
of this section discusses the impacts of the changing funding pattern on the university 
ethos, in respect of university autonomy. 
5.3.1 Overview of Financial Changes over the Past Two Decades 
As shown in Table 5.1, university recurrent income derived from exchequer block 
grants fell from 75.1 percent of the total in 1976-77 to 53.0 percent in 1988-89, and 
continued falling to 39.49 percent in 1996-97. Despite a decline in the form of block 
grants, the funding council grants still represent the largest single source of income for 
most of the universities. The figures stimulate reflection on certain issues, given debate 
on the status of British universities, as independent institutions under their Royal 
Charters or their legal instruments. Seeking alternative sources of income, and having 
closer links with industry, are reflected in Table 5.1. For example, summing up items 5, 
6, & 7, where income was merely 19.5 percent of the total university income in 1981-
82, but can see an increase to 31.8 percent in 1988-89, and 33.9 percent in 1996-97. 
There has been an increase in fees since 1990-91, and a further substantial increase after 
home and EU students have been charged with tuition fees since 1998-99, as a result of 
the Dearing Report. This also indicates an increasing influence of market forces. 
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Table 5.1 University Recurrent Income in the UK (1976-77 to 1987-88) (£ thousands) 
1976-77 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 
Total recurrent income 808790 1 563036 1 796321 1 879 197 1 982782 2 119647 2389719 2602873 2810484 
Total general income 699924 ----- 1 515904 ----- 1597319 1 667601 1 757977 1851299 1 999889 
Percent of total recurrent income 86.5 84.4 80.6 78.7 77.5 75.7 74.8 
1. Exchequer block grants 607046 978 512 1 016245 1 205446 1 225251 1 258008 1 311 991 1 367047 1482329 
Percent of total recurrent income 75.1 62.6 56.6 64.1 61.8 59.3 54.9 52.5 52.7 
2. Equipment and furniture n.a. n.a. 76578 n.a. n.a. n.a. 94586 119060 102685 
Percent of total recurrent income 4.3 4.0 4.6 3.7 
3. Fees and support grants 60463 268859 336620 247955 260575 282536 312802 339868 364446 
Percent of total recurrent income 7.5 17.2 18.7 13.2 13.1 13.3 13.1 13.1 13.0 
4. Endowments/ donations/ subventions 8315 14661 16 182 19611 22 855 22055 28237 33286 36430 
Percent of total recurrent income 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.3 
5. Other general recurrent income 24 100 54812 70279 78 480 88638 105002 104947 111 098 116684 
Percent of total recurrent income 3.0 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.5 5.0 4.4 4.3 4.2 
Total specific income 108866 ---- 280417 ---- 385463 452048 537 156 632514 707910 
I 
Percent of total recurrent income 13.5 15.6 19.4 21.3 22.5 24.3 I 25.2, 
6. Research grants and contracts 89038 201 529 222 137 259320 301 815 348990 410084 481276 529725 
Percent of total recurrent income 11.0 12.9 12.4 13.8 15.2 16.5 17.2 18.5 18.8 
7. Income for other services rendered 19828 44663 58280 68386 83648 103058 127 071 151 238 178 185 
Percent of total recurrent income 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.6 4.2 4.9 5.3 5.8 6.3 
Note: 1. 'n.a.': that year the item of equipment and furniture was calculated into non-recurrent income; '---': that year the financial data did not separate specific from general 
income. 2. Before 1994-95, the data was for all universities in the Great Britain; but since1994-95 available data was including all higher education institutions in the UK. 
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Table 5.1 (continued) University Recurrent Income in the UK (1988-89 to 1996-97) (£ thousands) 
1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 
Total recurrent income 3202450 3899550 4258421 4693218 5211 559 5676562 10038527 10 647 431 11 143 554 
Total general income 2361 366 2984215 3211 509 3556535 3886465 4183063 --- --- ---
Percent of total recurrent income 73.7 76.5 75.4 75.8 74.6 73.7 
1. Exchequer block grants 1619570 1 712 133 1514505 1490969 1 544529 1695131 4374054 4428 169 4400038 
Percent of total recurrent income 50.6 43.9 35.6 3l.8 29.6 29.9 43.57 4l.59 39.49 
2. Equipment and furniture 121413 115889 121 753 119047 131 754 156859 --- --- ---
Percent of total recurrent income 3.8 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.8 
3. Fees and support grants 398585 542 191 880 148 1 167362 1312317 1 340701 2248615 2508772 2698701 
Percent of total recurrent income 12.4 13.9 20.7 24.9 25.2 23.6 22.40 23.56 24.22 
4. Endowments/ donations/ subventions 47036 129914 155284 174972 199216 233 199 240 193 262416 269446 
Percent of total recurrent income l.5 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.1 2.4 2.46 2.41 
5. Other general recurrent income 174762 484088 539818 604184 698649 757 172 1 722544 1 906228 2 133033 
Percent of total recurrent income 5.5 12.4 12.7 12.9 13.4 13.3 17.16 17.90 19.14 
Total specific income 841 083 915335 1046912 1 136684 1 325094 1493499 --- --- ---
Percent of total recurrent income 26.3 23.5 24.6 24.2 25.4 26.3 
6. Research grants and contracts 628509 752267 862642 924 156 1 085779 1 217498 1 453 122 1 541 846 1 642336 
Percent of total recurrent income 19.6 19.3 20.3 19.7 20.8 21.4 14.48 14.48 14.74 
7. Income for other services rendered 212574 163068 184269 212528 239315 276002 --- --- ---
Percent of total recurrent income 6.6 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.9 
------------------_ . . _-
- -
Source: Compiled by the researcher from fmancial data in HESA. 
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Table 5.2 Income Structure Comparison by Institutions in England (1996-97) (£ thousands) 
Group of University Pre-1992 Universities Post-1992 Universities 
Type of Funding Pattern Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
UK England Oxford Cambridge Imperial UCL Liverpool Bath Keele Warwick LSE Green- Luton Ply- Teeside 
U3 U I College U U U U wich U U mouth U U 
Total Income 11143555 9103441 284916 282372 210012 294958 156922 69310 53137 138706 73783 99665 43473 90812 47786 
Funding council grants 4400038 3503666 82474 85002 60719 87995 60454 26915 16811 40618 17553 38428 17826 43533 21989 
Percent of total income 39.491 38.49 28.59 30.10 28.91 29.83 38.52 38.83 31.64 29.28 23.79 38.56 41.00 47.94 46.02 
Academic fees & grants 2698701 2282644 37439 39648 28781 44977 28373 13551 11721 31937 29868 24283 18390 30560 17118 
Percent of total income 24.22" 25.07 13.14 14.04 13.70 15.25 18.08 19.55 22.06 23.02 40.48 24.36 42.30 33.65 35.82 
Research grants & 1642336 1365633 107031 93603 80174 97276 33355 13329 8429 21508 9492 10826 584 4025 640 
contracts 
Percent of total income 14.74 15.00 37.57 33.15 38.18 32.98 21.26 19.23 15.86 15.51 12.86 10.86 1.34 4.43 1.34 
Other services rendered 612790 459881 7337 8756 5869 26477 9490 4967 1561 5486 1237 15707 810 2554 2521 
Percent of total income 5.50 5.05 2.58 3.10 2.79 8.98 6.05 7.17 2.94 3.96 1.8 15.76 1.86 2.81 I 5.28 , 
Other general operating 1520243 1265936 32278 24384 31183 31033 19736 8858 13844 37610 11716 8681 5791 9057 4894 
income 
Percent of total income 13.64 13.91 11.33 8.64 14.85 10.52 12.58 12.78 26.05 27.11 15.9 8.71 13.32 9.97 10.24 
I 
Endowment & interest 269446 225680 18357 30979 3286 7200 5514 1690 771 1547 3917 1740 72 1083 624! 
Percent of total income 2.42 2.48 6.44 10.97 1.56 2.44 3.51 2.44 1.45 l.l2 5.3 1.75 0.01 1.19 1.31 1 
--, - _____ J 
Note: 1. 'BOLD' figure: the dominant funding stream. 2. '1TALIC'figure: the second major funding stream. 3. Concerning the financial data for Oxford and Cambridge, the 
collegiate fees are not reflected in the Table of general income. 4. Type 5: The University of Buckingham (1 996-97-0verseas student fees: 60%; tuition fee: 20%; business 
and industry: 10%; research council: 2%; and others: 8%) Source: Compiled by the researcher Fom the financial data in the H ESA. 
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Through analysis of financial data (1996-97) of individual institutions, variations of 
funding patterns can be observed, and five types of pattern emerge (see Table 5.2). The 
universities whose research grants and contracts represent the first funding stream, and 
with a percentage of HEFCE grants lower than the average in England, are identified as 
Type 1. It includes Oxford University, Cambridge University, Imperial College of 
Science, Technology & Medicine, and University College of London. The difference 
between them is that Oxford and Cambridge have more income from endowments and 
interests than the other two institutions. The universities whose HEFCE grants 
represent the first funding stream, but whose research income maintains a significant 
portion of total income, are identified as Type 2. This includes Bath University, 
Lancaster University, Liverpool University, Keele University, Sheffield University, 
Southampton University, and Warwick University. The universities whose academic 
fees and support grants represent the first funding stream, and HEFCE grants only 
comprise a small portion, are identified as Type 3. This includes the London School of 
Economics and Political Sciences, City University, and Cranfield University. The 
university whose HEFCE grants represent their first funding stream, but with less 
significant portion from research income, are identified Type 4. The funding pattern of 
the post-1992 universities and of several pre-1992 universities (such as, University of 
Exeter and University of Hull), belongs to Type 4. Finally, the funding pattern of 
University of Buckingham as a private institute can be identified as Type 5. 
5.3.2 Current Funding Mechanism and Arrangements 
One of the significant characteristics of university funding pattern in England concerns 
establishment of intermediate funding bodies, as a buffer between government and 
university. It is necessary to give an overview of the transition of the funding bodies, 
which receive funds from the DfEE parliamentary vote, and allocate these funds to 
higher education institutions. (see Figure 5.1) 
Since 1993, the HEFCE has been in charge of allocating exchequer grants to 
universities and higher education colleges in England, and its grants remain the largest 
single source for most English universities, even though it is lessening as a percentage 
of the total recurrent university income. The HEFCE has continued, from the UGC, the 
separate calculation of funding for teaching and research, and a policy of selectivity in 
allocation of research funding. More importantly, the Council still remains to provide 
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funds in the form of block grants which higher education institutions are free to allocate 
according to their own priorities, but within HEFCE guidelines. 
UGC 1 UFC2 I Universities (1919-1989) -. (1989-1992) ~ HEFCE6 
Public AFEP(LEA)3 NAB4 PCFCS V (1993--) Sector (1965-1983) ~ (1983-9) -. (1989-1992) 
Figure 5.1 Transition of Funding Bodies in England 
1. UGC: Universities Grants Committee. 2. UFC: Universities Funding Council, replacing the UGC as a 
result of the Education Reform Act in 1988. 3. AFEP(LEA): Advanced Further Education Pool, 
allocating funds from Local Education Authorities for public sector higher education. 4. NAB: National 
Advisory Body for public sector higher education; pool funds were allocated on the advice of the NAB. 
5. PCFC: Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council, replacing the NAB as a result of the Education 
Reform Act in 1988. 6. HEFCE: Higher Education Funding Council for England, unifYing the UFC and 
PCFC as a result of the Further and Higher Education Act in 1992, which abolishes the binary system 
established in 1965. 
The funding formula for teaching considers factors such as number and types of 
students, and subject-related factors, and institution-related factors (HEFCE Guide 
98/67). On number of students, the universities have to follow the regulations, stated in 
the financial memoranda. Two terms should be noted, namely, the Contract Student 
Number (CSNs) and the Maximum Aggregate Student Number (MaSN). If the 
institutions do not satisfy each criterion, the HEFCE grants may be withheld. There 
will be no reduction in grant for those institutions which recruit award holders above 
their assigned MaSN, within 2 percent for 1999-2000, compared to 1.5 per cent for 
1995-96. Since 1995, the HEFCE have considered, but not formally incorporated, the 
results of the teaching quality assessment (TQA) into funding calculations. For those 
cost-centres, where any aspect is graded 1 or 2 will be reassessed within 12 months, and 
unless it has improved, the Council has the right to withdraw some or all of the funding 
for student places in that subject in the following years. 
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Most HEFCE research funds (97.6 percent in 1998-99) are distributed selectively to 
higher education institutions according the results of measurement of the institutional 
capacity in doing research, or in managing the research assessment exercises (RAEs). 
The funds primarily contribute to the salaries of permanent academic staff, and to 
premises, and central computing costs, while the research councils provide for direct 
project costs and contribute to indirect project costs. Although the Council provides a 
block grant for research, which the institutions can use at their discretion, the 
institutions must account for their use of research funds in annual reports to the Council. 
The HEFCE also provides some capital funding and money for new initiatives. For 
some capital projects, the Council, each year, sets up criteria, and then invites bids from 
the institutions to fund new projects to be completed over a period of two or three years. 
For specified purposes, the Council would provide 'earmarked funds' which would 
require those institutions which received such funds to assign activities spelled out by 
the HEFCE. Although the HEFCE funds still offer universities more discretion over 
internal resource allocation, the formation of the contractual relationship between the 
government, the HEFCE and universities, changing from an implicit (a system of 
grants; secretive funding allocation criteria in the days of the UGC) towards an explicit 
(a system of contract; and performance-based formula funding, and the right to 
withdraw funding) basis, cannot be neglected. 
Apart from the HEFCE and research councils, higher education institutions receive 
research funds from other government agencies, industry and charities, and other funds 
from private sources. With regard to the latter, English universities have participated in 
the competition in the market. Although different routes of private funding come into 
universities, main sources include student fees, sales of research, consultancy, and 
teaching services, ownership of income earning assets, endowments and donations, and 
letting universities' facilities and building. In total, such funds, as shown in Tables 5.1 
and 5.2, have increased, and even reached considerable levels in certain universities, 
like the University of Keele and the University of Warwick. 
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5.3.3 The Impact of Funding Patterns on the University Ethos, in Respect of 
University Autonomy 
One important justification for accepting and depending upon government annual grants 
appeared in the UGC memorandum in 1944. The UGC claimed that 'the acceptance of 
Exchequer money through the UGC tends to be less injurious to academic independence 
than reliance on municipal contributions and private benefactions' (cited in Shinn, 1986, 
p. 277). Since the block form of government annual grants was recognised, as an 
income, not so different from an endowment (Eustace, 1982, p. 284; Williams, 1984, p. 
93), it was possible for British universities during the period 1945 to the late 1970s to 
escape the inherent contradiction between accepting government funds and maintaining 
their autonomy. The UGC block grants modified the payer-piper principle into 'he who 
pays the piper listens to the music' and the principal-agent problem into 'the principal 
does not specify in detail what the agent is to do' (Williams, 1995a). 
However, many scholars, like Shattock and Berdahl (1984), Becher and Kogan (1992), 
and Scott (1995), have observed that the UGC was gradually transformed from being a 
buffer body into a planning and executive agency. The difference is that the former is 
'designed to insulate the autonomous domain of the universities from direct and detailed 
intervention by Whitehall', but the latter is 'responsible to ministers for planning 
university development' (Scott, 1995, pp. 15-6). Such changes have been embodied, 
first, in changes in UGC funding allocation strategies, and, then, in its successive 
bodies. By the end of the 1980s, a system of grants, previously assumed in the 
operation of the UGC, had been replaced by a system of contract, leading to 'greater 
precision in the specification of what is expected of institutions in return for public 
funding' (DES, 1987b; cited in Becher and Kogan, 1992, p. 64). More explicitly, the 
funding allocations were 'to be backed by financial memoranda which had the effect if 
not the precise legal status of contracts' (Williams, 1992a, pp. 10-2). The shift, from the 
grant letters to the financial memorandum which required the signature of each 
institutional chief executive, also conveys a certain symbolic meaning for the changing 
government-university relationship. 
Unlike the Scottish and Welsh councils which were newly created, the HEFCE was heir 
to several different traditions, as Scott (1995, p. 27) observes: an elite tradition inherited 
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from the UGC and the UFC; the mass tradition inherited from the local education 
authorities, the NAB and the PCFC; finally, a regulatory tradition, inherited from the 
role once played by the Council of National Academic Awards (CNAA) and Her 
Majesty 's Inspectorate (HMI) in the non-university sector. The HEFCE adopted mixed 
methodologies for allocation: in terms of funding for teaching, its allocation is based on 
the PCFC practice, broadly egalitarian, while funding for research is inherited from the 
UGC selective research assessment exercise. Despite its status as a quango, the job of 
the HEFCE tends ' to implement the government's predetermined objectives' (Scott, 
1995) and to align itself with the government 's agendas, rather than standing with 
higher education institutions. On the surface, funding and planning go hand in hand. 
However, while the HEFCE has to plan according to government's, rather than their 
own, agendas, Scott (1995) suspects that the HEFCE is a "funding" rather than a 
"planning" body. More subtle, this shift, probably did not lead to an increase in 
institutional autonomy, because the control system still remains the same, just being 
repositioned, and the 'gap' created by the HEFCE retreat from planning, has inevitably 
been filled by the government, rather than by institutions (Scott, 1995, pp. 29-30). 
Clearly, there exists a contradiction between the VIews of academics and those of 
government concerning the function of the HEFCE. Government documents and 
reports seem not to acknowledge any change in the function of the HEFCE, as 
acknowledged in academics' criticisms concerning the funding body acting as an 
government agency rather than a buffer body since the 1980s. For example, the Dearing 
Report in 1997, regards the practice of the intermediate funding body as a 'buffer' 
(para. 22.10 & 22.11). Again, the newly-published quinquennial government review of 
the HEFCE, in March 1999, still assumes that the HEFCE still retains its traditions, 
namely, as a 'buffer' operating at arm's length from the government. Despite the 
difference between academics' views and government reports, and the fact that the 
HEFCE is acting more in line with the government policies, another feature cannot be 
overlooked in maintaining institutional autonomy, that is, the government has no power 
to attach any conditions to funds received by individual institutions. To some extent, 
this feature still avoids political involvement directly into the affairs of individual higher 
education institutions, though the HEFCE can set out the terms and conditions in 
financial memorandum to individual higher education institutions. 
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As argued in the introduction of this chapter, for English authorities and universities, 
there will remain an issue, that of balance between funding and autonomy, so long as 
finance remains a powerful tool in conditioning the behaviour of the university. Table 
5.3 shows that different routes English universities receive funds can be used to predict 
form of organisational behaviours. Meanwhile, it also clarifies that it is a 
misunderstanding to claim, as in the study of Goedegeburre et al. (1994, p. 335), that 
the block grant in the UK has been 'replaced' with a system based on buying and selling 
of education services, whereas higher education systems in several European countries 
have moved away from earmarked funding to the allocation of block grants . The 
ultimate form of block grants in England remains in place, but the process of calculation 
bases on an idea of buying and selling education service. Basically, institutions are 'free 
to distribute internally at their own discretion', as long as HEFCE grants are used to 
support teaching, research and related activities (HEFCE Guide, 98/67). 
Table 5.3 Income Sources and Prediction of Organisational Behaviours 
Sources of finance % of Total Funding Methods Form of University 
university income Behaviour Predicted 
(1996-97) 
HEFCE Grants! 38.49 Formula-based for teaching bureaucratic 
Quality-based for research +collegial 
Given in the form of block 
grants 
Academic fees & 25.07 Fees and grants from G bureaucratic (who 
support grants decide Home student 
tuition fee level) 
S ales of academic service Market 
Research grants and 15.00 research councils bureaucratic 
contracts contracting market 
Other services 18.96 S ales of academic service market 
income 
Endowment & 2.48 independent property income collegial 
Interest receivable 
Note: 1. They are not stnctly 'grants' smce 1988, but, m the HEFCE documents and publicatIOns of the 
Higher Education Statistics Agency (HE SA), the term 'HEFCE grants' is still used. 
Source: combined Table 5.2 with the revision of Williams (1984) 'relationships between fmancing 
universities and their organisational behaviour ' by the researcher. 
94 
Accompanied with the collegial behaviour is the increase in the impact of bureaucratic 
and market forces in university organisational behaviours. Thus, as Williams (1992a) 
concludes, 'the real challenge, for higher education institutions as well as national 
funding bodies in Britain, will be to retain the best features of the collegial and the 
bureaucratic models while responding positively to market opportunities' (p. 141). 
In respect of this aspect of the changing funding pattern, there exists a question, of 
whether or not a culture of compliance has been formed, through linking performance 
with funding, in the government-university relationship. Scott (1997) suggests that the 
proposals in the Dearing Report 'contribute to the development of a compliance 
culture'. On reviewing the Report, it is found that a compliance culture can be observed 
in Recommendations 2, 24, 59 and 72, in which the Dearing Committee particularly 
recommended that the government and the funding body consider linking funding to the 
degree of institutional compliance with all codes of practices from the QAA, or the 
funding bodies. 
Finally, recent developments suggest that government intervention probably extends to 
those activities, which may not be linked with government funding. In the past, the 
funding bodies set requirements, and the latter were basically confined to those 
activities which were financed by the government. Thus, those elite universities whose 
government funding portion represented less than one third of their income, they still 
had great discretion over their own affairs. However, the Dearing Committee 
recommended that the QAA create a UK-wide pool of academic staff recognised by the 
QAA, from which institutions would have to select external examiners (Recom. 25). 
Also, the institutions should have their staff training programmes accredited, and should 
only appoint new staff who are the members of the Institute for Learning and Teaching 
(ILT), in fact recently established. In a sense, these developments which will limit 
insti tutions' freedom to select their external examiners, and appoint staff, cause 
academics and universities more concern. 
5.4 Changing Patterns of University Funding in Taiwan 
5.4.1 Overview of Funding Changes over Recent Years 
Due to an incomplete coverage of available financial data, it IS difficult to reVIew 
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financing of both national and private universities over the past two decades. On the 
other hand, for national universities, there is no need to see their unitary financial 
pattern before 1995, when they were completely financed by the government. Since 
1995, the funding pattern for national universities, has begun to change, from being 
"completely" financed to being "primarily" financed by the government, and 
responsible for generating some proportion of their recurrent income. Many Taiwanese 
scholars might agree with the claim that various funding patterns are starting to become 
apparent, along with a growing differentiation in the ways institutions generate income. 
Table 5.4 shows that there is one single, dominant funding stream, representing over 50 
or 60 percent of the total recurrent income, in either national or private universities. 
However, the source of income differs. The greatest single source for most private 
universities is tuition fees, but for national universities it is the MOE funding. Another 
difference is the percentage of income from research grants and contracts. Although it 
is slightly increasing, in private universities, it reflects their disadvantaged position, in 
competing research funds, with their national counterparts. The figures in Table 5.4 
reflect the fact that the MOE financial support to private universities may no longer 
increase to any significant extent, even though the MOE has promised to give them 
more financial support. 
Table 5.4 Funding Patterns in Private and National Universities over Recent Years 
in Taiwan 
~ Private Universities National Universities 
Sources Tuition Research Others MOE MOE Tuition Research Others 
I~ fees (%)1 grant & (%) funds funds fees (%) grant & (%) contract (%) (%) contract 
Year (%) (%) 
1992-93 65.05 0.00 19.63 15.32 100% of university expenditures were 
1993-94 61.42 5.53 21.89 11.16 paid for by the government, but all 
1994-95 61.73 5.28 19.34 13.65 university revenue had to be returned 
1995-96 60.34 5.50 19.88 14.27 to the Treasury. 
1996-97 57.64 5.18 24.03 13.14 66.46 10.76 18.12 4.65 
1997-98 53.08 5.07 27.44 14.41 65.31 12.16 16.81 5.71 
1998-99 -- -- -- -- 62.81 12.95 17.36 6.88 
Note: 1. % of the total recurrent income of universities 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the arumal financial statistics of university, produced by the 
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Accounting Department, MOE. 
There are several points to be noted, regarding variation in income structure between 
institutions, particularly between private ones, as shown in Table 5.5. First, the 
percentage of income from research grants and contracts differs. For example, it 
represents over one-fifth of the total recurrent income in National Taiwan University 
and National Normal University, but it is an insignificant figure in National Chengchi 
University, and in other private universities. Second, a differentiated pattern emerges: 
some of new private universities do not follow the pattern of the private universities' 
heavy dependence on tuition fees. Chang Ging University and Nan-Hua Institute of 
Management, for example, have a distinctive pattern, which reflects the ideas which 
underpin their management principles. Both universities were founded with strong 
financial commitments from their founders . However, the former has aimed at 
becoming a research university, while the latter set its goal as ' education' of, and 
benefiting, the public, and society generally, with a no-tuition fees policy. 
Table 5.5 Income Structure Comparison by Institutions in Taiwan (1997-98) 
~e Other funds (sale of Research grant services/ endowments/ 
Universities MOE funds Tuition fees & contracts in terests, etc.) 
National Universities 
1. National Taiwan U. 63.88 8.07 24.01 4.03 
2. National Chengchi U. 78.00 12.23 3.59 6.17 
3. National Normal U. 55.94 14.27 23.80 5.99 
4. National Kaohsiung 71.52 14.43 2.71 11.33 
Normal U. 
5. National Taipei 86.10 11.06 1.48 1.37 
Technology U. 
Private Universities 
6. Ming-Chuan U. 16.54 77.62 2.37 3.47 
7. Tamkang U 14.41 71.77 6.08 7.74 
8. Fu Jen Catholic U. 12.25 62.81 3.76 21.18 
9. Taipei Medical College 23.77 56.30 8.47 11.46 
10. Tatung Institute of 29.15 44.12 l.76 24.97 
Technology 
11. Chang GinK U. 5.12 5.82 2.27 86.79 
12. Nan-Hua Institute of 1.01 0.00 1.29 97.29 
Management 
Source: Complied by the researcher from the annual finanCIal statistics of university, produced by the 
Accounting Department, MOE. 
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5.4.2 Current Funding Mechanisms and Arrangements 
5.4.2.1 Funding Mechanisms for National Universities 
National universities in Taiwan have very close links with central government, 
particularly the MOE. Their staff are government employees and the financial matters 
are closely regulated by legal and administrative regulation. National universities have 
to follow the budgeting procedures, based on the system of the Official Government 
Budgeting (OGB), in drawing up their budgets, and individual university annual 
budgets have to be approved by Parliamentary vote. Before the end of October within a 
fiscal year, the Executive Yuan sets the governmental policy guide for the following 
year. This guide represents the highest authority in directing the budget preparation and 
its priorities, and budget instructions are distributed to each spending unit. The detailed 
instructions for the submission of requests, issued to all central agencies, are set up by 
the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics. National universities 
prepare their annual budget estimates based on the guidelines set by the MOE according 
to the above mentioned guidelines. The funding formulae have several main 
components: personnel salary (according to national salary scale) and expenses; a 
designated basic fund plus the formula which take account of certain factors, such as, 
type of subjects, programmes and students, newly-established departments, and 
maintenance fees, according to the size of campus. Once the drawing-up of the annual 
budget estimate is done, the cumbersome administrative and legal procedures has just 
started. Many rounds of revisions and re-submissions are inevitable. 
It is, in effect, a line-by-line itemised budgeting. Such budgeting does not gIVe 
individual universities much discretion over internal resource allocation. Under the 
OGB, national universities had little or no incentive to attract alternative sources of 
income, because all revenues attracted had to be returned to the Treasury, including 
tuition and fees, gifts and donations, income from sale of services. Due to the 
prohibition of carry-over of the surplus to the next year, it was a common phenomenon 
that before the end of the fiscal year, for example, universities tried hard to 'digest' the 
assigned budget; otherwise, they had to submit a written report, and might receive 
reduced funds in the next fiscal year. National universities used to spend all funds given 
by the government rather than managing them with economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness. The way in which national universities used public resources has been 
98 
long criticised. 
Under such criticisms, and constrained availability of government funds to higher 
education, a new funding scheme for national universities, called the University 
Development Foundation Fund (UDFF), was introduced in 1995, and was optional until 
1998. Under the UDFF, the national universities can keep all their revenue, but they 
must raise funds from elsewhere for 20 percent of the total recurrent university budget. 
It also means that the remaining 80 percent of the recurrent income still comes from the 
government. However, if universities cannot achieve this target, they must eliminate 
their expenditures in certain areas which are selected by them. This is a new way to 
stimulate universities to start to manage their resources efficiently. 
However, problems occurred. Universities' discretion over use of income earned by 
them is limited by a complex network of legal and administrative regulations, for 
example, they are neither allowed to employ extra staff, nor allowed to invest money in 
the market. On the other hand, universities fear that they might gain a 'punitive' result, 
that is, their achievements might lose them their share of the government financial 
commitment for the next year. Although the MOE promised to remove such 
disincentives m order to enhance national universities' motivation for income 
generation, other government agencies concerned appear to have continued to act in 
accordance with their stereotyped view of national universities, according to which the 
latter waste public resources in many ways. 
Annual capital budget requirements for each institution are also independent of the 
relevant formula, because the MOE will consider the institutional development plans 
against actual needs. Institutions receive different amounts of capital funding primarily 
as a result of their size and academic orientation, or, the government policy priorities on 
newly-established university, particularly the scientific and technological institutions. 
Besides, it is an acknowledged fact that the political power wielded by an institution's 
president has influence on the capital amount institutions may receive. 
Regarding research funding allocation, the National Science Council is similar in 
function to the research councils in the UK. It is the main government agency to 
allocate research funding. In essence, the Council allocates research funds according to 
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individual academics' proposals which must be sent through their universities . Several 
committees of professionals in the Council make the decisions. When the academics 
make their proposals, they have to follow written rules concerning pricing of projects, 
and, to increase the possibility of obtaining funds, they also have regard to the research 
which the Council is looking to fund . After approval, five percent of research funds of 
individual projects will go to the universities for administration costs. National 
universities also work with other government offices, and industry, to obtain research 
funds . 
5.4.2.2 Funding Mechanisms for Private University 
Before the mid-1980s, private universities were expected to be completely responsible 
for their costs, but they were required to charge the standard level of tuition fee, rigidly 
set up by the MOE. Many legal and administrative regulations were in place to 
determine the way in which they used their own resources, in order to avoid the risk of 
financial collapse and consequent closure. The tight control did not give them a chance 
to make the most use of their resources, for example, reserves were only allowed to be 
saved on deposit, in the bank, but not allowed to be invested in the money market. 
Thus, private universities, which did not enjoy public resources, were subject to an even 
more rigid control than their national counterparts. If applying the adage of 'he who 
pays the piper calls the tune' to describe the relationship between the government and 
private universities, the phrase will become very paradoxical - 'he who doesn't pay the 
piper still calls the tune'. 
With regard to strategy of resource management, what the private universities do may 
not be different from enterprise corporations. The concept of cost-benefit is 
emphasised. Securing sufficient funding to cover their substantial costs is still a 
challenging task. They make efforts actively to seek out income sources, through their 
marketing and public relation activities. Attracting prospective school leavers and 
mature students is an example. This tends to be challenging, but vital, since fee income 
represents the single dominant funding stream for most private universities. In the past 
decades, given the pecking order between institutions, it was hard for private 
universities to recruit enough student numbers, approved by the MOE, let alone recruit 
the top-graded school leavers. Through recent efforts in marketing and improving their 
images, the situation is changing. Competition for students between private and 
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national universities is beginning to appear, whereas, in the past, national universities 
never thought too much about how to attract students. Several private universities 
established after the open policy of the government in 1987, have shown potential to 
compete with other national universities in terms of attracting high profile academic 
staff, and research funds. 
The gap in unit cost for a student between national and private university has been 
considerable. Though the government has tackled this problem by offering private 
universities subsidies for upgrading facilities and improving their teaching profile (more 
full-time academic staff with a PhD degree), the gap is still evident. For example, while 
a private university student paid more than twice as much in tuition fees as a national 
university student, he or she enjoyed only half the level of resources. The average 
expenditure per student in higher education was, in 1996-7, over £4,000, that for a 
public university student was over £6,000, but that for a private university student was 
£2,611. The staff-student ratio in private universities was 20.70 whereas that in the 
national universities was 11.83. 
To obtain government funds, private universities are required to submit their academic 
and management plans, and mid-term and long-term development plans, to the MOE. 
The latter allocates the funds on the basis of a formula considering the following 
indicators: teaching, research, management, the degree of the execution of the mid-term 
plan and how effectively they use previous-year government grants. In effect, the MOE 
subsidies are deficiency grants by which the central government makes good the 
deficiency between what is believed to be needed to provide satisfactory education in 
private universities, and what is considered reasonable to expect them to raise from their 
own resources. Thus, private universities which receive the government grants have to 
assign a portion of their own resources equal to the level of 20 percent of the total 
government funds aside for improving quality of universities' education and services. 
However, Liu (1995) argues that the subsidies from the MOE merely create a way for 
government intervention into the affairs of private universities, but the existing 
problems, more related to heavy regulations in limiting how private universities use 
their own resources, remain unsolved. 
Although the allocation of research is made by several committees of experts from 
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different fields in the National Science Council, most projects which have been 
approved by the Council are applications from national universities. The reasons for 
difficulty of access to public research funds, by private universities, are many-fold. 
First, 'historically' the committee members were staff from the national universities; 
thus, they were both player and referee. Second, private universities had more 
undergraduate programmes than postgraduate ones. Thus, the teaching element loading 
for the private universities was higher than for their national counterparts; and the time 
for staff doing research was limited. Nevertheless, with the growth of new views 
towards research, realising its contribution to upgrading an institution's image, the 
founders and the boards of trustees of private universities are willing to provide more 
resources to encourage their staff to compete for funds, not only from the Council, but 
also from other government agencies, and from industry. The environment for research 
in private universities is improving. Private universities have started, though only two 
or three to date, to pave the way to developing themselves into research universities. 
5.4.3 Funding Patterns Changing the University Ethos, in Respect of University 
Autonomy 
University governance culture in Taiwan, mentioned in Chapter 3, is shifting from the 
bureaucratic and political model to a mix of collegial (academics have more say, not 
only in academic, but also in non-academic institutional matters), bureaucratic, and 
political ones. The change in the funding mechanism for the national universities 
represents an organisational cultural shift, with which universities and their academics 
are having difficulties in coming to terms. In the past, the national universities could 
lay blame on the MOE for being overly in control, giving universities little autonomy. 
However, universities used to ignore their financial over-dependence upon government. 
Under the new funding scheme (UDFF) which requires national universities to generate 
from elsewhere for 20 percent of their total recurrent income, financial management, 
suddenly and the first time, becomes a task for the national universities to learn from 
corporate business as their private counterparts do. While national universities assume 
it as the way to realise academic autonomy, granted by the revised University Act in 
1994, the implications of the UDFF scheme for financial autonomy can be significant, 
in theory, if not in practice. 
Overall, university autonomy for national universities might suffer within the 
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bureaucratic resource-allocation control model, but it must be said, in the interests of 
balance, that government funding which contributed to the development and expansion, 
still plays a core role, in helping national universities to move forward to earn 
alternative sources of income. Seeking alternative sources of income stimulates an 
increase in the influence of market forces in financing higher education which may 
revive the moribund operation of national universities because competition for attracting 
students, raising funds, and research funds with private universities is vigorous. 
However, it is clear that there is a long way for national universities to go, before they 
might be described as market-led, because the interventionist government policy (over-
protection) still dominates in financing national universities. 
Paradoxically, private universities in Taiwan have often been caught up in the dilemma. 
Their finance has been market-led, being dependent heavily on student tuition fees and 
sales of services. The government tries to control the price universities can place on 
their services, and the amount and variety of services they can sell. Private universities 
are encouraged to operate in the market, but they are not given substantial freedom to 
make their own choices. Now the competition for resources has become severe after 
national universities engaging energetically in fund raising since 1995. The only chance 
for private universities to compete with national universities, in terms of resources, is 
establishment of sources having the continuity of financial commitment, similar to that 
of the government financial contribution to national universities. Such financial 
commitment is more likely to come from their founders than other parties. On the other 
hand, academic achievements of private universities have changed their public image, 
which gradually generates more resources for them. In recent years, several successful 
cases show that private universities may not be doomed to be down the end of the 
university league table, and this achievement is a real investment to their future . 
Finally, though national universities can generate and keep their alternative sources of 
income, they have begun to experience difficulties similar to those that private 
universities have encountered, since their discretion over their 'earned' income is 
limited by the existence of heavy legislation and regulations. The call for revision of 
the legal and administrative structures is clear, but it is a time-consuming task, and also 
involves the good will of the central government agencies. The question of whether 
there are opportunities for universities to enhance their potential and capabilities in a 
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way which can result in more autonomy for them, would merit addressing. 
5.5 Similarities and Differences 
Comparing Table 5.5 with Table 5.2, the financial picture among English universities is 
more diverse than that in Taiwan. For example, in Taiwan, the MOE funding remains 
the dominant funding-stream in 28 national universities, and income from tuition fees 
represents the most important single funding-stream in most private universities. By 
contrast, for the universities in England, either HEFCE grants, academic fees and 
support grants, or research grants and contracts, may variously be the dominant 
funding-stream in different universities. Interestingly, funding pictures in both countries 
can be shown on the following continuum. 
England ...... ...... ... . . .. . .. Type 4 ...... . Type 2 . . ... Type 1 ....... Type 3 .. .. .... Type 5 
Taiwan ... . National .. ... .. ...... .. ... .... ... .. .. ... ... . ... .. ........ .. Most Private ..... Few Private 
Uni. Uni. Uni. 
100%govemment funded . ... ......... . . ... .. ... ......... . ................... . ....... . .... ... .... . 100% private funded 
Figure 5.2 Continuum between Universities' Being Government-Financed and 
Private-Financed 
There are several differences in funding mechanisms between the two countries. One 
big difference is the existence of an intermediate funding body. The establishment of an 
intermediate funding body, in England, has been claimed as a sign of a trusting 
relationship between government and universities (Eustace, 1994). Most of the HEFCE 
grants are given to universities in the form of block grants. Although the government 
can attach specific conditions to the funding for the HEFCE, the government cannot 
attach conditions to any funding allocated to individual institutions. By contrast, 
political involvement in deciding the annual budget of individual national universities in 
Taiwan, is common, because every line of budget must be approved by the vote of 
members of parliament. To moderate this political and bureaucratic involvement, the 
former Education Minister, in post from 1991-1994, approved a study on the feasibility 
of creating an intermediary funding body in Taiwan. However, the study was never 
published and no action has been taken. Academics in Taiwan might find it a comfort, 
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to suspect that the existing system environment might tum such an intermediary body 
into another bureaucratic layer, rather than acting as a buffer. 
Second, governments in the two countries use different ways to express their contracts 
with their universities. The financial memorandum is adopted in England. The 
existence of the financial memorandum as a contract, and the universities need to be 
clear about what educational provisions they need to make, in return for the council 
funds . While the universities use the funds from the council, they need to comply with, 
not only the 1992 Act and the financial memorandum, but also with 'any other 
conditions that the council may from time to time prescribe' (HEFCE Circular, 15/97) . 
The government-university financial relationship in England is gradually becoming 
formal and explicit, and such a development is starting to cause more concern for those 
whose council funds contribute merely one-third of their total recurrent income. By 
contrast, universities in Taiwan, have experienced an explicit and formal govemment-
university relationship since a higher education system emerged there. Financially, line-
by-line budgeting itself is a contract, in which the university must fulfil all the functions 
attached to the assigned funds. Besides, when the universities use their 'earned' 
income, they need to follow legislative provisions and regulations concerned. The 
MOE promises universities to relax certain rigidity, through revision of legislation and 
regulation. However, the prospects are not very good, because it is difficult to change 
the past 'distrustful' attitudes in other government agencies, and in Parliament, toward 
universities, in terms of the way they use resources. 
Third, in reviewing the primary motive of governments in financing universities in both 
countries, another significant difference is noteworthy. The issue of university 
autonomy has been a concern in the UK, but never appeared in Taiwan. As explored in 
5.3.3.1, from the very beginning, to lessen the fear of the UGC, and of some 
universities, that increasing financial dependence upon the government would threaten 
university autonomy, government grants were given universities on a 'deficiency' 
principle. The UGC made a statement in its memorandum in 1944, claiming that 'the 
acceptance of Exchequer money through the UGC tends to be less injurious to academic 
independence than reliance on municipal contributions and private benefactions' (cited 
in Shinn, 1986, p. 277). The British universities escaped the inherent contradiction 
between accepting government funds and maintaining their autonomy during the period 
105 
1945 to late 1970s. By contrast, the way by which the Taiwanese government financed 
higher education institutions was similar to that by which it financed other levels of 
education. Clearly, this was related to the purpose of education, which was recognised 
as a prime instrument in establishing the national identity, and in economic growth. 
These political and economic goals of government outweighed that of having or 
fostering university autonomy. 
Finally, block grants and earmarked funding, are, respectively, seen in the universities in 
England and in Taiwan, though market forces are intervened, from time to time, by 
government policies on higher education in both countries. However, the beneficial 
effects of the block grants, in England, have been emasculated in many ways. In 
practice, guidance in the forms of 'advice' from the government and quangos implies 
'instruction', and it is becoming harder for English universities to ignore such guidance. 
Since the 1980s, the government in England has taken a series of actions to condition 
universities' behaviour by linking the progress of their implementation of certain 
programmes and degree of compliance to codes of practice with funding. In the House 
of Commons Official Report, the Minister, Kenneth Baker (1986), told the Parliament 
that progress (in programmes, such as, development of the policy selectivity, the 
rationalisation of small departments, and improvement of standards of teaching) 'will be 
closely monitored, and future funding of the universities will depend significantly upon 
its implementation year by year' (cited in Tasker and Packham, 1990, p. 85). Similar 
views are also reflected in the recommendations of the Dearing Report (1997). The 
government has been given more formal power over universities, for example, in the 
Education Reform Act (1988), the Further and Higher Education Act (1992), and the 
Teaching and Higher Education Act (1998). Through the funding changes and the 
enactment of legislation, a compliance culture is promoted. 
A further subtle development IS under way In England, that is, the government 
intervention seems to extend to those activities which may not be linked with 
government funding. Most universities can accept the financial memorandum 
accompanying HEFCE funds as a contract between the government and the universities. 
However, the government establishes certain mechanisms to guide, if not to instruct, 
universities how to deliver their contracts. (see Chapter 8 for respondents' views) 
Subsequently, the government has enlarged its area of influence, not only over 
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university funding but also over other areas of higher education. If this development 
became firmly established, then seeking alternative sources of income can only be a 
weak way for a university to recover its autonomy. 
Unlike in England, having block grants from the government has never been the reality 
in higher education in Taiwan. Earmarked funding, however, has long been used as one 
of the powerful ways in which the Taiwanese government steers the development of the 
national universities. In addition, heavy legislation and regulations have made 
universities familiar with a culture of compliance. Recently, through the relaxing of 
certain regulations, the national universities have been granted some latitude when 
deciding appointment of academic and other staff, but the latitude does not extend much 
to finance. The new funding scheme, UDFF, was originally designed to enhance 
national universities' financial independence. However, the latter has been lessened, 
partly by the legal provisions which limit universities' discretion over their earned 
income, and partly by their limited capacity to seek alternative sources of income. 
Paradoxically, the private universities, even though they were independent corporate 
bodies, were, more compliant with the government command-and-control policy, than 
their national counterparts. Fortunately, with the advent of new open context during the 
mid-1990s, some powers have been released, to some degree, from centralised control 
back to hands of their own governing bodies. Now, the degree of autonomy of the 
private universities seem to be more likely to depend upon the extent to which they can 
show their ability to self-govern and keep themselves financially solvent, than that of 
their national counterparts. 
In concluding this chapter, Altbach's argument (1998) concernmg conflict between 
university autonomy and accountability pressures, may deserve noting. He states that 
the conflict, 
... takes on different implications in different parts of the world. In the third world, 
traditions of autonomy have not been strong and demands for accountability, 
which include both political and economic elements, are especially troublesome. 
In the industrialized nations, accountability pressures are more fiscal in nature. 
(Altbach, 1998, p. 14) 
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Such a statement is true of Taiwan as of other third-world countries. However, although 
accountability pressures in England are mainly fiscal, bureaucratic procedures imposed 
by various mechanisms are increasing and worry academics and universities. This 
leaves open the question, for universities in England and in Taiwan, as to whether they 
have a real possibility of reducing external control by generating their own income, as 
their governments believe. These investigations lead on to the next critical theme -
government-university relationships (Chapter 6), which will shed some light on 
understanding the relationships between university autonomy and funding in the context 
of England and in Taiwan. 
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Chapter 6 
Government-University (G-U) Relationships 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, general concepts concerning G-U relationships in the existing literature 
are summarised, critically but not exhaustively, under two headings: first, categorisation 
and modelisation; second, the dynamic boundary concept. Under the first heading are 
included the two often-tested governmental steering models (state-control model and 
state-supervising model) (for example, van Vught, 1989; Neave and van Vught, 1991, 
and 1994), and government policy instruments. Finding inextricable limitations of 
categorisiation and modelisation of G-U relationships, the boundary concept which has 
been employed to interpret G-U relationships, (for example, Neave, 1982; Russell, 
1993; Tapper and Salter, 1995; Kogan, 1996), deserves exploration. 
To offer an overview of the background of G-U relationships in England and in Taiwan, 
three contextual factors are selected to be examined: historical and cultural, political and 
economic, and legislative and regulative. In addition, significant events since the 
1980s, occurring in both countries, are reviewed to see how the boundary between the 
government and university has shifted in both. Findings from the two countries are 
compared, and implications for the relationship between university autonomy and 
funding are put forward in concluding this chapter. 
6.2 Concepts concerning Government-University Relationships 
6.2.1 Categorisation and Modelisation: Government Steering Models and 
Instruments in Higher Education 
Academic writers in the field of higher education have recognised that the relationship 
between government and university is complex. The better to understand and compare 
G-U relationships in different countries, some have tried to categorise and model them, 
and even to locate the position of different countries in a continuum or 'a triangle' (for 
example, Clark's triangle of coordination) between! among categories or models. 
Diverse steering models and policy instruments, carry crucial information for 
understanding relationships between the government and the university. 
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Van Vught (1989) and Neave and van Vught (1991 and 1994) argue that, from the 
perspective of decision-making, and in the light of specific characteristics of the higher 
education context, two main government strategies - and, based on them, two basic 
government steering models - can be distinguished. One is the governmental strategy of 
rational planning and control, which implies a centralisation of the decision-making 
process and a large degree of control over the implementation of a chosen policy, in 
which much confidence is put in the capabilities of governmental actors and agencies to 
acquire comprehensive knowledge to take the best decision. Founded on such strategy, 
this steering model is called the state control model (SCM). The other, the strategy of 
self-regulation emphasises the self-regulatory capacities of decentralised decision-
making units, in which governmental regulating activities are limited to monitoring the 
performance of the self-regulating decision-making units and to evaluating the rules 
which to a large extent define this performance. Such a self-regulatory government 
strategy underpins the state supervising model (SSM) (van Vught, 1989, pp. 37-39). 
Based on government strategies and steering models, many studies on changing G-U 
relationships have been carried out in different countries. For example, Neave and van 
Vught's Prometheus Bound (1991) explores the changing relationship between 
government and higher education systems in selected countries in Western Europe, and 
in Australia and in the US, and in their following book (1994), across three continents -
Africa, Asia and South America. Also, Maassen and van Vught (1994) employ such 
study's framework to test whether the more a governmental steering model has the 
characteristics of the SSM, the higher the level of innovativeness and flexibility of 
higher education institutions have in the Netherlands and Germany. Recently, a study 
on G-U relationships in selected Commonwealth Countries was carried out by 
Richardson and Fielden (1997). All these confirm the applicability of such a framework 
for comparing G-U relationships in different countries. Clearly, such a conceptual 
framework is useful. The conclusions of these studies tend to identify a so-called 
'general trend' of changing G-U relationships. Sometimes at odds with their foregoing 
analyses or case studies, many paradoxical points to their conclusive claim, however, 
can be seen. Neave and van Vught, for example, claim in concluding chapter of 
Prometheus Bound (1991), 
110 
From the end of the Second World War through to the 1980s, the basic nature of 
the relationship between higher education and government was one of amazing 
stability. This relationship rested on an implicit agreement whereby higher 
education provided the training and the education for all deemed qualified to 
enter, whilst governments provided in return, the funding necessary for this task. 
(bold added, Neave and van Vught, 1991, p. 244) 
However, they also offer the following description, inconsistent with, if not in 
contradiction to, what they just claimed. During the overlapping period, with 
governments using the strategy of rational planning and control, the relationship 
between higher education and government rested on detailed government regulations 
and mechanisms, rather than on an implicit agreement: 
... rational planning and control was widely used in Western systems of higher 
education during the 1970s and the start of the 1980s... in the Federal Republic 
of Germany... Mechanisms of quantitative planning were created and a 
considerable number of laws and decrees passed. In Ireland ... (government) 
using detailed regulations and stringent mechanisms of planning ... (bold 
added, Neave and van Vught, 1991, pp. 246-7) 
Such inconsistency is also seen in another empirical study by Richardson and Fielden 
(1997). While they indicate that G-U relationships in some African countries are being 
pushed towards the state control model, they locate those countries, in the continuum, 
more towards the state supervising model rather than the state control model end of the 
spectrum. 
Likewise, another categorisation has been at times used, but also challenged. The 
Anglo-Saxon model, as termed by Neave (1982), or the 'American-British Model' as 
labelled by Clark (1983b), is equivalent to 'the state-supervising model' and suggests 
that government intervention is less influential in the universities in both Britain and the 
United States than is the case in western European countries. The countermodel to the 
Anglo-Saxon model, the European model, also called the state control model by Neave 
and van Vught (1991 and 1994) implies that the government regulates university affairs, 
such as student access, curriculum, granting of degrees, and appointment of academic 
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staff. 
Do the models above still appear to fit present situations in those countries? It appears 
so, as academics in the 1990s inevitably add the term 'traditional' to this Anglo-Saxon 
model, and emphasise that it serves as a conceptual tool to describe limited state 
intervention. The European model faces a challenge similar to that confronting the 
Anglo-Saxon model. Just as adding 'traditional' to the Anglo-Saxon model, so adding 
'historical' to the European model, is inevitable, since it had appeared inadequate as an 
interpretation of changing G-U relationships in some European countries, such as the 
Netherlands and France. In the Netherlands, governmental policies were shifting from 
'correcting policy' of the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, in which the state 
actively corrected the low efficiency of higher education, to the 'facilitative policy' of 
the late 1980s, in which the state rather facilitates higher education making decisions for 
itself (van Vught, 1991, p. 109). In France, the policy of centralisation over higher 
education was under review, because it was regarded as too rigid to permit higher 
education adequately to meet future challenges. 
However, there exists no pure model, and one is much more likely to find combinations 
of models; for example, while the state control model dominates in certain university 
affairs, the state supervising model might dominate in others. This 'strange hybrid', in 
the words of Maassen and van Vught (1988), challenges the modelisation of G-U 
relationships, via the dichotomies of the state control model versus the state supervising 
model, and Anglo-Saxon versus European Model. Moreover, contrasts implicit in the 
term 'versus', as between two models, do not get support in McDaniel's study (1996), 
an extensive survey on the paradigms of governance in higher education systems in 75 
countries. Contrary to the findings in the previous literature, McDaniel found that 
differences in governance between the systems in Western European countries and in 
the US, are relatively small, and that even within the US or the Western European 
countries, there are 'no visible homogeneous patterns'. He concludes that this kind of 
simple delineation is not sufficient to identify or construct general theoretical models 
such as 'Continental' and 'Anglo-Saxon' (1996, p. 155). Nevertheless, it can not be 
denied that these models can still serve as a conceptual framework. However, they 
should be treated with caution, particularly when they appear to reach definitive 
conclusions. 
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Thus, the issue of G-U relationships is more complicated than is implied by debates on 
categorisation or modelisation. G-U relationships are multi-dimensional, and dynamic 
rather than fixed. Clark 's triangle of coordination (1983b), for example, can be treated 
as a multi-dimensional model, which has often been cited in discussion of the 
interaction of higher education institutions, government and market. Within Clark's 
triangle, the location of the higher education system of a given country represents the 
combinations of the three mechanisms in different degrees . While the location moves 
closer towards one of the three extremes, that extreme takes a more significant role in 
the process of coordination, but the other two extremes still have influence. On the 
limitations of Clark's triangle concept, Williams (1995a) proposes 'alternative models 
of the forces acting on universities' (pp. 172-3) to analyse the dynamic G-U 
relationships. 
Before movmg on to government instruments, it should be noted that academics' 
interpretation of G-U relationships across countries with their models can be 
contradictory one of another. For example, if the Anglo-Saxon model is set within 
Clark's triangle, the system of Britain and of America are differently located, although 
admittedly the present British practice is moving somewhat towards the market system, 
but with intensifying government intervention. Again, the contrast between Neave and 
van Vught's interpretation and Clark's triangle of coordination concerning the higher 
education system in Italy, is another example. Neave and van Vught (1991) observe 
that, before the 1980s, higher education in Italy was 'strongly regulated and heavily 
controlled with central government', while the validation of degrees, the fields in which 
degrees might be awarded were still centrally controlled and procedures for professorial 
appointments, as well as nomination to post of principal university administrators were 
matters for central administration (p. 247). However, very differently, for Clark, writing 
at the early 1980s, Italy was chosen as a case which was well down towards the 
academic oligarchic extreme in the triangle, since 'its prestigious and powerful national 
academic oligarchs, traditionally have been more than a match for a relatively impotent 
bureaucracy ' (Clark, 1983b, p. 143). The existence of the contrast exposes the low 
validity of each interpretation, unless it could be justified by that there was a dramatic 
change happened to Italy during the early 1980s. 
113 
Governments have a number of instruments at their disposal, to implement their 
policies. Van Vught (1989) highlights the views of several important figures in the field 
of public administration as follows: Etzioni (1968), Mitnick (1980), and Hood (1983). 
Etzioni distinguishes three types of social relationships: coercive, utilitarian and 
normative, and indicates that in any real case, there is a mixture of these three types. 
Mitnick (1980) develops a categorisation of the government instruments, namely 
'regulation by directive', which is defined as the interference occurring by 
circumscribing or directing choice in some area, and 'regulation by incentive', which is 
defined as the interference occurring by changing the perception of the nature of the 
alternatives for action, subject to choice. Hood (1983) develops four categories of tools 
applied by governments, namely instrument of information, instrument of treasure, 
instrument of authority and instrument of action, to inform, to exchange, to 
command/commend, or to directly influence, the behaviour of societal actors. 
There are, of course, numerous other examples which can be found in the literature. 
The differences between policy instruments depend on the level of control that 
governments use, to try to produce their desired effects and influence the behaviour of 
societal actors. It is assumed that, if governments tend to use the strategy of rational 
planning and control, highly restrictive instruments, such as authority and treasure, will 
be widely chosen, but, if governments tend to use the strategy of self-regulation, the less 
restrictive instruments, such as information, will be used, and even if the instrument of 
treasure is used, it will be employed as an incentive rather than directive. Such linkages 
between government strategies and instruments are informative, but it is to be clear that 
there are no absolute rules to them. The instruments such as information, treasure, 
authority and action, are seldom used in isolation or independently. The combination of 
instruments is the reality for most higher education systems. 
Last, but not least, Trow (1996) identifies three main elements between universities and 
government or the society at large, namely, trust, markets and accountability. As Trow 
(1996) observes, the linkages of the three forces in G-U relationships vary enormously 
among different types of institutions, different activities, different national agencies and 
different social constituencies. Up to this stage, many idiosyncratic approaches to 
understanding G-U relationships have been investigated. Such approaches are 
manifestly produced by the interplay between various factors, actors, and interests. As 
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Goedegebuure and his colleagues suggest, 
... it is more or less irrelevant whether these forces should be approached from a 
quadrilateral, triangular or diamond-shaped figure ... what is important, however, 
is the concept of several forces pushing and pulling the system, through mutual 
interaction, in a particular direction. (Goedegebuure et aI., 1994, p.4) 
Due to the 'push and pull' nature of forces, it is time to move to the next important 
concept, 'boundary', in understanding G-U relationships. 
6.2.2 The Concept of Boundary 
In the foregoing paragraphs, general forces operating in higher education systems have 
been identified. The issue of G-U relationships, however, involves, too, country-
specific factors. Although Neave and van Vught (1991 and 1994) can claim that there is 
a general trend toward the state supervising model in Western European countries, and 
that changes in Africa, Asia and South America do not uniformly confirm the trend to 
abandonment of the state control model, they still leave, unanswered, one question, on 
how contextual factors contribute to such shifts between models. 
Some studies contribute, albeit implicitly, to this type of exploration, that is, the in-
depth exploration of contextual boundaries between government and university. For 
example, although they are focused on the UK, Berdahl's British Universities and the 
State (1959), Becher and Kogan's Process and Structure in Higher Education (1992), 
and Salter and Tapper's The State and Higher Education (1994), demonstrate a 
different, but thought-out framework, and also add impressive pieces of work to the 
literature. Quite different from the literature on categorisation and modelisation of G-U 
relationships, these studies are located under the heading of 'the concept of boundary'. 
Besides the reasons for the use of it, given in Chapter 2, this concept of boundary is 
worth developing, in terms of its possibility, at the extreme, of expressing the dynamics 
of G-U relationships. At worst, it can at least avoid deficiencies in interpretation 
resulting from the categorisation and modelisation. 
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6.2.2.1 Introduction and Criticism of Neave's Concept of Boundary 
In the case of higher education, and from the literature available to the researcher, 
however, the earliest paper exploring and explaining the purpose of using the concept 
of boundary, not merely employing it to interpret government-university relationships 
and the concept of university autonomy, is Neave's paper' The Changing Boundary 
between the State and Higher Education' (1982). On the use of the concept to interpret 
the changing relationship (boundary) between the government and higher education, 
Neave insists that, 
Whichever model one examines ... all involve a certain concept of 'boundary' 
between the university and the state ... The first thing to stress in the concept of 
boundary is that it is not fixed. Rather, it undergoes considerable alteration and 
flux ... second .. . it is composed of many dimensions ... contribute to the location of 
this boundary, is to see to what extent it has changed over the past decade or so. 
(lVeave, 1982,pp. 232-7) 
Neave also argues that the concept of boundary is 'less-laden than the time-honored 
notion of autonomy' for describing the relationship between the state and the university. 
While the boundary of the state may extend officially into the administrative affairs of 
the university, or regulating the budgetary headings, the boundary of a university 
extends to the point where such matters as teaching methods, evaluation and assessment 
are at issue. Neave also tries to propose and operationalise several sets of questions -
Who teaches? Who is taught and for how long? What addresses control or regulation 
over university knowledge and its distribution amongst the labour force? And, Who 
pays what, and how? (N eave, 1982, pp. 234-7) 
While Neave tries to formulate and operationalise these questions, debatable points 
arise. First, the above questions are related to what the content or scope of university 
autonomy should be. However, as McDaniel (1996) suggests, one higher education 
system may enjoy some autonomy, in some areas in which other systems are restricted, 
or one system may be restricted in areas in which other areas may enjoy autonomy. 
While there is no authoritative formulation, Neave is similar to those academics (e.g. 
Ashby, 1966; Levy, 1980). Second, related to the first point, Neave ignores explanation 
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of the contextual factors which may make boundaries shift and be redrawn, how this 
happens, and what implications for government-university relationships are there, when 
the boundaries shift. 
6.2.2.2 Further Developing the Concept of Boundary 
The notion of boundary has been welcomed, and used widely, in areas concerning the 
interaction and relationship between system and subsystems, or between subsystems 
and subsystems, particularly in psychological counselling and family therapy. It is 
useful to quote a definition of 'boundary' in the family context: 
A boundary is an invisible line of demarcation that separates an individual, a 
subsystem, or a system from outside surroundings ... Minuchin (1974) contends 
that such divisions must be sufficiently well defined to allow subsystem members 
to carry out their tasks without undue interference, while at the same time open 
enough to permit contact between members of the subsystem and others. 
Boundaries thus help safeguard each subsystem s autonomy while maintaining 
the interdependence of all of the family s subsystems. (Goldenberg and 
Goldenberg, 1996, p. 55) 
Based on the degree of clarity of boundary, three major types of relationship are 
developed and named by Goldenberg and Goldenberg (1996). First, the 'enmeshed' 
relationship is established when the boundary between one family subsystem and 
another is diffuse. It implies that the behaviour of one family member has an immediate 
and marked effect on those with whom that person is enmeshed. Second, the 
'disengaged' relationship has a rigid boundary, which implies that the behaviour of one 
family member has little effect on other family members. Third, the 'healthy' 
relationship is seen, when there are clear yet permeable boundaries which allow for 
distance to be established without losing contact, and for contact to be maintained 
without losing individual autonomy. 
Referring to the definition above and Neave's notion of boundary, G-U relationships are 
re-interpreted as follows: 
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The boundaries between the government and the university are movable rather 
than fixed. Contextual factors contributing to shaping the boundary are both 
implicit/hidden (e.g. traditional and historic culture) and explicit (e.g. changes in 
policy and legislation). What G-U relationships exist depends on whether the 
boundaries of two are diffuse, rigid, or 'clear yet permeable '. Thus, if boundaries 
are diffuse, an enmeshed G-U relationship might be seen. Second, if the 
boundaries are rigid, it might show a disengaged relationship. Third, if the 
boundaries are clear yet permeable, a balanced G-U relationship might be 
evident. 
In theory, such a description for government-university relationships might be attractive, 
but one question clearly to be asked is, to what extent is it applicable in reality? 
Universities and governments having different identities, interests and perspectives, an 
enmeshed G-U relationship is not likely to be seen unless universities are completely 
controlled by governments. While the university system is unlikely to be immune from 
its environmental changes, and the financial role of the state in the university remains 
significant, a disengaged G-U relationship shows little possibility of existence. 
Concerning the clear yet permeable boundary, it seems more possible to see a 
permeable, rather than clear, boundary since neither the government nor the university 
is neatly bundled, and contextual factors can alter over time. However, in recognising 
that G-U relationships are movable rather than fixed, it will be wide of the mark to 
expect that a system stays permanent in each of the above G-U relationships. 
Besides these three types of G-U relationships, another description used by academics is 
'implicit (hidden)' and 'explicit'. The interaction between the government and the 
university observed in many countries since the 1980s is developing from implicit 
towards explicit; for example, a considerable number of laws and decrees passed in 
Germany, and detailed regulations and stringent mechanisms of planning in Ireland 
(Neave and van Vught, 1991, p. 247). Becher and Kogan (1992) note that the 
government-university relationship in Britain in the 1980s shifted from implicit, relating 
mainly to workforce outcomes, to explicit, because of the central authorities' 
determination to assert objectives which also directly affect the research and curriculum 
agenda. 
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However, as to whether the borders between the government and the university should 
be precise, or kept fuzzy, there is no absolute answer. Berdahl (1990), for example, 
presents two different views concerning the issue as follows. First, Bailey (1975) 
suggests that the border between the state and the academy must be kept fuzzy, since if 
'a precise delineation is sought. .. the state has more than the academy of what it takes 
to draw the line'. Second, the Carnegie Commission (1973), however, reasons that 
government authority is now expanding and coming to be seen in areas in which its 
presence had been unclear, in the past; 'the ambiguities that once were an asset are now 
a liability', and 'greater precision of understanding is now highly desirable'. Seeing a 
more explicit G-U relationship developing in Britain, Berdahl (1990) believes that 
current conditions 'do justify the Bailey's noted risks of attempting to obtain greater 
precision in defining the proper relations between universities and government' 
(Berdahl, 1990, p. 180). However, Russell (1993) insists that 'ambiguous or obscure' 
borders between the government and the university in Britain gave rise to a 'guerrilla 
war'. Thus, among academics, there exist more than one view in the argument. 
It is not the purpose of this study to investigate all possible contextual factors 
contributing to boundary shaping; so to do would be difficult, given the delicate nature 
of the boundary between the government and the university. The main concern is rather 
to select some of them, to enhance the understanding of boundary movement. These 
selected contextual factors are highlighted, to arrive at an overview of the two countries 
- England and Taiwan, as backgrounds for comparison. First, the historic and cultural 
factor, including the history of the development of the university, and its traditional 
position in its own society. This factor is more likely to shape, implicitly, boundary 
between the government and the university. Second, the political and economic factor: 
this includes whether the development of universities is integrated into the framework 
of national planning, and whether government financial commitment to universities has 
been stable, or has changed. Third, the legislative and regulatory factor: this contributes 
more directly to boundary movement than the first two factors. As Sowell (1980) 
interprets it, this factor acts as a 'framework of rules' used by governments to delineate 
the boundaries within which other units determine substantive choices and to make its 
own forces available to defend the established boundaries' (cited in Neave and van 
Vught, 1994, p. 4). Apart from constituting an opportunity for the government (Tapper 
and Salter, 1995), it can not be denied that legislation also creates the chance for the 
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university to claim a new G-U relationship. 
On changes in contextual factors, two types of movement are distinguished: one can be 
termed as 'boundary shifting' and the other as 'boundary redrawing' . 'Boundary 
shifting' implies that the movement can be observed by its effects. An example is the 
transition of the UGC in the UK from a buffer organisation to a strategic one. After the 
1980s, the universities had a strong sense of loss of autonomy, although they still held 
considerable power to self-administration. 'Boundary redrawing' implies that the 
movement can be observed, not just by its effects, but also directly by a formal granting 
of powers to, or withholding of powers from, the university administration. Examples 
include the 1988 Education Reform Act in Britain and the 1994 revision of the 
University Act in Taiwan. In the next sections (6.3 and 6.4), three areas are covered: 
first, the role of university expected by the government; second, the contextual factors 
in each case; and, third, the impact of significant events occurring since the 1980s, in 
changing the G-U relationship. Subsequently the boundary figures drawn from each 
case, in 6.5, are compared as the conclusion of this chapter. 
6.3 Government-University Relationships in England 
6.3.1 The Role of the University Expected by Government 
The role of a university in Britain expected by the government since the 1980s, can be 
traced through governmental policy statements or reports . The government, in the 
White Paper in 1987, for example, states clearly that the role of higher education is to 
help the nation meet the economic and social challenges of the final decade of the 
twentieth century and beyond. Such government expectations of the role of a university 
continue to be manifested in reports in the 1990s, notably in the Dearing Report (1997). 
The main reason for highlighting points from this report, is that the Dearing Committee 
had embodied government assumptions and conventional opinions in the Report 
(Kogan, 1998; Trow, 1998). 
At the very beginning of its Report, the Dearing Committee set out its vision for the 
next 20 years, of the development of the UK as a learning society, in which higher 
education would make a distinctive contribution 'to sustain a competitive economy' 
(para. 1.10). While declaring that higher education in the UK 'continues to have a key 
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role in developing the powers of the mind, and in advancing understanding and learning 
through scholarship and research' (p. 3), the Committee put more emphasis on how the 
higher education system contributes to economic growth, performance and international 
market competitiveness. As Kogan (1998) counts, the economy is referred to seven 
times in the Annex to the terms of reference of the Committee. After seeing the 
definition of the learning society in the Report (para. 1.10), Barnett (1998) has no doubt 
in commenting that the Report 'very much places itself on the side of the economic 
conception of the learning society' (p. 15). Likewise, 'a new compact' is waiting for 
higher education institutions to recognise that they are 'becoming ever more central to 
the economic wellbeing of the nation, localities and individual', and have become 'a 
crucial asset' of the state (Dearing Report, para. 1.22-1.25). Thus, higher education in 
the UK seems to exist more for other parties rather than for itself, while the aspect -
service to society - has been increasingly emphasised (Kogan, 1988). 
Higher education is caught in a dilemma, shown in the Dearing Report. On the one 
hand, Dearing insists that British traditional university values, such as institutional 
autonomy and diversity, should be treasured, but on the other, its recommendations 
contribute to the creation of a compliance culture, for example being highly prescriptive 
about university governance, and quality maintenance. Robertson (1998) has no doubt 
in arguing that the Report has 'the vision', but it is a vision of state control rather than a 
vision of a learning society, and he believes that people will find that 'the driving 
intelligence of the report is the conviction that the sector (higher education) must be 
controlled' (p . 7). Robertson's interpretation of this 'conviction' (1998) seems to be 
confirmed by identifying changes in the following contextual factors. 
6.3.2 Contextual Boundaries 
6.3.2.1 The Historical and Cultural Aspect 
From the following quotations, it seems that the pre-1980s context, in which British 
universities existed, tended to sustain the values of university autonomy and academic 
freedom, compared with that of other countries. When the Robbins Committee 
travelled abroad, and saw much from which Britain might well learn, one respect in 
which Britain induced envy elsewhere, was, 
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... a cardinal feature of academic tradition in this country to distrust (state 
control) and to regard them as fraught with real danger to the foundations of free 
society ... We do not regard such freedom as a privilege but rather as a necessary 
condition for the proper discharge of the higher academic functions ... (Robbins 
Report, para. 708 & 709) 
Eustace (1994) considers it 'a long-standing and deep-seated conviction' in British 
universities that only scholars can and therefore should, manage scholarship. He also 
believes that academic activity in the UK 'owes its excellence to its autonomy from the 
state'. While welcoming the government's generous financial commitment since the 
second world war, the university system was able 'to bask in the informal rules of the 
republic of letters' (Becher and Kogan, 1992, p. 145), and 'grew accustomed to a very 
high degree of practical autonomy' (Eustace, 1994, p. 88). Thus, state control was very 
much constrained during the development of the system. 
However, the above quotations do not exclude the fact that tension and 
misunderstanding existed between the university and the government in their joint 
history. As Russell (1993) observes, 'the bitter quarrels' between the two had already 
started by the thirteenth century. By the early twentieth century, due to mutual interests 
having been satisfied, the quarrels 'appeared to be an exhausted volcano, and relations 
between Universities and the State were more amicable than they have been for most of 
their history' (Russell, 1993, p. 5). Such amicable relations between two were, 
importantly, supported by the next aspect: political consensus and economic capability. 
6.3.2.2 The Political and Economic Aspect 
As Williams (1995b) observes, Britain in the nineteenth century was dominated by 
laissez-faire capitalism, which helped to protect the universities from political 
intervention. Not only this, the idea of establishment of the UGC was, as Shattock and 
Berdahl (1984) indicate, 'from the above by politicians, most notably Lord Haldane, 
and by the civil servants as an aid to the government', not by pressure from universities 
or academic professional bodies. It was an advisory body, rather than a planning body, 
because all involved still saw planning and development as a function of universities, 
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rather than of the UGC (Shattock and Berdahl, 1984, p. 472). In the UGC period, there 
was a widespread concern to reassure universities that there would not be government 
interference with their affairs, and that university autonomy would not be threatened by 
the government (Tapper and Salter, 1995, p. 60). This political autonomy was 'perhaps 
the most central aspect of the English idea of a university' (Halsey and Trow, 1971). 
Importantly, as Premfors (1980) observes, though the norm of political autonomy which 
has not always prevented government intervention, it has been sufficiently potent to 
force governments to restrain their activities. 
Moreover, the political consensus, enhanced by economic support, created 'a golden age 
of university autonomy', in Russell's words (1993), in the recent history of university 
development in the UK. However, the political-economic context of the universities 
since the 1980s has undergone important and significant transformation. The broad 
governmental intention is clear, as Bargh and her colleagues observe: 
... a political revolution characterised by the 'reform' of the welfare state, in 
particular the rise of quasi-contractual relations between 'customers' and 
'contractors' within the public sector (Ie Grand and Barlett, 1993) and of what 
has been called an 'audit society' (Power, 1994). The impact of both ideas, 
contracts and audit, on relations between higher education and the state (and 
funding and research councils}... over the past decade has been pronounced. 
(Bargh et aI., 1996, p. 13) 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 'refonn' of the public service, involves organisational 
cultural change, replacing the traditional public service ethos - with its inefficient 
administration - by a 'business', or 'market-oriented', ethos, comprising an enterprise 
culture and a more assertive managerial style. This has been introduced into the 
universities, and is manifested concretely in the Jarratt Report (CVCP, 1985). Of 
course, some conflicts with that, within the traditional autonomous universities, seem 
predictable. 
6.3.2.3 The Legislative and Regulative Aspect 
Legislation and regulations were not as predominant in shaping the G-U relationship in 
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the UK as in other European countries (Neave, 1988a). According to Tapper and Salter 
(1995), Parliament in the UK has weakened ministerial and funding councils by 
refusing to permit specific conditions to be attached to grants made to named individual 
institutions, seeing a potential danger of the undermining of any semblance of university 
autonomy. However, many academics, like Halsey (1992), Tapper and Salter (1995), 
and Kogan (1996), have observed that G-U relationships in the UK have evolved 
alongside the appearance of the first legislation regarding the university in the ERA 
(1988), and a rapid expansion of the university system resulting from the 1992 Act. 
These Acts and 1998 Teaching and Higher Education Act (THEA) have created a 
number of reserve powers that may be exercised by the Secretary of State. 
Inconsistency between introducing a quasi-market and maintaining a central planning, is 
one key feature of the way that the government regulates the development of higher 
education. Indeed, Becher and Kogan (1992) observe that 'government itself was 
ambivalent' switching between strategies - first central command, then managerialism, 
and finally market imperatives (pp. 65, 177). Likewise, Bargh and her colleagues 
(1996) describe such a kind of national policy on massification and marketisation of 
higher education as 'stop (1981 to 1986), go (1987 to 1992) and stop again (since 
1993)' (p. 17). According to Robertson (1998), higher education in the UK is 'in for a 
sustained period of command-and-control policy-making' (p. 15). However, 
government intervention is 'disguised through recruitment and deployment of 
intermediary agencies' (Morley, 1997, p. 235), called 'quangos', quasi-autonomous 
non-governmental organisations, which have created various codes of practice 
concerning governance, financial management, and quality assurance. Although the 
codes are not compulsory by nature, they gradually become nonnative forces through 
which the universities are regulated. 
6.3.3 The British Case: From Implicit towards Explicit G-U Relationship 
Changes came in the 1980s, when the interventionist nature of the Conservative 
government policy and the ambiguous function of the UGC, caused a sense of crisis in 
universities. Most scholars also agree that a change in G-U relationships in the UK 
began to be effected by the cuts in 1981 and onwards. For foreign observers, like Neave 
(1988a) and Madeleine Green (1995), it does not overstate things to say that the UK 
higher education underwent a revolution which started with the 1981 cuts. 
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Table 6.1 Major Events/ Reports/ Legislation since the 1980s in England 
YearfName Highlights Implications for G-U Relationships 
1981 July letter announced The UGC operated in a more directive style to execute I .UGC had difficulty in maintaining an arm's length relationship between G and U./ 
the cuts the financial cuts/ Examples of how universities coped 2. Subsequent G. initiatives confirm that the G. intended to steer HE to be good for 
with the cuts were given by Kogan and Kogan (1983) economy. 
1983 Setting up of National Its terms of reference were to advise the Secretary of The establishment of the NAB was eroding the power of LEAs in higher education/ 
Advisory Body for Public State on the academic provision to be made, the Its replacement by the PCFC without any LEA representatives in the membership in 
Sector Higher Education apportionment of the Advanced Further Education Pool, 1989, ended the role of LEAs in higher education (Williams, 1992a; Becher and 
(NAB) and the approval of advanced courses in the public sector Kogan, 1992) 
(Becher &Kogan, 1992) 
1985 Jarratt Report (CVCP) Introducing the streamlining of management systems into While Report acknowledged that the UGC had come to be regarded by U as 'a tool 
HE/ Us were required to respond to the recommendations of the DES', it ignored the fact that the CVCP itself 'too came to act as a tool of 
of the Report within 12 months of its publication. DES', as said Tasker & Packham (1990, p. 184). The latter 's observation regarding 
the CVCP may not be fully supported. 
1986 Research Assessment Selecting distribution of resources for research based on RAE's original purpose was protecting universities' research funds against the public 
Exercise (RAE) the performance of individual universities in RAE doubt of why universities are better funded than the public sector HE. However, 
through linking performance and funding, U was held to be more accountable; 
meanwhile, G enlarged its influence in the G-U relationship. 
- -







Table 6.1 (Continued) Major Events/ Reports/ Legislation since the 1980s in England 
Highlights Implications for G-U Relationships 
Reviewing the role and function of the UGC/ The G-U In line with Jarratt, implying that academic outcomes ought to be 'judged in terms of 
financial relationship was governed by the financial social rather than intellectual criteria' ; thus, ' the question who should run the 
memorandum! Declaring the necessity of existence of an institutions .. . as primarily a matter of political choice' (Becher & Kogan, 1992, p. 
intermediary funding body 183) 
I. The first legislation concerned HE and abolished I 1. Through legislation, the G. empowered itself in the G-U relationship'! The 
Higherl tenure system 
Education: Meeting thel2. UGC was replaced by UFC the majority of whose 
replacement of the UGC by the UFC marked an end for the system of 'grants' 
and the advent of a system of' contract'. 
Challenge members were from non-academic/ PCFC replaced thel2 . The 1988 Act broke 'the rule of the academics' (Becher and Kogan, 1992, p. 39) . 
NAB/ G. provided planning guidelines for U. system as a 3. While Russell (1993) recognised the abolishment of the tenure as erosion of 
1988 Education Reforrnlwhole/ releasing poly. & colleges from control of LEAs. academic freedom, Tapper and Salter (1995) suggest that it has increased the 
ability of U to adjust to changes in financial circumstances. Act (ERA) 
1991 l. Abolishing the binary system and creating a singlelThe G. revealed its attempt to continue to set the strategic directions for HE, and 
Higherl funding structure and extending degree-awardinglcontinued to make necessary contribution to funding further efficient expansion. 
New power to major HE institutions 
White Paper: 
Education: A 
Framework 2. The Secretary of State was given power to designate 
institutions that were eligible to receive funds from a 
1992 Further and Higher higher education funding council and laid down certain 
Education Act (FHEA) guidelines on how they were to establish their 
instruments of government. 
Source: Compiled by the researcher. 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) Major Events/ Reports/ Legislation since the 1980s in England 
YeariName Highlights Implications for G-U Relationships 
1997 Its establishment given to Joint Planning Group for Quality The emergence of the QAA implying that the previous external examiner 
Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) Assurance m HE (CVCP, 1996)/ Prior to it, the system was not enough and U need one body to 'help' them to examine their 
responsibility for maintaining and assuring of quality own practice in maintaining common standard and quality 
rested primarily with the pre-1992 U. 
1997 Giving advice on the future of development of HE Certain recommendations on linking performance to funding of HE imply that 
The Dearing Report (purpose, shape, structure and funding) over next 20 years/ HE should comply with what the G desires . 
proposing 93 recommendations 
1998 Teaching and Higher The Secretary of State was given powers to compel higher According to Farrington, this Act mayor may not affect the powers of the 
Education Act education funding councils for England and Wales to chartered university to ' demand and receive fees ', but 'obviously the 
impose conditions on university governing bodies as a promoters of the bill intend that the charter power should be attenuated ' 
condition of receiving grant, that is, fees are charged 'equal (THES, Jan. 23 1998). 
to the prescribed amount' prescribed by the Secretary of 
State from time to time. 
March 1999 Concluding that the current arrangement of the HEFCE While academics (e.g. Shattock &Berdahl, 1984) have seen a funding body as 
QuinquelU1ial Review of the operating at aIm's length from government should an arm of G, the official report is still claiming that it is a buffer (e.g. the 
HEFCE continue. Dearing Report, and this Review). Nevertheless, in technical sense, the 




Source: Compiled by the researcher. 
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Table 6.1 illustrates some major events and documents, and their implications for the 
changing government-university relationship. The changes noted in Table 6.1 illustrate 
the boundaries between the government and the university in the UK gradually 
transforming from implicit to, at least towards, the more explicit. The laissez-faire 
policy was abandoned by the government, which began to assert, for itself, a more 
active and interventionist role in higher education policy. As Becher and Kogan (1992) 
comment, 'academic norms and modes of self-governance had given way to powerful 
objective-setting by the central authorities' (pp. 48-9) and 'government's coyness abated 
and the setting of objectives ceased to be implicit' in the 1980s (p. 52). The 1988 
Education Reform Act and the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act, have reified the 
implicit G-U relationship into a rather explicit one. Higher education is moving to a 
point where 'more and more elaborate control systems were imposed by the 
government' (Scott, 1995, p. 16). 
However, Tapper and Salter (1995) have observed that the G-U relationship in England, 
moving from implicit towards explicit, occurred before the 1980s. A planning model, 
with bureaucratic links, started to appear in 1964 when the responsibility for the UGC 
transferred from the Treasury to the DES; and the PAC (Public Accounts Committee) 
gained access to the books of the UGC and the universities. However, at that stage the 
shifting boundaries between government and university were camouflaged by two 
critical variables: the existing mutual trust between the UGC and universities, and the 
belief in continuing the age of confident self-development. Not surprisingly, such a 
camouflage was removed with the abolition of quinquennial funding in 1974, and with a 
series of subsequent changes, in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Has a culture of compliance developed in the academic community, as Scott (1997) and 
Robertson (1998) argue? (also see 5.3.3) Tasker and Packham (1990) argue that in 
order to achieve intellectual and social purposes a university needs autonomy and 
freedom for its members in teaching and research (p. 181). However, they deplore the 
fact that such a concept of the university is being challenged in Britain, not only by the 
government reforms, but also by some within the universities who regard the concept as 
an impossible dream. In the course of shaping the boundary between the government 
and the university, the university academics, 
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... have failed to assert strongly and publicly their function of intellectual and 
moral leadership within society, and to assert it, moreover, in language proper to 
a university. The intellectual and linguistic vacuum that was the result has been 
filled by the values and terminology of the market place... We have an obligation 
to society to state publicly that governmental policy is destroying the proper 
environment for research and teaching in universities. (Tasker and Packham, 
1990, p. 193) 
Such a view corresponds to that of Becher and Kogan (1992), who claim that the 
universities 'failed to convince governments of their undisputed claim to do good by 
doing what academics wanted to do' (p. 179). However, Russell (1993) notes that some 
academics asserted what they thought to be right, but that the whole context and system 
of higher education appeared to be slipping from academic control, since 'universities 
are told to change' and 'it seemed to have become a matter for politicians, not for 
academics to decide what a university should be'. Indeed, the government is seeking to 
enlarge its area of influence, as reflected in the emergence of the QAA and the direction 
of policy-making, which 'make it more likely that the DillE will be able to retain its 
grip on the shape of the sector' (Robertson, 1998, pp. 14-15). While calling for 
statements of overall objectives for the planning period, research achievements and 
plans, and forecasting of student numbers in various subject group and financial 
forecasts becomes 'normal and frequent' (Becher and Kogan, 1992), universities are 
subject to 'ordeal by standards, inspection, and paperwork' (Robertson, 1998). 
However, the government is not always in succeeding translating the pressures upon 
itself into policies which produce the desired results (Salter and Tapper, 1994, p. 18). 
The universities themselves could modify the boundaries, such that decisions are left to 
individual universities, and the failed bidding system of the UFC is an example (Tapper 
and Salter, 1995, p. 68). Finally, it would be helpful to employ Tapper and Salter's 
conclusion, here, to support the description of boundary shifting in the English case as 
being a shift between who was previously, and who is now, dominant, in defining the 
boundaries between the government and the university. They said, 
At one time those boundaries were imposed by a powerful segment of university 
opinion and led to a university system that was elitist ... In recent years the state 
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has reclaimed the control of the boundaries ... (and) universities need to make 
choices within boundaries. (bold added, Tapper and Salter, 1995, p. 70) 
6.4 The G-U Relationships in Taiwan 
6.4.1 The Role of the University Expected by Government 
When the Taiwan govenunent faced political vulnerability at the very beginning of the 
retreat from China to Taiwan in 1949, it adopted centralised and authoritarian political 
strategies. After political issues, economic growth was central to govenunent planning. 
Education was taken as an instrument to achieve political and economic purposes, 
although the govenunent never ceased proclaiming education as the cornerstone of 
social and cultural development in Taiwan. Inevitably, when higher education was 
instituted to instil state ideology and provide manpower, the utilitarian role of the 
university outweighed the traditional values of university autonomy and academic 
freedom during that period of an authoritarian political regime. More detrimental to the 
development of higher education, its main purpose was to serve what the govenunent, 
in fact the ruling party (Kuomingtang, KMT), wanted, rather than to be a centre of 
critical thinking and reflection on what a society might need. 
Under such circumstances, the establishment of subjects in humanities and social 
sciences, particUlarly political studies, philosophy, and law, were subject to rigid 
govenunent control because the students and graduates of those departments tended to 
become the leaders organising protests against the government. Unlike the natural 
science and technological subjects, they were more vulnerable to political interference 
which had often caused problems with academic freedom (Chen, 1991). While the 
govenunent adopted the excuse of national security to censor the contents of teaching 
and research, some university presidents, appointed by the MOE, became the political 
facilitators of the MOE, and jeopardised academic morale. The purpose of academic 
research turned up to be the back-up of govenunent policy. One example was given by 
Chang Tsun-sin, who conducted his survey in 1983 to investigate how the students in 
teacher universities reacted to the Teacher Act of 1979, and found that the students' 
views were not in line with govenunent policy, and against certain provisions in the Act. 
Incredibly, the president of Chang's university savaged Chang's study, accused him of 
'forging data' and re-checked his raw data (1,263 copies of questionnaire, done one by 
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one). While such false accusation against academics' studies was a reality, academics' 
hesitation and avoidance of touching so-called sensitive issues, was manifest. 
Up to the late 1980s, an irony of the higher education system in Taiwan remained that, 
under the seamless government control, there was only one university, called 'the 
University of the Ministry of Education', even though it already had at least 40 
university establishments (Chen, 1993). However, since the mid-1980s, the existence of 
an opposition party as well as a series of protests started to form a strong tide against the 
government. The universities and academics started seriously to examine what their 
intellectual and social roles, and their relationships with the government, should be. 
Fundamental questions, such as why a university should have autonomy and academic 
freedom, and what hindered the latter's development, were also asked among academics 
in Taiwan. Liu (1985), for example, suggests that university reform should begin by 
revising the University Act to state clearly what power the MOE has in the Act, and that 
if powers were not granted to the MOE, they would fall within the scope of university 
self-government. 
Although the instrumentality of higher education as a tool of the economy is deeply-
rooted, universities have gained a chance to have more say in establishing their own 
goals during the 1990s. It is time to present the contextual boundaries between the 
government and the universities in Taiwan, before exploring the changing G-U 
relationships in Taiwan. 
6.4.2 Contextual Boundaries 
6.4.2.1 The Historical and Cultural Aspect 
The history of modem Chinese higher education, if counting from the establishment of 
'Jing Shi Da Shui Tang', the former Beijing University, founded in 1898, extends over 
at least 100 years. However, on analysing the relationship between the emergence of 
western style of university and Chinese culture, Kung (1990) argues that higher 
education in China (now in Taiwan) developed in the way isolated from its own 
traditional culture, because it was a product of imitation and implantation of western 
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systems. Although the organisation and system of higher education were extraneous to 
the Chinese education system, fundamental ideas which characterised western higher 
education were also present in traditional Chinese culture. These include: pursuit of 
knowledge for the sake of knowledge; cultivation of personal characters; and, 
educational establishments as the centre of thoughts and reflection. However, many 
events, including western military intrusions, civil wars between the communist party 
and the national party, and the relocation of Chinese government in Taiwan, not only 
worsened the chance of, but precluded, the incorporating of its own traditional values 
into the higher education system. 
Nevertheless, in the history of university development, there are two events from that 
history worth mentioning. First is the days of Tsai Yuan-pei's 'Beijing University' 
(1917-23), and, second is Fu Shi-nien's 'National Taiwan University' (1949-50). Both 
involved the most energetic academic pursuits and critique of to the then government. 
According to Chang (1986), a professor of history, education experienced an 
unprecedented phase of freedom during the period right after the Qin Dynasty was 
overthrown by the national government in 1911. The Beijing University, presided over 
by Tsai in 1917, benefited from such a context. Tsai, deeply influenced by the 
Humboldtian idea of a university, highly valued the freedom of teaching and of 
learning. He invited certain significant but controversial figures to teach in his 
University. For example, Fu Shi contributed greatly to thinking on freedom in China. 
As a protest against the illegal arrest of the then Treasury Minister by the military 
government, Tsai proposed, in 1923, to resign as president of Beijing University. 
Ambrose King (1983), a professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, commends 
Tsai, who established the Beijing University as an ideal place for academic pursuit 
where there was no compromise with political intervention (cited in Kao, 1991). 
Second, under the leadership of Fu Shi-nien, the idea of a university blossomed in the 
National Taiwan University. He supported and protected academic freedom. For 
example, Fu insisted on establishing the first committee in charge of academic 
appointments which were solely based on academic and intellectual criteria rather than 
individual political background. However, during the 1970s, a severe disagreement 
arose between certain academics and so-called 'political staff and students' in the 
Department of Philosophy. This event was not only a major blow to the growth of the 
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idea of a university, but also blocked the way for those academics who fought for 
freedom in teaching and research, forcing them away from such the leading university 
in Taiwan. 
6.4.2.2 The Political and Economic Aspect 
Since the 1950s, when the government relocated itself to Taiwan, there have been three 
stages of political-economic changes influencing the development of higher education. 
First, in the early 1950s, since political stability and economic growth were central to 
government agendas, the development of higher education suffered from government 
indifference. Second, during the period from 1954 to 1980, the government realised 
that the development of human resources was the only way to upgrade the society from 
an agricultural into an industrialised state. Thus, the development of the higher 
education jumped on to national agendas. However, this development was incorporated 
in national economic planning. For example, establishment and expansion of 
technological, rather than social science, departments, were favoured. Higher education 
institutions became places for manpower training rather than education. Third, since 
1980s, the whole external context in which the universities in Taiwan live, has 
undergone an important and significant transformation, noted below. 
Two notable political events contributed to the liberalising trend. First, in contravention 
of the Martial Law, declared by the ruling party (KMT) , more than 200 political 
dissidents organised, in 1986, their own political party, called the Democratic Progress 
Party (DPP), and gained influence through the election of the same year. Second, in the 
face of much criticism and protest from the people and the opposite party (DPP), the 
government was forced to lift the Martial Law in 1987. Subsequent changes, such as 
more openness in the news media, freedom of speech and ability of unions to organise, 
among others, have liberalised, energised and democraticised the whole society. The 
changes in the government policy in higher education since the 1980s and their 
implications for the G-U relationship are considered in 6.4.3. 
6.4.2.3 The Legislative and Regulative Aspect 
Since the first modern institution was established in China in 1898, there has always 
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been legislation concerning higher education, but most of the time it appeared irrelevant 
and redundant, partly because of a series of civil wars and partly because administrative 
regulations were violating the legislation, and acted as simple controls. Directly 
relevant to higher education is legislation such as the University Act, the Private School 
Act, the Education Personnel Recruitment Act, and the Degree Award Act. Besides, 
heavy regulations were created to control all aspects of university affairs. 'Jadot's 
Law', in the words of Neave and van Vught (1994), suggests that the degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by an institution is inversely proportional to the volume of a nation's 
legislation defining it. In the case of Taiwan, however, not only thick volume of 
legislation concerning higher education, but also the onerous and numerous regulations 
should be taken into account, in any examination of the degree of university autonomy, 
there. 
However, a turning point occurred in the year of 1994 when the newly-revised 
University Act was promulgated. The Act provides the legal basis for granting 
universities more decision-making powers in certain areas, such as presidential selection 
and appointment of academic staff. More importantly, the Interpretation No. 380 of the 
Council of Grand Justice in 1995 brought in a new way of interpretation of the scope of 
university autonomy. Also, the Interpretation facilitates the universities learning how to 
examine whether the parameters established by the government are legitimate or not. 
Subsequently, calls for revision of other statutes concerning higher education are 
continued. 
6.4.3 The Taiwan Case: Still Explicit and Formal, but Having a Visible Boundary 
The complex set of events which affected, and shaped, the relationship between the 
government and universities in the UK, shifting it from implicit toward explicit, status, 
was possibly not seen in Taiwan before the mid-1980s. The main reason is that the 
government-university relationship in Taiwan was simple and direct. It was simple 
because most observers had no difficulty in defining the government-university 
relationship in Taiwan as a typical example of the state control model. It was direct 
because the central authorities were dominant actors in defining the relationship by 
controlling many affairs of the university. 
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Table 6.2 Major Events in Taiwan since the 1980s 
Year/Name Highlights Implications for G-U Relationships 
1986 Non-G Proposal of revising An appeal of revising the University Act initiated by This proposal did not have too much effect on G due to the rigid political context 
the U Act the Asian Foundation and Tamkang University which was still under the Martial Law 
1986 Formation of an opposition Violating the Martial Law/ gaining an important status The past 'superficially-stable ' context was broken and this context facilitated 
party (DPP) through the election universities' and academics' reflection upon their relationships with G. 
1987 Lifting the Martial Law With the lifting, the removal of control on the media, Society was liberalised and the time seemed to have come to examine the past 
organising political party, university unions. authoritarian and centalised policy of HE. 
March 1987 Student Protest The students of National Taiwan U protested against University students found that censoring the publications was a tip of the iceberg, I 
the U. which censored the publications of the student and, thus, delivered their appeal to the Legislative Yuan to revise the U. Act, 
societies. which caused more concern of the society 
Nov. 1987 Legislative Yuan's A Draft, promoting granting of legal entities to national The rare occasion on which the Legislative Yuan was actively involved in 
Draft of U. Act universities, is put forward. proposing a draft of a relevant Act, and formed a source of checks and balances 
to monitor the central G. 
Dec. 1987 MOE's Draft ofU. Act MOE's draft was not accepted by the Executive Yuan Infuriating universities and academics, stimulating them to fight for their values 
(the cabinet), which re-imposed control attempts into and purposes. 
MOE's Draft. 
, 1989 Foundation of University Organising the first-time professorial street protest and Creating a new force to compel the G and the Executive Yuan to listen to what, 
Reform and Promotion proposing its own draft of University Act. universities and academics had said. 
Association (URPA) 
1991 Granting Uni. The power to The power was, first, granted to 14 national Some of the universities started to have decision-making power in faculty I 
peer-review faculty appointment universities, and latter, extended to other universities . appointments and promotions. 
and promotion internally 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) Major Events in Taiwan since the 1980s 
YeariName Highlights Implications for G-U Relationships 
1994 Promulgating of the revision Article One of the Act stated that academic freedom of The whole process of revision took 7 years; many parties' efforts (including Uni. 
of the University Act a university shall be protected and U shall enjoy ,academics, the Legislative Yuan, the UPRA, and so on» modified their 
autonomy of the extent provided by laws. boundaries with G. 
1994 Establishment of the The Executive Yuan formed a commission (2-year) on Educational groups and societies criticised the commission and G., and proposed I 
Commission on Education Reform Education to advise on education. an appeal to the continuity of reform, and actions should be taken, rather than 
producing short-term reports 
1994 MOE' Enforcement Rules of The University Act authorised the MOE to enforce the Suspecting MOE of intending to control U by issuing Enforcement Rules/ the 
the University Act Rules, some of which were controversial since they Legislative Yuan delivered an appeal to the Council of Grand Justice for 
were beyond the scope of the parent statue. interpretation. 
1995 Interpretation No. 380 of the The Interpretation confirms the scope of university Confirming that areas not authorised for MOE to control or to set rules, do fall 
Council of Grand Justice autonomy and academic freedom within the scope of university autonomy/ After this, G's position in dealing with, 
I 
U. affairs is somewhat constrained. 
1995 New funding scheme for It aims to grant greater flexibility of funding of national National universities started to learn to manage their own resources more 
National Us universities and to enhance financial autonomy effectively and economically, and generate part of their own income 
1995 White Paper on Education On HE, the G showed its will to respect academic At this stage, G and Us are still fumbling in the new era: G. learns how to take a 
toward 21 51 Century freedom and granting more autonomy in aspects of supervising role, and Us learn how to govern themselves i 
personnel, financial and curriculum to Us 
1997 Promulgation of the revision Compared to the previous revisions, this revision was Before 1994, private Us did not enjoy the autonomy they should have because the 
of the Private School Law significant and reinforced the contribution made by MOE's heavy regulations/ With the changing G-U relationship, they realised that 




Source: Compiled by the researcher. 
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In such an authoritarian and centralised context, the MOE had extended its power 
beyond those authorised by the statutes, but the universities were 'surprisingly' 
compliant with what the MOE determined via regulation, and failed both to claim their 
rights in those areas in which legislation did not authorise the MOE to regulate, and to 
question the misuse of power by the central authorities until the mid-1980s. 
Since the mid-1980s the whole authoritarian centralised control has been challenged by 
many parties, such as the main opposition politic party (DPP), university academics and 
student societies. The original G-U relationship was in tatters, challenged by new 
requests for university autonomy and academic freedom. A series of negotiations, with 
bargaining as well as legislation revision, illustrate the advent of new era for university 
development and for its relationships with government. (see Table 6.2) In the so-called 
new era (Free China Magazine, 1995), exploration of the G-U relationship in Taiwan 
merely via examination of legal acts and regulations, can be frustrating. This is 
because, diverse pieces of legislation on higher education prove that the formal and 
explicit G-U relationship is undeniably still in place. However, the process of 
interaction between the government and the university, rather than the 'product' (e.g. 
the passage of the revision of the University Act), is what carries the most significant 
implication for the changing G-U relationships in Taiwan. Two examples as follows 
can illustrate this argument: first is the process of revision of the University Act; and, 
second, the formation of checks and balances compelling the MOE and other 
government agencies to practise self-restraint. 
On the former, the MOE claimed that it took the initiative to revise the Act rather than 
being forced to do so by any other parties (Kao, 1991). However, Ho (1990) argues that 
the initiative of revising the University Act was triggered by non-government groups, 
universities and students. It is also found that academics had put forward requests for 
the revision of the University Act many times, for example, Liu (1985) and Fu (1990), 
and earlier than the MOE decision to revise the University Act. The revision in 1994, 
by contrast with the previous revisions of 1972 and 1982, implies that the MOE no 
longer held a dominant position. Other parties, such as the University Reform and 
Promotion Association (URPA) and the Legislative Yuan (particularly those legislators 
from the DPP), were active in monitoring the draft drawn up by the MOE, and in 
proposing their own drafts. During the course of revision, there occurred the first 
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professorial street protest. Irrespective of who was the winner in this revision, the 
whole process demonstrates that the universities and academics were beginning to fight 
for their own autonomy and academic freedom, and that for the first time the 
universities were realising that they could modify the boundaries between them and 
government. 
Conflicting interests made the revision extremely complicated, and it took seven years 
to finalise. The URPA insisted on incorporating the words 'academic freedom of a 
university shall be protected, and it (a university) shall enjoy autonomy to the extent 
provided by law' in the Act, but compromised elsewhere, letting military education 
personnel remain on campus, as requested by the MOE. From the beginning, the URPA 
compromise was seriously criticised by academics and university students, but its 
insistence regarding wording of the Act turned out to be a significant legal source of 
authority to nullify MOE power on the university curriculum. 
On the latter, that is, checks and balances operating on the MOE. During the period 
from accomplishment of the revision of the University Act until the emergence of the 
Interpretation No. 380 of the Council of Grand Justice, the MOE still intended to 
control universities through issuing administrative regulations, as it had done before. 
For a better understanding of this case, several important pieces of legislation, as 
follows, should be briefly stated. 
Constitution of the Republic of China 
Article 11: .. . People have the freedom in speech, instruction, writing and publishing.. 
Article 162: ... All public and private educational and cultural institutions in the country 
shall, in accordance with law, be subject to state supervision. 
The revision of the University Act in 1994 
Article 1: ... Academic freedom of a university shall be protected and it (university) shall 
enjoy autonomy to the extent provided by law. 
Although Article 162 in the Constitution had spelled out what the G-U relationship 
should be, the reality has never matched this, over the past decades. Even the 
Legislative Yuan, which in theory had power to impose checks and balances, correcting 
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the government, merely acted in reality as a rubber stamp. However, the story changes 
in the 1990s. After promulgating the revision of the University Act, the MOE quickly 
issued the 'Enforcement Rules of the University Act', one type of administrative 
regulation. Originally, the Rules were to be made in accordance with its parent statute, 
the University Act. However, nearly 20 items in the Rules violated its parent statute, in 
the view of Shie Chang-ting, a legislator of the DPP (United Evening News, October 
26, 1994). Having been aware of what amounted to a fundamental and critical misuse 
of power, the then Minister of Education still claimed that the Rules were effective until 
further revisions were made. The legislators of the KMT also, tried, skilfully, to cover 
the MOE by overturning Shei's proposal. The most controversial issue was related to 
Article 22 of the Rules: 
Enforcement Rules of the University Act 
Article 22: .. (paragraph2) those who fail in the common compulsory courses for each 
university and specialsied compulsory courses shall not graduate. Common 
compulsory courses for each university shall be made by the MOE through inviting all 
relevant persons of each university for discussion. 
While academic freedom and university autonomy had been granted, in law, to the 
universities, the MOE still prescribed some rules relating to academic matters, such as 
common compulsory courses and requirements for graduation. Several legislators 
delivered an appeal to the Council of Grand Justice for an interpretation of the scope of 
university autonomy and academic freedom. The Interpretation, made on May 26, 
1995, reinforces the principle that those powers which were not granted by statute to the 
MOE, do fall within the scope of university autonomy. It also confirms that the scope 
of university autonomy covers direct involvement with crucial academic matters in 
connection with teaching and research. 
Since the Interpretation was made, the MOE and other government agenCIes have 
gradually adopted a position of self-restraint when dealing with university matters. 
Nowadays, the MOE may stop short of distorting the meaning of legal provisions to 
control universities, but the former does have influence, held via its power of approval 
in matters such as the establishment, merging and discontinuing of programmes, 
departments, and the like. Nevertheless, it is clear that the MOE was no longer 
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dominant in defining the boundaries between government and universities. A new 
territory was born out of a series of events and changes, for universities in Taiwan, 
modifying these boundaries. 
6.5 Similarities and Differences 
Despite the argument of Levy (1994) that autonomy from the state does not mean 
autonomy from all external control (p. 254), Neave and van Vught suggest (1994) that it 
is sufficient to state that university autonomy to a large extent depends upon the way 
governments try to regulate the university system (p. 9). These words are true of 
England and Taiwan, where governments are playing a significant role in defining the 
G-U relationships, which in tum carry profound implications for university autonomy. 
In this section, changing G-U relationships, and their implication for university 
autonomy, in England and in Taiwan, are compared. 
The development backgrounds of the university m these two countries, are very 
different. If the existing models (discussed in 6.2.1) are applied to compare the two 
systems, what can be gained might be merely a formal contrast, such as that of the state-
control model in Taiwan versus the state-supervising model in England. With regard to 
the effects on university development of contextual factors, profound differences are 
also visible, between the two. Contextual factors in England insulated university affairs 
from government intervention. Thus, the universities in England in the three decades 
before the 1980s enjoyed, as Russell (1993) observes, a more amicable G-U relationship 
than they had had for most of their history. The political consensus on academic self-
government was embodied in the emergence of the UGc. The G-U relationship before 
the 1980s rested on an implicit agreement, and in which trust was placed by both sides. 
By contrast, contextual factors in Taiwan did not form a solid foundation for the 
university to claim what should have been a G-U relationship pre-designated by the 
Constitution of the Republic of China, right up to the 1990s. Even more detrimental to 
the idea of university autonomy, was that university education was a channel for 
political ideology. Compared to England, where formal legislation governing 
universities came only in 1988, legislation concerning universities was ever-present 
during the university's development in Taiwan. In addition, legislators, who originally 
represented the people's right to monitor government, in practice neither weakened 
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government nor functioned as a source of checks and balances on it. Complex 
legislation with heavy administrative regulations was imposed on universities, national 
and private ones. Study of contextual factors in Taiwan illustrates a lack of trust in the 
G-U relationship. 
There is one superficial similarity to be seen in both countries, before the 1980s. While 
the tensions and quarrels between the government and the university in the UK seemed 
like 'an exhausted volcano' in Russell's words (1993), it also seemed to be 'a dormant 
volcano' in Taiwan. On the surface, calm could be observed. However, there was an 
interesting difference, deep within the two cases. In England an amicable relationship 
between the government and the university emerged, where the English universities 
were dominant in defining the G-U relationship, and the government accepted a position 
of self-restraint. However, the case in Taiwan showed a superior-subordinate 
relationship, in which the government dominated the universities, and the latter were 
compliant with government wishes. Arguably, compared with the case in England, 
universities in Taiwan were in a situation where they could not properly discharge their 
responsibilities to society at large. 
Nevertheless, the concept of boundary makes this comparison meaningful, because the 
relationships between the government and the university are dynamic rather than fixed. 
Regarding the development of the relationship between the government and the 
university in both countries, the following figures are drawn to serve as a platform for 
further comparison. 
The Figure 6.1 demonstrates that an arm's length relationship existed, between the 
government and the university before the 1980s. An 'engaged relationship' was 
established, through the buffer body, the UGc. The main events, listed in Table 6.1, 
contributed to the boundary to shift and be redrawn. In the earlier analysis, the function 
of funding bodies shifted from that of a buffer body (the UGC before 1980s), and a 
planning body (the UGC and the UFCI PCFC), to arm of government, and influence -
albeit an emasculated one - in the key policy forum, the HEFCE. Various quangos' 
calling for statements of overall objectives for the planning period, for research goals 
and plans and financial forecasting from universities became 'normal and frequent' 
(Becher and Kogan, 1992, p. 45). Various codes of practice for universities to follow 
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and linking institutional performance to funding gradually fostered a culture of 
compliance. The Education Reform Act (1988) and the Further and Higher Education 
Act (1992) redrew the boundary between the government and the university (see Figure 
6.2). It is clear that 'the zone of penetration' of central government through various 
quangos had moved into university territory, while 'academic norms and modes of self-
governance had given way to powerful objective-setting by the central authorities' 
(Becher and Kogan, 1992, p. 49). The universities in England had no longer been in a 
dominant position in defining their boundaries with the government. (see more evidence 
given in 6.3.2) 
Figure 6.1. The 'Arm's Length' G-U relationship but Engaged through the UGC 
Prior to the 1980s (England) 
Note 1. 'Zone of negotiation' (Neave, 1988a, p. 38) between G and U, in effect, which was controlled by 
the universities themselves. Thus, it is also called 'an extension of the university' . 
2. Drawn by the researcher. 
Figure 6.2. The Zone of Penetration of Central Government into the Universities in 
the Post-1988 Era (England) 
Note: 1. 'Zone of penetration' (Neave, 1988a, pAS) of central government through quangos (HEFCE, 
QAA, ITA) into the universities. 2. Drawn by the researcher. 
142 
In Taiwan, universities' development was completely incorporated into a national 
centralised planning mechanism. The government control was two-fold. Externally, the 
MOE and other government agencies were issuing diverse regulations to control 
universities. Internally, for reasons of national security, the government deployed 
certain special personnel and political students to censor and report on the behaviour 
and speech of academics. The private universities were not exempted. Such an 
entangled G-U relationships between the government and the university can be termed 
as an 'enmeshed' relationship, which implies that the government was dominant in 
defining the boundaries, and the universities, were vulnerable to governmental actions. 
The universities in Taiwan were completely in the 'zone of penetration' of central 
government. As van Vught (1989, p. 54) describes, under such circumstances, the 
organisational variety of universities was greatly reduced and their professional 
autonomy was largely restrained. (see Figure 6.3) 
Figure 6.3. An Enmeshed G-U Relationship Prior to the Mid-1980s (Taiwan) 
Note: 1. The university entity was, ironically, called as the University of the Ministry of Education. 2. 
Drawn by the researcher. 
Figure 6.4. A Negotiable G-U Relationship in the Post-1994 Era (Taiwan) 
Note: Drawn by the researcher. 
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In 6.4.2, the whole process by which the boundaries between the government and the 
universities shifted, in Taiwan, has been explored. The transitional social-political 
context since the 1980s has contributed to this shift. The universities started to claim 
autonomy, and to think in terms of their own goals, rather than those assigned by the 
MOE. The boundary of the university gradually moved out of the zone of penetration 
of the government, until it created a new territory, a status confirmed by the revision of 
University Act and the emergence of the Interpretation No. 380 of the Council of Grand 
Justice. (see Figure 6.4) Within the boundary of the university, the areas for university 
self-government have been extended, to include elements of academic matters, 
presidential selection, academic staff appointment and institutional development 
planning. The birth of a new territory offered a chance for universities to modify the 
boundaries with the government. This new relationship can be termed as the 
'negotiable' G-U relationship. The private universities enjoy, in theory, more autonomy 
than their national counterparts, in the period after 1994. 
The shifts from Figure 6.1 to 6.2, and from Figure 6.3 to 6.4, illustrate the changing G-
U relationships in both countries. Comparison of Figure 6.1 with Figure 6.3 suggests 
that, in regard to university autonomy, the 'arm's-length relationship' mediated via the 
function of the UGC in England, meant that the university system there was able 'to 
bask in the informal rules of the republic ofletters' (Becher and Kogan, 1992, p. 145), 
and 'grew accustomed to a very high degree of practical autonomy' (Eustace, 1994, p. 
88). By contrast, the 'enmeshed relationship' in Taiwan implies that the university 
system was dominated by central government, and had weak autonomy. 
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.4 suggest that in both countries, the boundaries between the 
government and the university shift into a new area, that of shared territory, but differ as 
to which is dominant in defining or influencing the relationship and which body can 
succeed more, in expressing the values which it holds or embodies. The birth of a new 
territory in England is more an expression of the values of central government, which 
enlarges its area of influence. By contrast, the birth of a new territory in the case of 
Taiwan is more a case of the university checking whether parameters imposed by 
government are legitimate, and starting expressing its own values and purposes. Thus, 
one question to be asked is what implications of this present shifting in G-U 
relationships have for university autonomy in each country. 
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In England, the development of the university system is progressively placed within 
central government's area of concern, particularly when the 'gap' created by the 
HEFCE retreat from planning has been inevitably filled by the government rather than 
by the universities (Scott, 1995). The politicians then wish to decide 'what a university 
shall be' (Russell, 1993, p. 107) and the universities are moving toward a system in 
which they are not in control of their values and purposes (Tapper and Salter, 1992, p. 
243). Under such a relationship, where the government has become more dominant in 
defining G-U relationship and has imposed more and more elaborate systems, many 
academics, like Tasker and Packham (1990), Becher and Kogan (1992), Russell (1993) 
and Scott (1995), suggest that university autonomy in England is eroded. 
Unlike the English case outlined by Tapper and Salter (1995), the case in Taiwan 
demonstrates that legislation provides an opportunity for universities rather than 
government, to proclaim a new G-U relationship. Such a changing G-U relationship 
confirms and supports university autonomy which is granted by statutes, although in 
practice the MOE in some cases uses the instrument of treasury, that is, financial 
control, and the power of approval to influence universities' choices. However, whether 
university autonomy can be realised as a consequence of the changing G-U relationship 
is still inconclusive. The vacuum of power on campus, created after the retreat of the 
government's centralised authority, seems to be filled by the values and terminology of 
'campus democracy' and 'professorial rules', but the chaotic reality has frustrated 
academics who fought for the rebirth of the university. In this situation, the universities 
in Taiwan may miss an opportunity to convince the government that they can govern 
themselves properly. This possibility is discussed in Chapter 8, where views of 





It is insufficient to understand university autonomy by merely exammmg legal 
framework for universities, since a considerable gap can exist not only between legal 
and effective autonomy (Jadot, 1981), but also between the given power and the room 
for which those power can be exercised. Thus, this empirical study is hoping to give 
rise to another complementary picture of the practice of university autonomy, and its 
association with funding, in England and in Taiwan. 
7.2 Methodological Issues Regarding Assessing University Autonomy 
7.2.1 Methodological Issues 
In the social research, the term of 'methodology' involves not only a set of methods, 
skills and procedures, but also 'the logical and theoretical basis' (Sjoberg and Nett, 
1968) on which to find a way to produce 'accounts that correspond to the nature of 
social reality' (Hammersley, 1993). Thus, it becomes an interesting phenomenon, that 
is, a wealth of books and articles on the subject of the methodology in social research 
can range from being either very theoretical-oriented or very applicable, to a mixture of 
two. Indeed, it is far easier to give a definition to methodology than to give a 
comprehensive account of all methodological debates, or all the views taken towards the 
issue involved, since different views are supported by their epistemological advocators, 
ranging from positivists at one extreme to idealists at the other. 
The social scientists holding the positivist Views tend to believe that objective 
knowledge in the study of social world can be attained and observed as what nature 
scientists insist. By contrast, the social scientists holding the views of idealism or 
cultural relativism tend to believe that individual societies have their own 'laws and 
destiny', and even to lead a position 'to a denial of the very possibility of obtaining 
objective knowledge, and consequently of any generalizing science of society' (Sjoberg 
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and Nett, 1968, p. 6). These two epistemological poles are, as Henwood and Pidgeon 
(1993) describe, 'competing claims regarding what constitutes warrantable knowledge'. 
The war zone between them has already extended to different methodological 
paradigms. Among them, the fights between quantitative and qualitative research have 
vigorously remained at issue for several decades (Gaiser and Strauss, 1967). 
The methodologists in the quantitative research paradigm try to minimise contextual 
influence by standardising the procedures of data collection, thus enhancing reliability, 
while they tend to assume that there is a clear and unambiguous reality out there. 
Unsurprisingly, they tend to question the objectivity of the qualitative research, and 
criticise the low level of reliability (consistency) and generalisability of its findings. 
However, social phenomena do not exist in vacuum, and the methodologists holding 
qualitative approaches assume that everything is situated in its own unique context and 
tend to seek contextual interpretations of the social world. They tend to criticise 'the 
simplistic and superficial nature of quantitative research' (Jayaratne, 1993), and to the 
extreme, even, to strongly claim that there is a need 'to reduce or eliminate the use of 
quantitative research as a valid methodology for social scientists' (Reinharz, 1979). 
However, if the debates end with the claim that the quantitative approach is superior to 
the qualitative one, or vice versa, they will become part of the questions, rather than the 
way to answer the questions. Increasingly, the assumption that they represent two 
opposed approaches to the study of the social world has been challenged. This is not to 
deny the reality of differences in epistemological positions, and consequently in nature 
of data, modes of data collection and data analysis between quantitative and qualitative 
research. While they share the same aim, that is, achieving the way to develop, support 
and explicate social theory, research methodologists, like Schofield (1993), Jayaratne 
(1993) and D. Scott (1995), make efforts to reconcile the hostility between these two 
methodological approaches. Based on the observations of Cronbach et al. (1980), 
Schofield (1993) claims that 'the striking rapprochement' between them occurred 
during the 1980s after both sides of researchers have more contacts with each other's 
traditions (p. 204). Jayaratne (1993) advocates the use of qualitative data in conjunction 
with quantitative data, since quantitative research could benefit from the addition of 
qualitative data, and certainly qualitative data can support and explicate the meaning of 
quantitative research. Also, D. Scott (1995) indicates that 'two methods do not belong 
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within separate research paradigms and thus can be sensibly used with the same 
investigation'. Although the choice between quantitative and qualitative research is to 
do with their suitability in answering particular research question (B rym an, 1988) and 
this can be very pragmatic, the accounts above provide an orientation to the discussion 
of the methodological issues regarding assessing university autonomy. 
7.2.2 Assessing University Autonomy 
There are some empirical studies on assessing university autonomy. The studies of 
Levy (1980) and McDaniel (1996) are examples among them. Interestingly, both 
studies employed different research approaches, but both of them had an extensive 
involvement of peoples within a country or across countries. In the former, interviews 
with 100 Mexican scholars with a reputational and positional basis, were employed. In 
the latter, questionnaires were used to assess the current level of institutional autonomy 
in the 75 states and countries involved. 
Levy (1980) makes the criticisms that the absence of rigor definition of university 
autonomy 'permits loose usage, especially as authors seize randomly upon only one or 
two aspects of autonomy while ostensibly evaluating the overall concept' (p.2). There 
are three reminder points from Levy's study for this research. First of all, the 
researchers should consider how to operationalise the definition of university autonomy 
before assessment. Second, the expression of the practice of university autonomy is 
multi-dimensional, covering not only academic and financial, but also appointive 
(personnel) and institutional governance, aspects. Thus, he gives an operational 
definition of university autonomy as 'who decides' or 'whether universities control 
over' major components of university affairs. Such an operational definition is still 
commonly used in relevant studies, but there are differences in what constitutes 'major' 
components of university affairs. Third, an in-depth analysis of the context issue should 
be included in understanding the practice of university autonomy of any given country. 
However, if the studies involved many countries, then, apparently, they will have 
difficulties in affording an analytical methodology such as that of Levy (1980), which is 
feasible when the studies involve a single country or few countries. McDaniel's study 
(1996) is another type of example. McDaniel (1996) designed the questionnaire with 19 
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questions and issued it to the higher education authorities in 75 countries. After 
summing the scores, he drew a matrix to illustrate the relevant and referential location 
of each country. Indeed, it provides a broad picture of university autonomy across 
countries. With the thought of the complexities of the practice of university autonomy, 
McDaniel's study reveals a major deficiency, which appears commonly as the subject of 
criticism to quantitative research. That is the ignorance of the context issue in 
understanding university autonomy, which leads to question what purpose of such a 
research tries to achieve. Does it only intend to claim that one country has greater 
university autonomy than another? Thus, working out a matrix to illustrate the results 
sounds interesting, but it means little in terms of understanding of university autonomy 
in different countries, and tends to over-simplify the concept of university autonomy. 
From the reviews of the studies above, a deficiency is still manifest in terms of the 
quality of research. However, laying all blame on researchers may not be completely 
fair while the concept of university autonomy is multi-dimensional, and there are no 
established models in assessment of university autonomy. It is believed that the concept 
of university autonomy is 'contextually and politically' defined (Neave, 1988a). It is 
hard for social researchers to claim that what they obtain is a complete picture of the 
practice of university autonomy. 
There is a need of 'a critical examination of the impact of the researcher upon the 
research design is the first step toward objectivity', while the researchers themselves are 
recognised as a variable in the research design (Sjoberg and Nett, 1968). Recalling the 
discussions during attending doctoral programme training courses, one picture was 
drawn to the researcher's attention, that is, that most research students seem to give 
more credits to a qualitative-oriented research than a quantitative-oriented one, while 
the tutors asked us 'what research methodology will you adopt in your research?'. On 
certain occasions, it needed courage for those students who planned to employ a merely 
quantitative approach in their 'PhD' research to justify their choices. This background 
influenced the researcher to avoid choosing quantitative methods as a research approach 
in the first place. However, after extensive theoretical exploration of the concept of 
university autonomy and with reflection on methodological debates, choosing the use of 
quantitative research in conjunction with qualitative research comes to seem critical, not 
arbitrary, and it is also the consequence of a careful consideration of the research 
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objectives. 
7.3 Research Design 
The purpose of the empirical research is to investigate university staff's views of the 
practice of university autonomy, and its association with funding in key areas of affairs, 
and of the usefulness and applicability of the concept of 'contractual autonomy' , 
proposed by the present study, in both countries. This empirical study was built on a 
two-stage research design. The first stage was a questionnaire survey, designed to 
provide some breadth to the portrayal of the overall picture of the practice of university 
autonomy, and the relationship between university autonomy and funding, in England 
and in Taiwan. This stage was conducted during the period April to May 1998. 
Second, based on initial statistical analysis of the questionnaire, interview schedules 
were drafted, to conduct in-depth interviews with those universities, which expressed 
willingness to be further interviewed after the questionnaire survey. The interviews 
were undertaken in England (during the period May to August 1998) and in Taiwan 
(September and October 1998), respectively. Diagram 7.1 briefly illustrates the overall 
design framework of the investigation. 
Two fundamental principles have been born in mind during the process of research 
design: one is to evaluate the feasibility of the empirical design; the other is to set out 
the logistics, including time-requirements. The design stage was regarded by the 
researcher as an iterative, dynamic process, such that completion came only with the 
final-draft questionnaire through which the final data was collected. On feasibility, the 
design was refined via a 'pre-pilot' study, before a formal pilot. Although time-
consuming, the 'pre-pilot' study provided the researcher with valuable experience and 
lessons, by which the research design was re-thought and the instrument of research was 




University Governance! University Autonomy/ 
Funding! G-U Relationships 
Research Design 
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Design 
Diagram 7.1 Design of the Investigation into University Autonomy and its Relationship 
with Funding in England and in Taiwan 
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7.3.1 Design of the Research Questionnaire 
The instrument of research was devised to help provide the empirical data from four 
aspects, covering, first, what the degree of autonomy in 37 key areas of university 
affairs is; second, what areas are under external regulations; third, on what areas 
universities have the possibility of reducing external control by raising of universities' 
own income; and, fourth, on what areas university autonomy has changed during the 
past ten years. Given the distinctive purposes of this research and with the thought of 
limitation of the pre-existing questionnaires, there seems no other feasible way, except 
devising a new questionnaire. Nevertheless, pre-existing questionnaires (for example, 
McDaniel, 1996) on the assessment of university autonomy provided this design with a 
stimulating starting-point. 
Critically, and in the technical sphere, one great challenge came - how to include the 37 
key areas of university affairs, overall and, on each four sections of questions needing to 
be asked, and to balance respondents' patience against time availability, and the 
resulting possible effect on data quality, and the response rate. On the latter, however, 
Fowler's dictum (1993) was noted - 'there is no agreed-upon standard for a minimum 
acceptable response rate'. A traditional format (a list of questions) did not work 
effectively, because it generated a questionnaire at least eight pages long. In the end, a 
tabular framework was devised to minimise the length of the questionnaire, and 
maximise respondents' willingness to fill in it. 
The instrument of this research - Questionnaire oj University Autonomy and Its 
Relationship with Funding (see Appendix 4) - was briefly introduced as follows: 
In Section I, on the degree of university's decision-making power, a five-point scale was 
employed to ask the respondents to locate decision-making on each area of university 
affairs, on a scale 'entirely within university', 'largely within university', 'shared or 
mixed', to 'largely external' and 'entirely external'. These five options were 
operationally defined as follows in the guidance to respondents: 
1). 'entirely within university': Initiation, process of decision-making and final approval 
are all in control of the university. 
2). 'largely within university': At least one of the 3 stages is significantly influenced by 
outside agency. 
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3). 'shared or mixed': There are significant inputs from both inside and outside the 
university, and both have effective power of veto over the decision. A decision is also 
'shared' if in some cases it is made by the university and in others it is determined 
externally. 
4). 'largely external': External authority has formal power to initiate the making of a 
decision, or to give final approval, but is subject to some influence by the university. 
5). 'entirely external': The whole decision process is determined by an external agency 
or agencIes. 
In Section II, on the form of external influence or authority, there are four options 
provided - 'legaL! administrative', 'financial', 'other', and, finally, 'none/ don't know.' 
1). 'LegaL! administrative' form means those in statutes, government regulations, etc. 
2). 'Financial regulations' means any significant financial conditions imposed by 
government. The other two options are self-explanatory. 
In Section III, on the possibility of significantly reducing external control if a university 
can raise its own income, there are three options provided - 'yes', 'no', and 'don't 
know/ not applicable.' 
In Section IV, on any change in autonomy during the past ten years, there are three 
options provided - 'increase', 'decrease ' and 'no change'. 
Indeed, formulating the questionnaire, one immediate issue, also a common subject of 
criticism in survey, had to be considered. It is its pre-set response categories, limiting 
the way the respondents can answer and making it unlikely to evaluate the validity of 
the answers. To minimise the validity of such a criticism, an explicit "don't know" 
option in Section II and III was included. Inclusion of this option has been argued by 
Andrews (1984) as being associated with better data and high validity (cited in Foddy, 
1993, p. 111). After adding an introduction, institutional background details, and the 
key guidelines for completing questionnaire to the draft questionnaire, an appendix was 
also attached for inviting respondents' comments, and an invitation to make further 
contact if they were willing to be interviewed, or to receive a copy of the summary of 
the study. After the draft English questionnaire was completed, the Chinese version of 
questionnaire was produced through several rounds of translation and back-translation. 
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After drafting the questionnaires (English and Chinese versions), a pilot study was 
conducted with 14 persons (eight from pre-1992 and six from post-1992 universities) in 
England, and five persons (four from two national and two private universities, and one 
from the Ministry of Education) in Taiwan. Several revisions were made in the light of 
this pilot to both English and Chinese questionnaires. In both versions, for example, a 
note was added beneath the Table of questions to clarify what 'external agencies' meant, 
'the guidelines for completing the questionnaire' were made much clearer, an option 
'Not applicable' in Section III was added, and e-mail addresses were given. In the 
English version, some areas of university affairs were suggested to be more explicit, 
such as that area 26 should have the 'undergraduate' tuition fees added. In the Chinese 
version, the advice, such as combining several areas (such as, 31 and 32), to add some 
areas (such as, award an honour degree), and to omit the areas 27 and 28, was given. 
After careful consideration and discussion, 37 key areas of university affairs were 
sustained, because increasing the number of areas covered would have made the 
questionnaire unacceptably complex. Also, no item of out of 37 areas was omitted, 
because the latter were regarded as key university affairs, regardless that some of them 
in practice, at present, were not allowed to do by the government in Taiwan. 
The final drafts of the questionnaires (English and Chinese versions) were formally 
issued. Of course, established strategies were followed to maximise effectiveness of a 
postal questionnaire, such as providing a stamped addressed envelope. One week after 
the pre-designated return date, non-respondents were sent with, not only a reminder 
card, but also another copy of questionnaire, in case they had mislaid the first one, 
and/or they did not have time to search for it. 
The sample in this study comprised the universities in England and in Taiwan. In 
England, those institutions with the title of university were selected. For the University 
of London, several major colleges were selected to take part in this study. In Taiwan, 
institutions with the status of university (some of them are called 'college') before the 
passage of the revision of the University Act in 1994 were selected. The total number 
of selected universities was 77 in England and 40 in Taiwan. Senior staff of the 
individual selected universities, such as the vice-chancellor (called 'president' III 
Taiwan), the registrar, or the secretary, were target respondents of this survey. 
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Despite the efforts, made in the design and piloting of the questionnaire, some rejections 
were inevitable, but some of the latter included explanations of refusal to participate, 
reasons being, for example, lack of institutional resources (e.g. time), or a set 
institutional policy of declining to participate in such studies. However, the overall 
response rate was quite encouraging. Table 7.1 shows that of 77 universities 
approached in England, 45 questionnaires were returned (58.4%). From 40 selected 
universities in Taiwan, 27 questionnaires were returned, and the response rate was 
67.5%. It can be inferred, though tentatively, from these response rates, that the subject 
matter of this study, university autonomy, remains of interest to a substantial numbers of 
university staff in both countries. Table 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 illustrated basic data regarding 
types, financial types (referring to Table 5.2), and number of institutions (pre-1992 and 
post-1992 in England, and national and private in Taiwan), and categories and number 
of respondents and those willing to be interviewed after the questionnaire survey. 
Table 7.1 Response Rate by Type of Institution 
Type of Institution Questionnaires Questionnaires Response 
Dispatched Completed (per cent) 
England 
Pre-1992 university 43 25 58.1 
Post-1992university 34 20 58.8 
Total 77 45 58.4 
Taiwan 
National university 18 14 77.8 
Private university 22 l3 59.1 
Total 40 27 67.5 
Table 7.2 Categories of Respondents 
Type of Vice-chancellor/ Secretary and Registrar Secretary Planning 
Respondent President Registrar Manager and 
Others 
England 
Pre-1992 university 4 6 10 4 1 
Post-1992 university 6 2 3 6 3 
Taiwan 
National university 11 0 2 1 0 
Private university 10 0 0 1 2 
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National university 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Private university 2 1 0 0 0 
Note: the number of interview is based on the respondents, who ticked 'Yes ' at the time of filling in 
questionnaire. (see Table 7.5 for fmal number and type of interviewee) 
7.3.2 Design and Carrying-out Interviews 
The second stage of the empirical study involved 25 in-depth, semi-structured, tape-
recorded interviews with senior staff of universities in England and in Taiwan (lOin 
England and 15 in Taiwan). Interview schedules were expected to achieve, first, a 
greater understanding of some interesting findings from the initial analysis of 
questionnaire survey, particularly those points showed inconsistencies with, or 
contradictions of, the literature. For example, results from Section III suggest - except 
in respect of certain areas of university affairs - little optimism on the possibility of 
reducing external control by raising universities' own income, in both countries. 
Results from Section IV suggest, contrary to claims common in the literature, little 
support for the view from pre-1992 universities that university autonomy has decreased. 
Second, the views of university staff about their autonomy on, for example - 'What 
might be the main challenges to university autonomy?' and 'What is the relationship 
between university autonomy and funding?', were sought. Third, the interviewees were 
invited to comment on the definition of 'contractual autonomy' . (see Appendix 5 & 6 
for interview schedules in detail) 
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However, several differences in the interview schedules for England and for Taiwan 
should be identified. In England, the staff views on the financial memorandum between 
the funding council and their university, and about the research assessment exercise 
(RAE) and teaching quality assessment (TQA) were sought. In Taiwan, the specific 
questions on the enormous changes on campus, which were occasioned by change in the 
government-university relationship; on the idea of ' professorial rule'; and, finally, on 
the granting to national universities, of legal corporate status, were asked. 
Covering the above subjects, interview schedules were sent, with a covering letter, to 
individual interviewees two weeks before the appointment. At the interview, 
interviewees were invited to add any topics they thought important, for discussion, over 
and above those set schedules. Meanwhile, with the consent of interviewees, interviews 
were tape-recorded. 
Compared with Table 7.4, Table 7.5 shows some changes in the number of interviewees. 
In England, initially fifteen respondents agreed to be interviewed. However, after 
further contact, some of them were lost before arrangements were finalised, reasons 
being, too busy, or changing post, or indeed changing university. Finally, ten interviews 
were conducted. By contrast, ten more universities in Taiwan for interview were 
gained, through further contacts and with the help of an MOE senior administrator. 
Table 7.SType (Code) of University Staff for Interview 
Type of V-C/ Registrar Dean Secretary Planning 
Interviewee President Manager and 
Others 
England 
Pre-1992 2(VCl *1; VC2*) 3(Reg.l *; 0 l(Mang.l) 
university Reg.2; 
Reg.3) 
Post-1992 0 1 (Reg.4) 1 (Deanl) 2(Sec.l; 0 
university Sec.2) 
Taiwan2 
National 4(Pres.l *; 0 l(Dean2*) 2(Sec.3*; 0 
university Pres.2*; Pres.3*; Sec.4*) 
V-Pre.l *) 
Private 2(Pres.4*; 0 3(Dean3*; 2(Sec.5*; 0 
university Pres.5*) Dean4*; Sec.6) 
Dean5*;) 
157 
Note: 1. ,*, means that interviewee himself or herself is also an academic. 2. Each interviewee is given a 
code, used in the future analysis of interview. 3. The fmal number of interviewees in Taiwan is 15. One 
interviewee, who was planning to establish a private university, was a legislator, a member of an 
Education Select Committee in the Legislative Yuan. 
7.4 Methods of Analysis 
This section introduces methods of analysis on the data, obtained from the questionnaire 
survey, and from interview. Regarding quantitative data, SPSS Base 8.0 was used for 
statistical analysis. One feature of the quantitative data set of this study should be 
noted. Generally speaking, the aim of conventional quantitative research is to collect 
the sample data, which are used 'both to calculate sample statistics and to estimate how 
close these are to the unknown parameters' (Schofield, 1996, p. 26). How the 'sample' 
is selected matters, when the population size and location are not clear. Many ways of 
sampling have been proposed in sampling theory, such as simple random sampling, 
stratified random sampling, cluster sampling, and quota sampling. 
However, the present research has a clear population, that is, all universities in England 
and in Taiwan, except those without the title of university in England, and those without 
the status of university before the passage of the University Act in 1994 in Taiwan, for 
which many relevant population parameters should in theory be known. However, 
respondents' willingness to take part was of course beyond the control of this study. 
Thus, the 'sample' was produced, when individual selected universities chose to return 
their accomplished questionnaires, or to decline participation. The response rate of each 
group of institutions being over 50 percent means that the sample is reasonably 
representative of establishments overall within each group. Inferential statistics can also 
be used to test hypotheses about differences in the popUlation, using the data from the 
sample (Calder, 1996). Thus, both descriptive statistics, to summarise the data, and 
inferential statistics, to test the generalisability of the results for sub-groups, are relevant 
in this study. 
On the data obtained from Section I of the questionnaire, four statistical methods were 
used. First, the T -test was used to compare the means of university autonomy scores 
between countries (England and Taiwan) and between type of institutions (pre-1992 
versus post-1992; national versus private). Second, ANOYA was used to compare the 
means of university autonomy scores across four groups (pre-1992, post-1992, national, 
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and private universities). Third, Nonparametric test (K-independent Sample) was used 
to test the difference in the degree of university autonomy between institutions with 
different financial types. Fourth, Chi-square was used to test the difference in the 
overall proportion of university autonomy between countries. Finally, on the data 
obtained from Section II, III and IV of the questionnaire, Chi-square was also used to 
test differences between countries. 
The steps taken between interviews and analysis, were, first, initial transcription of 
taped-interviews, verbatim, in the language of interviews; second, re-reading transcripts, 
to mark and, if possible resolve, points which were not clear; third, listening to the tapes 
again, to eliminate as far as possible any doubtful points, and to create reports of 
interview. And then, English being as the second language of the researcher, two native 
speakers were invited to read through interview reports and marked doubtful points, to 
alert the researcher to re-check them via the tapes. Finally, the report on each interview 
in England was sent back to the interviewee for verification. Regarding interview 
transcripts in the case of Taiwan, the first three procedures were as for the English data, 
and the transcripts were then translated into English. 
Subsequently, to analyse the qualitative data, the following techniques were used: 1) 
search of transcripts for themes, 2) development of analytical categories, and 3) to index 
all pieces of transcribed texts accordingly. The main themes to be looked for, in the 
data, included: the main challenges of university autonomy; the relationship between 
university autonomy and funding; the government-university relationship; themes 
specific either to England or to Taiwan; and, finally, the feedback about the definition of 
'contractual autonomy'. Under each theme, the analytical categories were developed to 
index transcribed texts. 
Dealing with all the categorisation and indexing, the computer package (NUDIST) was 
employed in order to trace each reference back to the interview which had generated it, 
and to retrieve or add indexes. Basically, the package helped the researcher look at data 
horizontally, across different interviewees. However, the indexed texts themselves 
provided only with a route into the qualitative data set, rather than providing analytical 
end-products. Finally, it should be noted for clarity that the data from questionnaires 
and from interviews were treated as being independent the one of the other, in what they 
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provided to the overall investigation, though they were clearly related and might well 
generate themes which would turn out to be similar. Empirical findings are presented in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Empirical Findings in England and in Taiwan 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide the survey results, quantitative and qualitative, on 
respondents' perception of 1) university autonomy in practice; 2) the relationship 
between university autonomy and funding; and, 3) the usefulness and applicability of 
the concept of 'contractual autonomy'. 
8.2. Results on University Autonomy in Practice in England and in Taiwan 
Results on university autonomy in practice, in this section, cover four aspects: first, the 
degree of university's decision-making power in 37 key areas of university affairs; 
second, the proportion of those 37 key areas of university affairs which are thought by 
respondents to be under any external regulation, and if so, what form the external 
regulation takes; third, the proportion of the key areas of affairs in which autonomy has 
changed over the past ten years; and, fourth, the views of university autonomy in 
practice held by university staff in both countries. The first three aspects are presented 
in 8.2.1, and the final aspect is presented in 8.2.2. 
From here on, references to "key areas of university affairs" means, unless clearly 
specified otherwise, the specific set of 37 key areas of university affairs which were 
investigated in this study. 
8.2.1 Questionnaires on University Autonomy in Practice 
Degree of University's Decision-making Power 
Figure 8.1 indicates that, in a majority of key areas of university affairs (34 out of 37; 
92 per cent), respondents from universities in England thought that they could decide 
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themselves. Four areas, which they thought they could, entirely, decide for themselves, 
concern matters such as appointments of faculty deans and department heads, registrar, 
personnel director and finance director. However, there were certain areas which were 
thought to be largely decided by external bodies, though these areas represented a tiny 
proportion of the total. Such areas include: determining number of UK undergraduates, 
setting level of undergraduate tuition fees, and determining salary scale of academic 
staff. These results also applied to pre-1992 and post-1992 universities. There was no 
statistically significant difference between pre-1992 and post-1992 university 
respondents regarding the perception of the overall university's decision-making power, 
and that power in the individual affairs. 
Figure 8.1 The Overall Pattern of University's Decision-making Power in England 
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As shown in Figure 8.2, in respect of nearly half of key areas of university affairs (16 
out of 37; 43 per cent), respondents from universities in Taiwan thought that they could, 
largely, decide for themselves. However, for more than one-third of them (14 out of 37; 
38 per cent), they thought that they shared decision-making power with external bodies. 
They thought that there were six key areas of affairs which were decided largely by 
external bodies, and one key area which was wholly out of the control of universities. 
The former include the areas such as undergraduate entry qualifications, number of 
undergraduates and postgraduates, setting level of undergraduate tuition fees , 
determining salary scale of academic staff and salary of individual academic staff. The 
latter, one area, concerns rights to establish university company, on which external 
bodies have full decision-making power. 
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Figure 8.2 The Overall Pattern of University's Decision-making Power in Taiwan 
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Significant differences between national and private universities In the degree of 
university's decision-making power were found in eight individual areas of affairs. In 
seven of the latter, private universities enjoyed a greater degree of decision-making 
power than their national counterparts. These areas include: appointments of president, 
personnel director, and finance director; drawing up annual budgets; determining salary 
scales and salary of individual academics; and, finally, setting annual income generation 
targets. However, national universities enjoyed a greater degree of decision-making 
power than their private counterparts on the area of promotion of academic staff. 
Significant differences between England and Taiwan were found in the overall pattern 
of university's decision-making power (Pearson chi-square .000, d.f. 4; see Figure 8.3). 
The proportion of key areas of affairs, in which university respondents thought that they, 
largely or entirely, decided matters for themselves, was higher in England (92 per cent) 
than that in Taiwan (43 percent). In both countries, however, matters in the areas of 
determining undergraduate numbers, undergraduate tuition fee level, and salary scale of 
academics, were thought to be decided largely by external bodies. 
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Figure 8.3 The Overall Pattern of University's Decision-making Power: 
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Table 8.1 Differences in Degree of University's Decision-making Power in 
Individual Key Area of Affairs between Respondents in England and Taiwan 
Key Areas of University Affairs Country (Mean) T Value 
England( 45) Taiwan(27) 
1. Undergraduate Entry Qualifications 4.82 2.74 8.695** 
4. Number of Postgraduates 3.98 2.88 4.640** 
6. Setting Degree Standards and Criteria 4.41 3.56 3.507** 
7. Awarding the Degree 4.82 3.96 4.115** 
16. Appointment of Vice-chancellor/ Principal 4.96 3.81 6.635** 
18. Promotion of Academic Staff 4.96 4.44 3.252** 
19. Dismissal of Academic Staff 4.84 4.52 2.905** 
22. Appointment of Personnel Director 5.00 3.63 5.225** 
23. Appointment of Finance Director 5.00 3.52 5.868** 
24. Drawing up Annual Budgets 4.67 3.56 4.325** 
27. Setting up University Companies 4.69 1.88 9.531** 
29. Determining Price of Commercial Teaching 4.67 3.63 5.019** 
32. Determining Salary of Individual Academic Staff 4.51 2.41 6.654** 
33. Setting Annual Income Generation Targets 4.91 3.56 5.669** 
36. Establishing! Merging! Discontinuing Departments/ 4.89 3.33 8.873** 
Faculties/ Group Studies 
37. Determining Internal Administrative Structure 4.96 3.93 6.021** 
Note: Results significant at 0.001 level. 
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Also, significant differences between England and Taiwan in the degree of university 's 
decision-making power in individual key areas of affairs, were found. As Table 8.1 
suggests , there is one systematic difference - while respondents from most universities 
in England believed that they could decide matters in a majority of these 16 areas for 
themselves, respondents from universities in Taiwan thought that they shared decision-
making power with external authorities in most of them (10 out of 16), but left decision-
making power largely to external authorities in four areas (1, 4, 27, and 32). 
The results of ANOYA and Scheffe multiple comparisons suggest that statistically 
significant differences in the degree of university's decision-making power, among the 
four groups of universities, exist for 19 individual areas of university affairs. Both pre-
1992 uni versities and post-1992 universities in England had greater degree of decision-
making power than either national or private universities in Taiwan. These 19 areas 
were summarised as eight patterns (Table 8.2). Pattern 4 shows respondents from 
national universities in Taiwan claiming to have the lowest degree of decision-making 
power, in appointment of personnel and financial directors, and in several financial 
matters (24, 28, 31, and 33), among the four groups of universities. Pattern 7 shows 
respondents from private universities in Taiwan claiming to have the lowest degree of 
decision-making power in the promotion of academic staff, among the four groups of 
uni versi ties. 
Table 8.2 Patterns of University's Decision-making Power in Individual Key Areas 
of Affairs: Comparison of Four Groups of Universities 
Patterns Areas of University Patterns Area of University 
Affairs Affairs 
l. 1, 2>3,4; 4>3 6,27,32 5. 1,2>3; 2>4 7 
2. 1, 2>3,4 1,29,36,37 6. 2,3>4 17 
3. 1,2>4 4,6 7. 1,2,3>4 18 
4. 1,2,4>3 22,23,24,28,31,33 8. 2>3 19 
Note: 1. summansed from the results of multiple compansons; 
2. ' 1' = pre-1992 university in England, '2' = post-1992 university in England, '3' = national 
university in Taiwan, '4' = private university in Taiwan 
Results on University Affairs under External Regulation 
Results relating to university affairs under external regulation were two-fold: broad and 
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detailed, in scope. The former concerns the overall proportion of key areas of university 
affairs, which were thought to be under external regulation in both countries. The latter 
concerns the forms that such external regulation those areas take. 
As shown in Figure 8.4, over half of key areas of university affairs (20 out of 37; 54 per 
cent), were thought to be under some degree of external regulation by respondents from 
universities in England. These 20 areas involve (see Table 8.3): student recruitment (1, 
2, and 4), structure contents of teaching and research (5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13), research 
management (14 and 15), dismissal of academic staff (19), financial management (24, 
26, 27, 28, 30, 31, and 32). No differences in the proportion of key areas of university 
affairs under external regulation, and in forms of external regulation, were found, 
between respondents from pre-1992 and post-1992 universities. 
Figure 8.4 Overall Pattern: Proportion of University Affairs Thought to Be under 
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Table 8.3 Twenty Areas of Affairs Thought to Be under a Certain Degree of 
External Regulation, by Respondents from Universities in England 
Main Aspects Key Areas of University Affairs 
Student Recruitment 1. Undergraduate Entry Qualifications t 
2. Number of undergraduates 
4. Number of Postgraduates 
Structure and Contents of 5. Setting Exams & Student Assessments 
Teaching and Research I 6. Setting Degree Standards and Criteria 
8. Structure of Academic Courses 
9. Contents of Individual Courses 
11. Adding/ Discontinue Postgraduate programs 
12. Broad Research Priorities 
13. Direction of Specific Research Projects 
Research Management 14. Ownership of Copyrights 
15. Ownership of Other Intellectual Property Rights 
Staffing 19. Dismissal of Academic Staff 
Financial Management 24. Drawing up Annual Budgets 
26. Setting Level of Undergraduate Tuition Fees 
27. Setting up University Companies 
28. Borrowing Money from Capital Market 
30. Determining Price of Research Contracts/ Projects 
31. Determining Salary Scales of Academic Staff 
32. Determining Salary of Individual Academic Staff 
Note: 1. Respondents offer a statement that the external regulation on these areas came largely 
from professional bodies, such as the Engineering Society, the General Medical Council, and the 
QAA as well. 
For respondents from universities in Taiwan, as shown in Figure 8.5, nearly every area 
of university affairs (36 out of 37; 97 per cent) were thought to be under external 
regulations, the only exception being the area of direction of specific research projects. 
This picture also applied to national and private universities. For the former, all 37 key 
areas of university affairs were thought to be under external regulation. For the latter, a 
high proportion of key areas of university affairs (34 out of 37; 92 per cent) was thought 
to be under external regulation . 
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Figure 8.5 Overall Pattern: Proportion of University Affairs Thought to Be under 
Some Degree of External Regulation in Taiwan 
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Statistically significant differences, in the proportion of key areas of university affairs 
thought to be under external regulation, were found between England and Taiwan. Chi-
square test results suggest that the proportion of university affairs, which were thought 
to be under external regulation, was higher in Taiwan than in England (see Figure 8.6; 
Pearson chi-square .000, d.f. 2). 
Figure 8.6 Proportion of University Affairs under External Regulation: 
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Differences in forms of external regulation were found in 25 individual areas of 
university affairs between England and Taiwan. Forms of external regulation on these 
25 areas were summarised and listed in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4 Summary of Forms of External Regulation in England and Taiwan 
England Taiwan Key Areas of University Affairs 
Forms of No regulation Legal! 3. Selecting Postgraduate Entrants 
external Administrati ve 7. Awarding the Degree 
regulation 10. Adding! Discontinue Undergraduate 
I programs 
16. Appointment of Vice-chancellor/ 
Principal 
17. Appointing Academic Staff 
18 . Promotion of Academic Staff 
20. Appointment of Deans & Department 
Heads 
21 . Appointment of Registrar 
22 . Appointment of Personnel Director 
23. Appointment of Finance Director 
25 . Allocation Budgets within Universij)' 
29. Determining Price of Commercial 
Teaching 
36. Establishing! Merging! Discontinuing 
Departments/ Faculties/ Group Studies 
37. Determining Internal Administrative 
Structure 
No regulation Legal/ 33 . Setting Annual Income Generation 
Administrative Targets 
/ financial 
Legal/ Legal/ 6. Setting Degree Standards and Criteria 
Administrati ve Administrati ve 19. Dismissal of Academic Staff 
24. Drawing up Annual Budgets 
26. Setting Level of Undergraduate Tuition 
Fees 
27 . Setting up University Companies 
32. Determining Salary of Individual 
Academic Staff 
Financial Legal/ 2. Number of undergraduates 
Administrati ve 4. Number of Postgraduates 
30. Determining Price of Research 
Contracts/ Projects 
Financial None 13. Direction of Specific Research Projects 
The most noteworthy result is that, while a majority of areas (15 out of 25) were thought 
not to be under any form of external regulation by respondents from universities in 
England, they were thought to be under legal/ administrative or financial form of 
regulation by respondents from universities in Taiwan. These 15 were related to those 
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areas such as student recruitment (3), academic areas (7 and 10), staff appointments (16-
18,20-3), financial matters (25, 29, and 33), and institutional governance (36 and 37). 
Another difference is that, while areas such as number of undergraduates and 
postgraduates, and determining price of research contracts and projects, were thought to 
be under financial regulation by respondents from universities in England, they were 
thought to be under legal! administrative regulation by those from universities in 
Taiwan. 
Changes in University Autonomy 
Results on changes in autonomy in key areas of university affairs were two-fold: broad 
and detailed, in scope. The former concerns the overall proportion of key areas of 
university affairs, on which respondents from universities in both countries thought that 
their autonomy has' increased', 'decreased', or 'not changed'. The latter looks in more 
detail at those areas in respect of which respondents from universities in both countries 
thought that their autonomy had changed. 
As shown in Figure 8.7, for a very large proportion of key areas of affairs (36 out of 37; 
97 per cent), respondents from universities in England thought that their autonomy had 
not changed over the past ten years. Differences in the perception of changes in 
university autonomy between respondents from pre-1992 and post-1992, were found 
(Pearson chi-square .009; d.f. 3; see Figure 8.8). For pre-1992 universities, respondents 
thought that, for almost key areas of affairs (36 out of 37; 97 per cent), university 
autonomy had not changed, and in no area, had autonomy increased, over the past ten 
years. This result, together with the result on the overall pattern of university's 
decision-making power, suggests that pre-1992 university respondents thought that their 
universities had had decision-making power in almost all areas of university affairs, but 
remained to have a lower degree of decision-making power in two areas. The latter 
areas are setting level of undergraduate tuition fees (mean score: 2.30), and determining 
salary scale of academics (mean score: 2.58). 
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Figure 8.7 Overall Pattern of Respondents' Perception of Changes in University 
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A different story appeared in the results from post-1992 university. Respondents there 
thought that, in almost one quarter of areas of affairs (9 out of 37; 24 per cent), 
university autonomy had increased. The areas involve determining number of 
postgraduates, awarding degrees, determining broad researoh projects, appointing of 
vice-chancellor, dismissing academic staff, drawing up annual budgets, allocating 
internal budgets, borrowing money from the market, and determining salary of 
individual academic staff. One finding, which should be noted here, is that for post-
1992 universities, there were also a majority of university affairs (26 out of 37 areas), on 
which autonomy was thought not to have changed. As with the pre-1992 universities, 
post-1992 university respondents thought that their universities had had decision-
making power in a majority of key areas of university affairs, but remained to have a 
lower degree of decision-making power in two areas. The latter areas are setting level 
of undergraduate tuition fees (mean score: 2.20), and determining salary scale of 
academics (mean score: 2.75). 
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Figure 8.8 Difference in Perception of Changes in University Autonomy as between 
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As shown in Figure 8.9, respondents from universities in Taiwan thought that university 
autonomy had increased in a majority of areas of affairs (22 out of 37; 60 per cent), but 
that university autonomy had not changed in a second largest group (11 out of 37; 30 
per cent). In a very small proportion of affairs (3 out of 37; 8 per cent), university 
autonomy was seen as having decreased. No significant differences in perception of 
changes in university autonomy in key areas of university affairs were found between 
respondents from national and private universities. 
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Significant differences in perception of changes in university autonomy in proportion of 
key areas of university affairs were found between England and Taiwan. Chi-square 
test results suggest that the proportion of key areas of university affairs in which 
respondents from universities thought that their autonomy had increased, is significantly 
greater in Taiwan than in England. (see Figure 8.10; Pearson chi-square .000, d.f. 3). 
Figure 8.10 Difference of Respondents' Perception of Changes in University 
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8.2.2 University Staff's Views of University Autonomy in Practice in Both 
Countries 
Given that the questionnaire results have offered an overall picture of university 
autonomy in practice, the interview investigations provide the in-depth and critical 
examination of similarities and! or differences in views regarding university autonomy 
in practice in England and in Taiwan. In this section the staff's views regarding the 
main themes - the backgrounds against which university autonomy has been brought 
forward as an issue, and the main challenges to university autonomy - are presented. 
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In Eng/and 
Views differed as to whether there was any background to the bringing forward 
university autonomy as an issue. On the one hand, university autonomy never came as 
an issue to concern the public. A post-1992 university secretary believed that 'whether 
the universities are autonomous or not is not exciting the public', and the issue of 
university autonomy 'merely matters for academics', since 'what is happening in 
schools and in hospitals is more important to people than what is happening in the 
university' (Sec.1). 
On the other hand, university autonomy has undoubtedly become an Issue m some 
quarters. Views which revealed a perception of background issues to the raising of 
university autonomy, related to a limited number of areas, namely, the contraction in 
government resources, government taking active position, the advent of a mass higher 
education system, and, as a concomitant, the issue of quality and standards. For 
example, one pre-1992 university registrar argued that university autonomy has had a 
very long history in England, to date; 
... it became a problem... because resources got contracted. In the sense of 
general independence and freedom of manoeuvre, the real pressure put on the 
university is from the beginning of the Conservative Government in 1979 and the 
cut in 1981... . (and also because oj) the Government and public nervousness 
about the standards following the expansion. The quality assurance and 
examination is a piece of machinery put into place, and really stems from a 
concern that more means worse. (Reg. 2) 
The advent of a mass system of higher education bringing university autonomy as an 
issue was also reflected in the view of another pre-1992 university registrar. He said, 
1 think that university autonomy reflects the history of university development. I 
think it is something much easier to explain and understand when there were far 
fewer universities and students. When you move to a mass system of higher 
education, then the question about autonomy is raised. Particularly when we take 
government money, then we have to accept that the government has the right to 
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ask us to do certain things. (Reg. 1) 
Nevertheless, the general picture drawn from the interviews indicates that interviewees 
from universities in England, whether pre-1992 or post-1992, felt that English 
universities were autonomous, as shown in the questionnaire results. However, some 
qualitative differences between pre-1992 and post-1992 university interviewees were 
detected. The most noteworthy difference was that the former tended to express 
philosophic and idealist views concerning university autonomy, while the latter tended 
to be more pragmatic and realistic. For example, several interviewees from pre-1992 
universities expressed the view that being autonomous was of 'the very nature of the 
university itself (Reg. 1), a tradition reflecting' a culture of the separation of academic 
scholarship from the state s intervention!. Scholarship and academic inquiry should be 
free ' (Reg. 2). Their views also related to being a position of 'being able to criticise 
the government' (Ve2). Besides, in the description of one pre-1992 university registrar, 
universities in England 'are still very free, if compared with the universities abroad' 
(Reg. 3). He was confident in stating, 
On determining contents and structure of courses, we still have considerable 
freedom .. . ; on research, most of the research universities have considerable 
freedom in what they do ... ; on staff appointment, this is the area where we have an 
absolute freedom; and, on finance, we are largely free.. . we are sufficiently 
autonomous to make a profit and keep it. (Reg. 3) 
Optimism in relation to the practice of university autonomy was also shown by other 
pre-1992 university interviewees. For example, a registrar at an affluent pre-1992 
university believed that unless' the fundamental autonomy of the university - to appoint 
people whom we want to appoint, and to teach what we want to teach' had changed, 'so 
far, no government really sought to interfere with whom we will appoint to teach and 
research (or) to interfere with the curriculum '(Reg. 1). Besides, a planning and 
secretariat manager at a pre-1992 university was firm in believing that 'our autonomy 
stems from our power as an independent institution incorporated by Charter in which it 
is not currently possible to be influenced by outside rules'. However, receiving public 
funds might condition the way in which universities in England exercise the powers 
175 
given by charter, this manager added. The latter view could be sensed among, but not 
much directly spoken by, other pre-1992 university interviewees. An exception was 
Professor R. Taylor, vice-chancellor of the University of Buckingham. Professor Taylor 
argued that other chartered universities could be independent like his university, but 
they chose not to be so, in order to receive 'guaranteed and easy money' from the 
government. 
None of post-l 992 university interviewees expressed views such as one that university 
autonomy was a tradition, or of a nature of a university, as pre-1992 university 
interviewees did. They had more pragmatic views than their pre-1992 colleagues did. 
In their view, differences in the degree of university autonomy were not necessarily 
related to where a university's origin had been, but rather to the resources that 
institutions had. A dean of quality assurance of a post-1992 university argued that pre-
1992 universities 'can have more autonomy not because of having royal charters but 
because of their financial situation', and stressed that 'the extent of autonomy 
universities can exercise depends on their freedom in financial terms'. He reinforced 
his arguments by indicating differences in the way of dealing with national bodies 
between pre-1992 and post-1992 universities. He stated, 
... (in the THES) you will see a lot of articles about how Oxford and Cambridge 
say to the QAA: 'we are not interested in the quality audits; we don ~ like the way 
you are doing the subject reviews '. Actually they know perfectly well they've got 
the millions of pounds in the bank which can cushion them against the 
government. But we don ~ have much money in the bank at all and we have to 
respond to the opportunities through the HEFCE. The opportunities for us to do 
something different are very rare indeed. (Dean 1) 
The views of several post-1992 university interviewees also reflected a perception that 
financial constraint had made the practice of university autonomy less than that -
legally - allowed. A university secretary of a post-1992 university admitted this, citing 
the example of his university, where 80 per cent of its income came from government, 
to illustrate the present situation. In his own words, 
... the money is available through the funding council which obviously controls 
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what we can do. In a sense autonomy is controlled by money. We are fairly 
dependent on government funding. Therefore, we don't really have much 
opportunity to argue. (Sec. 1) 
Another difference between pre-1992 and post-1992 university interviewees, lies in 
views regarding the main challenges to university autonomy. Staff of the former tend to 
argue that increasing accountability, and unnecessary bureaucratic devices and 
arrangements imply a lack of trust in the government-university relationship, which 
threatens university autonomy, though one of them was concerned that 'when you 
receive less money, your room for maneuvre is much restricted' (Reg. 2). Staff of the 
latter remain pragmatic in stressing financial security or institutional viability, instead of 
talking about university autonomy, and some of them (for example, Sec.1 and Sec. 2) 
even defended the government, arguing that its actions had nothing to do with university 
autonomy. 
In the VIews of several pre-1992 university registrars, for example, what concerns 
universities is unnecessary bureaucracy. One of them (Reg. 1) claimed that universities 
accepted that the government, of course, had the right 'to look to certain level of 
standard of performance', but thought that it should 'adopt a light touch dealing with' 
such universities, having demonstrated that they had delivered an excellent education, 
rather than over-burdening them with unnecessary procedures. The present situation, 
however, made him ask, 'Why do we have to submit to the fundamental institutional 
reviews of the way we teach when the government consistently knows we come up with 
very high scores (in teaching quality assessments)' and questioned, 'What does the 
government want to achieve by that? (Reg. 1)' 
Another registrar said that he could not imagine how those universities, which were 
particularly reliant on government funding, coped with government agencies' 'complete 
obsession' with accountability, 'which is affecting the ability of the university to think 
for itself and to move' (Reg. 3). Some of them might find themselves in a position of 
'being suffocated', if not 'being drowned', in accountability to government agencies, 
while 'more and more money is being targeted by the funding council for the 
government purpose or policy'(Reg. 3), he added. He argued that 'the main challenge 
to university autonomy at the moment is the increaSing encroachment of the funding 
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council and other national agencies, and their audits and other regulations upon our 
day-to-day life' (Reg. 3). 
Accusations of increasingly unnecessary bureaucracy, as the main threat to university 
autonomy, did not appear so strongly-expressed in the views of post-1992 university 
interviewees as they did say that they thought themselves to be in a situation where 
there was autonomy, but where the room to exercise it was constrained. A dean of 
quality assurance expressed his view that, 
In terms of course and syllabus we do have complete freedom. I mean nobody 
tells us what courses or assessment or contents of courses should be. There is 
autonomy there. But there are still some constraints, like funding, student 
numbers, HEQC audits, and QAA subject reviews. When you put those together, 
your room for action actually is very limited. You always feel: you are free to do 
what you like, but the constraints operating on you by them are very heavy. (Dean 
1) 
Nevertheless, post-1992 university interviewees showed more acceptance of what was 
arguably reality, and more 'sympathy' towards government actions, than their pre-1992 
counterparts. One post-1992 university secretary, for example, thought that 'the main 
challenge to university autonomy is all this inadequate funding. If the government 
determines to restrict public support, there is nothing we can do about it. Equally, there 
is a strong feeling that it is not necessary for the government to control university 
autonomy' (Sec. 1). Another post-1992 university secretary even put himself in the 
government's shoes, and said, 
I think that the government would like the universities to educate as many students 
as possible for less cost. That is nothing to do with autonomy. .. I don't think the 
government has made an attempt to control what we teach, but there is a wish to 
control our cost-effectiveness ... So I don't think that attacks university autonomy. 
The government just wants lower tax and to increase the benefit of higher 
education to the people. (Sec. 2) 
One interesting finding was different interpretations of the same example given by 
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different interviewees in different universities, or by the same person adopting different 
viewpoints. Regarding the closure of Russian departments during the '80s, a planning 
and secretariat manager at a pre-l 992 university, argued that the funding council tried to 
close down some departments, 'but the universities can still decide themselves whether 
they want to keep them or not'. But, in the opinion of Professor Taylor, vice-chancellor 
of the University of Buckingham, the funding council had a way, albeit an informal one, 
to make universities close such departments. The former said that it was' institutional 
autonomy in practice'; but the other observed that universities were 'victims' in reality. 
It must be acknowledged, too, that sometimes differences might not necessarily be 
capable of substantiation in reality, but be, rather, interpretations, dependent on 
interviewees' particular circumstances and/or perspectives. A post-1992 university 
secretary felt able to give a reminder of this, in dealing with differences in views 
relative to the practice of university autonomy by taking himself as an example, 
I used to be academic registrar in XX Polytechnic. So I was doing academic 
administration. If I had been as secretary in that Polytechnic, I would have been 
very conscious of the lack of autonomy because the LEA run the pay roll, 
payments, and had very tight control. (Sec. 2) 
In Taiwan 
The issue of university autonomy had been long discussed in other countries as part of 
university tradition and itself reflected university history, but it has just begun to be 
discussed in Taiwan. According to a general secretary (Sec. 5) of a private university, 
the development of university autonomy was another 'by-product' of the transformation 
occurring in the whole economic, political and social context, and of the advent of an 
open and democratic society. Another account, given by a dean (Dean 3) of the 
planning office of a private university, claimed that the government initially did not 
have any intention of 'granting' universities proper autonomy, but was forced to release 
certain control to universities with the advent of a mass system of higher education. 
This was because the Ministry of Education (MOE), which had had capability to run the 
system when it had relatively few students and institutions, did not have the capacity to 
'manage over 100 higher education institutions' (Dean 3). 
No matter whether university autonomy was derived from context changes as a 'by-
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product', or was 'an accident', how did interviewees VIew university autonomy m 
practice? First of all, university autonomy was not taken to be in an absolute term, but 
was seen as meaning something that was being exercised within laws, boundaries, or 
certain frameworks. It was, too, considered a necessity for the realisation of academic 
freedom. For example, one national university president defined university autonomy 
as 'a university governs itself within the laws, and exercises its freedom against every 
aspect of external inappropriate powers which may threaten academic life, whatever 
power comes from the government or the society' (Pres. 2). The importance of 
university autonomy was also recognised by another university president (Pres. 1). But 
for his university being a newly-established institution, university autonomy was 
something too ideal because 'We think that our viability and survival is much more 
important than talking about university autonomy' (Pres. 1). 
Second, interesting responses were received when interviewees were asked their views 
about the importance of university autonomy towards university development in 
Taiwan. First, instead of articulating how important it would be to university 
development, the interviewees (for example, Pres. 1, Pres. 2, Dean 2, and Sect. 3), 
commonly, raised a serious issue of what kind of university deserves autonomy. 
Second, several interviewees (for example, Pres. 1, Pres. 5, and MP) tended to believe 
that society creates its universities in its own image. Unfortunately, university 
autonomy was not deeply rooted in this society, and the public was not mature enough 
to value university autonomy. Thus, two aspects of interviewees' concerns and worries 
were noticeable. Internally, lack of capacity for self-discipline and self-reflection in the 
academic community, may make universities miss an opportunity to claim self-
government. Externally, whether university autonomy can be enhanced, or not, very 
much depends upon the good will of the government and of society more generally. 
These responses revealed the story which was behind this so-called 'new era for 
university' after the enforcement of the revision of the University Act in 1994. 
In order to prove that chaotic circumstances in campuses derived from a lack of the 
capacity for self-discipline in the academic community, the practices of two ideas were 
often taken as examples by university interviewees in Taiwan. They were - academic 
self-government (represented by the practice of peer-review in academic hiring and 
promotion, and of professorial rule); and, democratic governance (represented by the 
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operation of the University Assembly, and presidential and other elections). 
On the former, a dean of general affairs (Dean 2) at a national university, insisted that 
before a university was granted autonomy, it should have shown its capacity for self-
discipline. He gave his view, after having witnessed the academic community 's 
'sloppy' attitudes in using the newly-granted power in academic hiring and promotion. 
'Once professional autonomy is abused', the external power would 'take this chance to 
interfere with university management', he (Dean 2) warned. Another general secretary 
(Sec. 3) at a national institution was also critical of the fact that power was abused in the 
academic community, and even worse, there appeared to be 'divisions and sects' 
fighting for personal interests among academics. Both interviewees confirmed their 
stance that they supported that the power of appointment and promotion of academic 
staff should be included within the scope of university autonomy. Both said that the 
present mechanism - a three-tiered system of review committees - was also reasonably 
set up, but was spoiled by the academic community itself. 
Arguments were presented, regarding the practice of the idea of professorial rule. Its 
feasibility was severely challenged since the idea had arguably been mis-presented by 
its proponents, and indeed mis-interpreted on campus, and had turned the university into 
a place in which academics had been fighting for their own interests and power, rather 
than a place in which academic excellence was being pursued. Several university 
presidents (Pres. 1, Pres. 2, Pres. 4 and Pres. 5) questioned its purpose, though they 
expressed views, albeit with two conditions, supportive of the idea. First, the faculty 
members should be mature and responsible, and second, the scope of professorial rule 
should be kept to their areas of expertise, teaching and research, and their disciplines, 
rather than them being able to interfere with university administration. However, some 
faculty members, in the view of a university president, had proved critical to others, but 
generous to themselves. For example, a national university president (Pres. 2) pointed 
out that certain academics now liked to write to the newspaper to criticise their 
colleagues or the government policy. He also observed that 'some criticisms were 
entirely off-target, and merely reflected their personal preference and hatred', and 
wondered, 'Would such an irresponsible academic concern himself about the 
development of a university? (Pres. 2)'. Moreover, the practice of professorial rule was 
'against the principles of management', as a private university president commented, 
181 
If using this system merely on the academic matters, I will not oppose it. But if 
trying to administer all the matters of a university, I will definitively oppose it. 
Collegial and collective decisions will turn out to be the situation in which no one 
is responsible. It will leave universities in trouble. (Pres. 4) 
The evidence that there had been negative impacts of all sorts of elections of 
president, department heads and college deans, and the radical call for campus 
democracy (the practice of University Assembly), undermined higher education as a 
place of being self-critical and self-reflection, is overwhelming. Most interviewees 
(Pres. 2, Pres. 3, and Sect. 3) at the national universities expressed their disappointment 
that elections, taking place in academic institutions, had proved like those 'dirty and 
nasty' elections, taking place outside the university, the winner grasping the chance to 
take revenge on their opponents after election. 
Regarding the practice of the University Assembly (also see Chapter 3), university 
presidents questioned its being nothing more than a 'superficial democracy', standing in 
the way of the operation and development of a university, while the member of the 
Assembly seemed there to defend their own interests. One president recalled, 
A year ago, we wanted to promote an international liaison with universities 
abroad, and submitted the plan to our Assembly. The plan got rejected since some 
representatives from the administrative staff and technicians in the Assembly 
demanded that the university should improve their working conditions first, and 
take it as a priority, instead of promoting such an international link. (Pres. 1) 
Ironically, the main threat to university autonomy now came, said some interviewees, 
from 'internal members' of universities, instead of the MOE. According to the 
observation of a university president, 'internal members' distortion of the meaning of 
autonomy and democracy gradually forms a big threat' to university autonomy and also 
has brought 'negative impacts on campus' (Pres. 1). Another university president (Pres. 
2) even believed that such a chaotic practice of university autonomy would bring 
'disaster' to a society rather than giving any benefits to that society, if the faculty 
members and other university members persistently failed to demonstrate their capacity 
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for self-discipline. 
Is the MOE interference with university affairs coming to an end, even though, as one 
university president suggested, it may no longer be singled out as 'a big threat' to 
university autonomy? Criticisms of the practice of the University Assembly were not 
strong in private universities, where the governing boards had greater authority in 
dealing with the development of the university. However, interestingly, the MOE was 
identified by most interviewees as a trouble-maker, issuing memos requiring 
universities to submit - arguably to no useful end - all key university affairs, including 
curriculum design, to the Assembly for approval. This requirement provoked fierce 
arguments within universities. 
Curriculum design within individual universities has been confinued as an 'internal' 
affair since the Interpretation No. 380 of the Council of Grand Justice was made, in 
1995. However, according to the observations of interviewees, the MOE interfered with 
those procedures which universities should have had at their disposal in dealing with 
this task. One national university president (Pres. 2) thought that it was very ridiculous 
to ask a 'large-but-functionless' University Assembly to review and approve curriculum 
design for a whole university, and questioned the purpose of the MOE in continuously 
interfering with universities' "internal" affairs. In one vice-president's opinion, the 
MOE did not trust its universities, and so it tried to manage, if not control, everything. 
He suggested that before the MOE talking about the relaxation of regulation on higher 
education, 'a trusting relationship between the university and the government should 
have been established', and that was 'the starting point of the practice of university 
autonomy in Taiwan' (VP1). 
Apart from memos, the MOE also issued so-called 'common prescriptions', restricting 
university actions, after its pledge to 'relax' unnecessary legal and administrative bonds. 
The MOE's failure to be consistent was challenged by a dean of the planning and 
development office at a private university, who recalled, 
In minutes of meeting regarding extension courses, universities were given 
discretion to set the fees for extension courses. When we submitted the whole plan 
of extension courses to the MOE, we were told that the fees we set were too high. 
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Another matter also quite upsets me - the education officers in the MOE tried to 
fix their ideas on us, during the consultation process. Much worse, sometimes we 
felt cheated by them, when we found that what we had suggested during the 
meeting was different from what was shown latter in the minutes. (Dean 6) 
Given that academic autonomy was legally ensured for universities and despite their 
encountering problems in practice, in general private universities' staff expressed more 
optimistic views than did their national counterparts. The interviewees from private 
universities expressed more hope of being on a trend towards greater autonomy. One 
private university president argued that autonomy would be rewarding for 'those 
universities which have made efforts to develop their own characteristics and identities' 
(Pres. 5). A dean of the planning office at a private university expressed confidence 
that, if the government wanted to relax 'inappropriate' ties, especially the financial 
bonds, then private universities would perfonn better than their national counterparts. 
He also suggested, from his perspective within an effective planning office, that certain 
planning power be released from the MOE to individual universities . 
... to be honest, as far as the MOE control in the past is concerned, the Planning 
Office was like a redundant unit because there was no room for a university to 
plan before the enforcement of the revised University Act in 1994. Since 1994, 
private universities like Yuan-ze, and Chung-yuan, and national universities, like 
Cheng-kung and Chiao-tung, have begun to pay attention to thinking about 
university missions and directions. 
themselves. (Dean 3) 
Universities have started to plan for 
The recent changes in the government-university relationship were welcomed by private 
university interviewees. For example, a private university president (Pres. 5) observed 
that 'universities now are more autonomous than the past' because 'we have a more 
benign interaction with the MOE', and 'we have the way to express our views and to 
influence, if not change, the MOE s decisions', though several areas of university affairs 
were still under restriction, such as salary scale, and number of staff. Nevertheless, the 
call for an end of government's inappropriate and unnecessary personnel and financial 
restrictions on universities was evident in the views of many interviewees. One general 
secretary at a private university indicated, 
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I am sure that it is a right direction for the MOE to go in, to loosen its grips on 
universities. But up to the present, ironically, we still find that the MOE controls 
too much. For example, we want to advance our teaching, and want to appoint 
more teaching staff, but all academic qualifications and number are prescribed in 
regulations of the MOE. (Sect. 6) 
Regarding financial matters, there were many examples of control. One of them was 
given by a private university president, who recalled the following situation to show 
how suspicious the government was about financial management in the private 
universities, 
Several years ago, there was a big plot of private land, just next to this campus. 
The owner of the land initially wanted to endow my university with this land. But 
we made a deal about how to deal with this endowment which might benefit each 
other. The owner planed to endow a large sum of money to my university, and 
then my university used this endowment to buy his land. But finally this deal was 
dropped, because the MOE said to us that 'you should have consulted with us 
before you made a deal with that land-owner. ' (Pres. 5) 
Indeed, the call for an end of government's inappropriate and unnecessary personnel 
and financial restrictions on universities was an outward expression of the call for a 
trusting relationship, between the university and the government (and the society). A 
private university president (Pres. 5) identified that the most difficult part of the practice 
of university autonomy in Taiwan as getting true confidence from the public. This was 
an important strand to interviewees' views on university autonomy in practice. 
Sometimes, government regulation and related laws became a secondary factor 
constraining universities' action. But social conventions, full of 'forces of 
conservatism', were identified as one of key reasons to why university autonomy was 
difficult to be institutionalised. Thus, several interviewees wondered whether, even if 
a dramatic relaxation of statutes and regulation regarding higher education really 
happened, as the government pledged, it would make the practice of university 
autonomy different. One strongly-argued view was that politicians and the public in 
Taiwan had difficulty in not seeking to develop a university system fitting their own 
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needs, and could not allow the system to develop in a way that met academic purposes, 
and be critical of government and society. What characteristics do politicians and 
people have, in this society? One of the interviewees, an MP on an Education Select 
Committee, expressed sadness in the fact of those politicians and groups within the 
public, who could distort moral and value systems, even facts, just for their personal 
interests. He recalled, 
I am an NIP of Hau-lien County, where the local people make a living by planting 
'Bin-Ian', one kind of economic plant, which causes soil-retention problems, and 
the fruits of which are recognised as a potential risk factor for mouth cancer. The 
Department of Health made a TVad to educate people not to take it any more. To 
defend their own vested interests, the local people went to my service office and 
asked me to lead them to the Department of Health, to protest against such an ad. 
Being a doctor, can I make a compromise with my professional consciousness for 
my political career? They got rejected by me, but gained support from other local 
MPs. (MP) 
Under such circumstances, he argued that all the efforts in relaxing higher education 
laws or enacting laws to protect university autonomy, would be a trivial measure to the 
macro problems faced by universities. 
Comparison between England and Taiwan 
Interview results on university autonomy in practice, showed a more dramatic contrast 
between staff views in England and Taiwan, than had the questionnaire results. The 
general picture drawn from the interview indicates that university staff in England, 
whether in pre-1992 or post-1992 universities, felt that universities remained 
autonomous, as shown in the questionnaire results. But certain differences in views 
between staff of pre-1992 and those of post-1992 were detected. However, the general 
picture drawn from the interviews indicates that university staff in Taiwan, particularly 
in national universities, did not show much confidence in recent changes in university 
autonomy, contrary to questionnaire results. Most interviewees expressed the concerns 
and worries of the academic community lacking the capacity for self-discipline, rather 
than one showing appreciation of recent developments in university autonomy. An 
exception was that some of the interviewees from private universities still expressed 
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optimistic views about the developmental trend in government deregulation. 
There were three aspects of main differences in university staff's VIew regarding 
university autonomy in practice between England and Taiwan. First of all is regarding 
the backgrounds against which university autonomy had been brought forward as an 
Issue. Several interviewees in England thought that this was associated with the 
contraction in government resources, and government anxiety towards university 
quality and standards after its expansion. This context contrasts with that in Taiwan, 
where university autonomy was seen, first, as a 'by-product' of the process of 
transformation of society from an authoritarian towards an open one, and, second, as a 
consequence of the advent of a mass higher education system, since the MOE was not 
able to manage and control over 100 higher education institutions. Furthermore, one 
interviewee in England thought that university matters were not a priority for 
government or society, and that university autonomy mattered only to the academic 
community. By contrast, several interviewees in Taiwan indicated that Taiwanese 
society and government were much involved in trying to create the university system in 
their own likeness, and that this process constrained universities, strongly though 
implicitly rather than explicitly. 
Second, the restrictions imposed on universities in both countries are different in nature. 
Several interviewees in England noted that universities had undoubtedly been legally 
autonomous, but had chosen not to exercise those powers, such as borrowing money, 
taking more home undergraduates and charging top-up fees, and the like, not because 
they lacked the powers, but because they received government funds. Unlike in 
England, restrictions imposed on universities in Taiwan were unrelated to whether 
universities received public funding, or not. On the other hand, universities were not 
granted certain powers, regarding personnel and financial matters, by the government. 
The third difference is in the views about the main threats or challenges to university 
autonomy. In England, several interviewees from pre-1992 universities recognised that 
increasing and unnecessary bureaucratic arrangements and requirements had a major 
impact on universities' action and freedom to act, and these reflected that there was a 
lack of trust, in governrnent, relative to universities. Post-1992 university staff were not 
as concerned, regarding these bureaucratic arrangements as their pre-1992 university 
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staff, but the financial situation did not give them a chance to do something different 
from what the national bodies required. Interestingly, none of the interviewees in 
England were worried about the academic community, or identified internal members as 
the main threat to university autonomy, as interviewees in Taiwan did. Reviewing 
university autonomy in practice, the interviewees in Taiwan showed concerns and 
worries about the lack of capacity for self-discipline of university members, and had 
fears that universities might miss an opportunity to prove their capacity for self-
government to the government and the society at large. Private university interviewees 
held a more optimistic view than their national counterparts, but were still depressed 
about the rigidity of government regulation on personnel and financial matters. 
8.3 The Relationship between University Autonomy and Funding 
This section aims to draw together the empirical results regarding the following three 
aspects: first, identifying areas of affairs, in which university respondents in both 
countries thought that they had the possibility of reducing external control by raising 
their income; second, examining whether universities of different financial type (see 
Table 5.2) have enjoyed a different degree of university'S decision-making power; and, 
third, presenting views of the relationship between university autonomy and funding, 
held by university staff. The first and second aspects are presented in 8.3.1, and the 
third in 8.3.2. 
8.3.1 The Possibility of Reducing External Control by Raising University's Income 
As shown in Figure 8.11, in a majority of areas of university affairs (29 out of 37; 78 
per cent), respondents from universities in England thought autonomy to have nothing 
to do with whether or not universities could raise their own income. In six areas of 
affairs, they thought that they had no possibility of reducing external control, even 
though they might raise their own income. These areas involve affairs such as 
determining number of UK undergraduates, setting degree standards and criteria, 
determining direction of specific research projects, setting undergraduate tuition fees, 
determining salary scale of academics and salary of individual academic staff. There 
were two areas - determining number of postgraduates and setting broad research 
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control by raising their income. These results also applied to pre-1992 and post-1992 
universities. No differences in views regarding those key areas of affairs, on which 
universities might have the possibility of reducing external control by raising their 
income, were found, between pre-1992 and post-1992 university respondents. The 
respondent universities were re-grouped, according to financial types in Table 5.2. The 
results from a non-parameter test (K-means) did not suggest any significant difference 
in the degree of university's decision-making power between these five groups of 
universities. 
Figure 8.11 The Possibility of Reducing External Control by Raising University's 
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As shown in Figure 8.12, for over half areas of affairs (19 out of 37; 51 per cent), 
respondents from universities in Taiwan thought autonomy to have nothing to do with 
whether universities could raise their own income or not. There was one area -
determining number of undergraduates, in which universities thought that they had no 
possibility of reducing external control, even though they raised their own income. 
Nevertheless, in eleven areas, respondents from universities thought that they had some 
possibility of reducing external control by raising their own income. These involve 
areas such as determining number of postgraduates, setting broad research priorities and 
direction of specific research projects, drawing up annual budgets, allocating internal 
budgets, setting level of undergraduate tuition fees, borrowing money from capital 
market, determining price of commercial teaching and price of research projects, setting 
annual income generation targets, and establishing! merging/ discontinuing departments/ 
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faculties. These results also applied to national and private universities. No differences 
were found in views regarding key areas of affairs, in which universities might have the 
possibility of reducing external control by raising their own income, as between national 
and private university respondents. 
Figure 8.12 The Possibility of Reducing External Control by Raising University's 
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Significant differences between England and Taiwan, in the proportion of key areas of 
affairs, in which university respondents thought that they had the possibility of reducing 
external control by raising their income, were found (Pearson chi-square .001; d.f. 4; see 
Figure 8.13). The proportion was higher in Taiwan than in England (a 24 per cent 
difference). However, the proportion of university affairs in which university 
respondents in both countries thought that they had the possibility of reducing external 
control by raising their own income, represented a small proportion of the 37 key areas 
of university affairs. There is one similarity, that is, two areas - determining number of 
postgraduates and setting broad research priority, in which universities in both countries 
had the possibility of reducing external control by raising their own income. 
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Figure 8.13 The Possibility of Reducing External Control by Raising University's 
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8.3.2 Views of the Relationship between University Autonomy and Funding, Held 
by University Staff 
The analysis of the interview results was arranged under the following main aspects. 
First, reasons were sought to explain the questionnaire results which suggest that 
university respondents did not think they had the possibility of reducing external control 
by raising their income in most areas of university affairs. Second, how funding, and 
related issues, mayor may not enhance university autonomy, were examined. 
In England 
As with the questionnaire results, the views of both pre-1992 and post-1992 university 
interviewees tended to agree that universities did not have many possibilities of 
reducing external control by raising their income. However, the arguments used were 
different. They included, fIrst, the fact that in several areas of university affairs, matters 
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had been decided by universities; second, some areas, such as changing the contents of 
programmes, were clearly nothing to do with how much income universities could raise; 
and, third, some of them, such as taking additional UK undergraduates beyond the 
'approved' number, were under external regulation. One argument, given by a pre-1992 
university registrar, was unique, because his university so far had achieved as best 
funding pattern it could; and, thus, he wondered whether there was a possibility of his 
university increasing autonomy by making further changes in its present funding 
pattern. He said, 
The present pattern of funding shows that 30% of our income comes from the 
HEFCE, which is quite low in the UK, 14% from the research councils, and 39% 
a/income from our investments ... We also have large private endowments. (Reg. 1) 
Several interviewees suggested that, if the questions of the interview had been couched 
in terms of universities having 'huge endowments' or 'free money', rather than 'raising 
university income', then the answers would have been more positive, and if not 
reducing external control, then at least they could do many other things. In a sense, as 
one college principal of the University of London considered, such funding could 
enhance autonomy since autonomy was that universities were 'able to achieve more 
things and more independent actions' (Vel). However, free money is very rare. Most 
interviewees recongised that all sorts of funding, no matter whether government or non-
government funding, came with some sorts of constraints or demands on universities. 
For example, a pre-l 992 university registrar observed, 
There are very few organisations or people who just hand over money and say: 
'get on with it.' They all want something in return: it might be, their name on the 
building; it might be, their right to be consulted about the nature of work; it might 
be, they want to have intellectual property rights, or to impose conditions on the 
sorts of people you recruit. (Reg. 1) 
Given the above, two lines of arguments were sustained. Some interviewees still argued 
that attracting non-government funding would enhance university autonomy, and 
reported their institutions' efforts to make themselves less dependent on government 
funding. The lines of argument can be described as passive and active. On the first, 
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university staff realised that government funding would not increase to any significant 
extent, and that they would have to 'find other sources of income' (Reg. 2). On the 
second, positive side, staff acknowledged that establishing the government as 'a 
minority shareholder' was vital to the development of a university. One registrar (Reg. 
3) even believed that 'until we generate even more private income, we will not be able 
to break out of our present situation to reaffirm our proper autonomy ... (and) gain the 
opportunities to rebalance the effects of government'. He analysed the present situation, 
thus, 
. .. the (funding) council becomes more and more like a government department, 
and merely passes down the expectations of government to universities. The 
government can always say: 'Autonomy is all very well, but you receive public 
money. We've got to make sure how public money is spent; therefore, we have 
these controls.' So, back to the simple statement: so far we are reliant on the state, 
we won't be able to redefine our relationship with the state. (Reg. 3) 
However, some interviewees argued that attracting non-government funding would not 
necessarily bring about greater autonomy, or even worse - would constrain university 
autonomy. As a planning and secretariat manager of a pre-1992 university argued, 
... raising funds privately might actually reduce university autonomy. You could 
gain large amounts of money from industry on the condition that the research 
findings are exclusive to that company, and you could not publish freely in the 
international academic community, and so on... One can imagine some 
circumstances where you really have to tie the hands of the university to get the 
funding, and thus lose autonomy. (Manager) 
Even if universities had free money, sometimes it would only represent a small portion 
of the university income. Thus, a post-1992 university interviewee identified the 
difficulty in generating a substantial sum of free money, and argued that being reliant on 
government funding was, and continued to be, an inevitable phenomenon among 
universities in England, except for the University of Buckingham. Moreover, given that 
no funding was free from constraint or control on universities, more positive views of 
government funding were expressed by several interviewees, particularly those from 
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post-1992 universities. One general secretary at a post-1992 university (Sec. 2) argued 
that no matter who funded universities, the interference by government was less than 
that experienced when funding carne from industry. On the other hand, government 
funding offered financial security which allowed universities to plan ahead, when 
compared to funding from industry and overseas student fee. A dean of quality 
assurance at a post-1992 university compared different funding sources, and said, 
... if you are dependent on funding from industry, something which can come-and-
go at very short notice, you are always fighting to get the next lot of income. So 
that does not offer you long-term safety... So, I wouldn't say that if you have a 
good proportion of income from industry, that means you have more autonomy 
than other institutions. But, if you have a lot of income from trusts or foundations, 
then they might give you a much more secure basis to operate ... Comparatively 
speaking, the HEFCE grants offers guarantees for the university to plan ahead 
because the university knows the student numbers which it will get for next year, 
and knows how much income there is. (Dean 1) 
While no funders are gomg to hand over significant amounts of money without 
attaching very firm conditions, one post-1992 university interviewee (Reg. 4) offered an 
interesting speculation regarding universities' efforts in diversifying their funding bases. 
He described, 
It is interesting to speculate the situation where the universities may try to free 
themselves from governmental control by looking elsewhere for funding. I am sure 
that any funding comes with the same sort of demands and constraints as the 
governmental funding does. (Reg. 4) 
Thus, as Professor Taylor, vice-chancellor at the University of Buckingham, argued, 
universities which were trying their best to diversify their funding bases or to generate 
non-government funding, just gained more autonomy from the government, but no 
universities were' completely autonomous from the market'. He noted, 
Looking into our income sources: overseas students fees, research contracts, 
donations, certain business, all the way to get the income to protect our autonomy 
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from the State. But it doesn i increase our autonomy from the market forces. For 
example, the Malaysian economy collapses, 20% of overseas students come from 
Malay and they may stop coming. The university is not autonomous from the 
Malaysian economic forces. (VC 2) 
Perceptions regarding relationships between university autonomy and funding in 
England vary between universities and between individuals. While university staff 
recognised that no funding is free, except that from endowments and their own property 
investments, some defended government funding, which, they believed, carries less 
interference than does other funding. Others, however, recognised that their universities 
should diversify their funding bases, and try to be less reliant on government funding. 
Interestingly, the former argument was supported by, relatively, more interviewees from 
post-1992 universities than from pre-1992 universities (4 to 1). By contrast, the latter 
was supported by, relatively, more interviewees from pre-1992 universities than those 
from their post-l 992 counterparts (5 to 1). 
In Taiwan 
In general, the picture drawn from the interviews indicates that university staff in 
Taiwan did not hold positive views regarding the relationship between university 
autonomy and funding. Several interviewees at the private universities argued that 
given such a government-university relationship, in which onerous laws and regulation 
dominated, what concerned private university staff most, was whether they could have 
greater discretion to deploy and invest their own resources, rather than worrying about 
seeking alternative funds or diversifying funding bases. In a tone suggesting that 
private institutions had been treated unfairly, a dean of the planning office at a private 
university questioned why private universities did not have as much government 
financial support as their national counterparts, but their development was as restricted 
as that of the latter. He was depressed about the present situation, 
.. . laws and government regulation restrict the way we manage our property and 
saving. The money, we've earned cannot go in the investment market, cannot 
purchase any estate, except those for university-purpose estates, cannot set up any 
company to sell our services, and so on. The money is only allowed to be used for 
buying national funds or for being put on deposit in the bank. (Dean 3) 
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Several interviewees at the private universities also offered examples to demonstrate 
that some of the problems their universities encountered were nothing to do with 
resources, but were associated with government policy and restriction. The following 
example was given by a university president, who recalled, 
When we established this institution, we had adequate resources to make it a 
comprehensive university. We were not allowed to do that, because at that time 
the MOE s higher education policy merely permitted private bodies to establish 
science and technology institutes, which were thought to make a direct 
contribution to economic growth. Hence, we started the name of XX Institute of 
Technology. Upgrading from Institute to University now is completely associated 
with the changes in government policies and their attitude, nothing to do with 
resources. (Pres. 4) 
The MOE and government regulation and laws were singled out as 'primary factors 
hindering' the development of a private university. One general secretary at a newly-
established private university, described how financially sound his university was, and 
condemned the MOE, government regulation and laws, for getting in the way of the 
development of his university, whose aspiration was to establish a research university, 
'rather than to add one more common university in this island (Taiwan), which has been 
crowded with over 100 institutions' (Sec. 6). Thus, a private university president 
suggested that the government should have flexible policy in dealing with university 
funding. In his own words, 
I think for a university which lacks resources, the government needs to supply it. 
But for a university which has affluent resources, the government should give it 
more freedom to use its money. Don't let a university, which has resources, feel so 
constrained. (Pres. 5) 
The picture, drawn from the VIews of the interviewees at the national universities, 
indicated that national university staff began to experience the restrictions, mentioned 
above, that private universities had experienced over the past decades, in using their 
earned income after the implementation of the scheme of University Development 
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Foundation Fund (UDFF) in 1995. Before 1995, national universities were completely 
financed by government funding, which was line-itemised eannarked budgeting. (see 
Chapter 5) Compared to the previous system, the UDFF scheme had made national 
universities begin to be active in generating income, for example by fund-raising, 
offering training courses, and research contracts, and 'paying attention to their financial 
management', one dean of the planning office (Dean 3) said. Naturally, national 
university staff were expecting that the UDFF scheme would lead to more financial 
autonomy, and then would help universities realise their autonomy granted by the 
revised University Act and Interpretation NO. 380 of the Council of Grand Justice. One 
vice-president also recalled that the motivation for his university choosing to participate 
in this scheme had been to gain 'more room for us to plan and develop' (VP 1), before 
this scheme became compulsory. 
After experiencing such heavy regulation and laws in restricting how universities spent 
their earned funds, national university staff now believed that, even though universities 
had a capacity to generate their own income from elsewhere, to lower the level of 
dependence upon government funding, universities' efforts would not change anything 
fundamental in relation to university autonomy. After the emergence of problems 
which were associated with the government's attempts to control universities by 
regulation and laws, it seemed impossible to gain so-called 'discretionary money', 
which was identified as a real help to the development of a university, by a university 
president, who said, 
The implementation of new scheme makes university funding diversified; however, 
universities feel so restrained in using their earned money since heavy regulation 
are still in place. I wonder how many benefits a university can get from this? 
Thus, a real help for a university to develop will depend on how much 
discretionary money it has, instead of how diversified its funding is. (Pres. 1) 
Context, West or East, was found to be one element in explaining the relationship 
between university autonomy and funding. The views of interviewees in Taiwan 
suggest that a positive relationship between university autonomy and funding was 
empirically evident in the West, where universities were given freedom, but was having 
difficulty in emerging in the East, as in Taiwan, where universities were set to achieve 
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national policy. For example, a national university president observed, 
... some differences exist between West and East. For a university in the West may 
have this possibility oj reducing the external influence by raising its own income. 
But Jor a university in the East, one oj the purposes oj a university should serve its 
society and a country. Hence, the decisions on many aspects oj university affairs 
are often subject to the national policy and society s expectation. (Pres. 3) 
One general secretary at a private university also noted, 
.. .1 think this situation (universities having resources, but without Jreedom to 
develop themselves) is not allowed to exist in universities in the western 
countries. This is also the difference between the eastern and western thinking. 
Under the eastern thinking, the authorities try to control everything. But under 
the western thinking giving the universities Jreedom to develop is customary. (Sec. 
6) 
This element of context may echo the results, presented in 8.2, regarding university 
autonomy in practice in Taiwan. At this stage, it was found that the realisation of 
university autonomy, in Taiwan, depends more upon the good will of government, than 
on how well universities can generate their own income from the government or from 
non-government sources. 
Comparison between England and Taiwan 
There are two main differences in the views of university staff in England and in Taiwan 
regarding the relationship between funding and university autonomy. The first 
difference involves the consideration of the nature of sources of funding and its 
implication for university autonomy. The second difference involves an element of 
'context', where government-university relationship and university autonomy involved 
more than a financial tie. This was more manifest in Taiwan than in England. 
In England, university staff thought that they had the possibility of having so-called 
'free money' . Though the latter was rare, the universities could use them to achieve the 
things they wanted to do and to gain more independence of action, which might not 
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necessarily lead to reducing external control. Some university staff also believed that 
government funding was less interfering than other sources of funding, as funders 
always wanted something from universities in return. However, university staff in 
Taiwan were depressed about the situation, where government interference was too 
heavy, no matter whether universities obtained funding from government or private 
sources. Under heavy government regulation and laws, universities had little possibility 
of gaining such 'free money', because universities were not given much discretion and 
flexibility in using funding, even including their earned money. 
The contrasts between England and Taiwan can be seen in the matter of how 
universities use their own resources to appoint extra staff. For example, a college 
principal of the University of London, confidently expressed the view that 'if we did 
have more free money .. . , we would be able to employ more postgraduate research 
fellows' to support research and to get a better grade in the RAE. One of the 
interviewees, the dean of general affairs at a national university in Taiwan, was willing 
to talk about his recent research project on the feasibility of hiring extra staff through 
the implementation of the UDFF scheme. The research finding indicated the difficulty 
of doing so, because personnel policy in Taiwan had been prescribed in laws and 
regulations, for example via a fixed salary scale, fixed academic and non-academic 
ratios, and prescribing educational qualifications for faculty hiring. Paradoxically, 
private universities also needed to follow most of the personnel laws in the same way as 
their national counterparts did. The example here demonstrates that while a matter was 
associated with whether universities had resources (free money) in England, it was 
associated with whether universities had discretion in hiring extra staff, even though 
they had already had resources, in Taiwan. 
Although the interview .results in England did not confirm the argument that the more 
funding universities can get, the greater autonomy they will have, they showed that 
universities still had the possibility of gaining more independence of action in deploying 
and using their own resources to achieve their goals. By contrast, the interview results 
in Taiwan showed little possibility of universities doing something different from that 
which the government required them to do, even though universities had their own 
resources. The difference was attributed to an element of context, whereby the nature of 
government-university relationship was more vital than the matter of resources, in the 
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view of the interviewees in Taiwan. Several of the latter argued that universities in the 
West were trusted by their government, even though they were funded by government, 
but that universities in the East were heavily regulated by their government, even 
though they were not funded by government. This finding, possibly of some interest, 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
8.4 Views Regarding Usefulness and Applicability ofthe Concept of 'Contractual 
Autonomy' 
There was a contrast result in 8.2. On the one hand, respondents from universities in 
England thought that they could decide for themselves in a majority (92 per cent) of 
areas of university affairs, and those in Taiwan, similarly, thought that they could decide 
for themselves in nearly half (43 per cent) of areas of university affairs. On the other, 
the results showed that the proportion of key areas of affairs, on which universities in 
both countries thought to be under certain degree of external regulation was high. It 
was fifty-four per cent of areas of university affairs in England, and ninety-seven per 
cent of them in Taiwan. These results suggested that there was no absolute autonomy. 
Universities exercised their decision-making powers within a framework set by certain 
written and formal external regulations, though universities in England were in a better 
position than those in Taiwan, where heavy regulation and legislation were more 
evident. This latter point is made clear in 8.2 and 8.3 . 
Regarding the usefulness and applicability of the concept of ' Contractual Autonomy', 
there were mixed responses. Some interviewees felt that the notion was interesting and 
useful, but some had doubts about certain parts of definition. Different suggestions 
were made about this study, and were summarised in three main points. 
The first point concerned the words 'contractual' or 'contract'. Most interviewees in 
both countries argued that there was no absolute university autonomy, and believed that 
universities were operating within 'boundaries' or ' frameworks ' (rather than being sure 
about the usage of 'contracts'). 'Contract' gave an impression of something which must 
be written, formal , time-fixed, and legally-binding, though it had been noted in the 
interview schedule definition that ' contracts' existed in 'explicit and formal or implicit 
and informal form'. One English interviewee commented on the definition and said, 
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'Not a bad definition, provided you really do mean the term of contract which includes 
the informal contracts as well' (Reg. 2). Another English interviewee felt interested in 
the definition, proposed in this study, and said, 
I think the contract does exist. In some cases it is very closely defined, such as the 
financial memorandum. In other cases, it is more loosely defined ... Apart from 
that, you use the interesting phrase 'social contract ' ... I think the university is 
related not just to the students, but to the employers and local communities, and so 
on. All these stand by social contracts. This university is committed to deliver 
higher education across the peninsula; so in the sense we have the social contract 
with the people living in the southwest region who will benefit from higher 
education. (Reg. 4) 
One Taiwanese interviewee (Dean 3) did not favour this term, Chinese-translated from 
'contractual autonomy', since he argued that the first impression of this word 'contract' 
in Chinese 'must be written in words'. However, another interviewee in Taiwan saw it 
in a broad sense, and believed, 
... a university is "contractual" within some boundaries. For example, we have a 
commitment to our governing board, accountable to the MOE, and responsible to 
our society. All these may be expressed both in the explicit and implicit forms. So 
contractual autonomy can be recognised in the operation of a university in 
Taiwan. (Pres. 5) 
One of the Taiwanese interviewees indicated one interesting but important point to 
prove that, sometimes, 'unwritten' contracts were substantial in constraining 
universities' ability to make decisions, by giving the following example of a situation 
which his institute had encountered, 
After we were upgraded to university status, we were forced to keep a 5-year 
junior college programme, due to strong pressures from parents who were 
planning to send their children to my college after their graduation from junior 
high school. We did not have any formal contracts with those parents, but we 
made a compromise. (Sec. 4) 
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Interestingly, 'contracts' involved those social norms, prescriptions and expectations of 
the society., which were thought by interviewees to be another factor constraining 
universities to function properly, and be 'what universities should be' . This point was 
also particularly emphaisised among Taiwanese interviewees (for example, Pres. 2, 
Pres. 3, Pres. 4, VPl and Sec. 4). 
The second general point made by interviewees about 'Contractual Autonomy' involved 
questioning the existence of 'negotiation' while the two parties (universities and 
external agencies) were not equal, and the latter were powerful. Several English 
interviewees took their relationships with the funding councilor research councils as 
examples. The relationships were undoubtedly contractual, but normally the contracts 
were in standard form, and would not entail any negotiation. For example, one 
interviewee stressed, 
In English contract law, we have so-called 'standard form contract', which is 
basically taking all the legal situation where the major part for agencies say, 
'These are the terms. You can't negotiate.' Likewise, you can't go along to a gas 
company which will not negotiate with the customers because it is one powerful 
party. Now here we've got a situation where the university and the funding 
council are not equal. The funding council is so powerful, and you can't have 
negotiations ... , so it is more like a standard form contract .... The terms of contract 
are largely non-negotiable, meaning that the funding council imposes the terms of 
contract. (Sec. 1) 
, "Contractual autonomy" is a very useful notion', said a dean of quality assurance at 
one post-1992 university. However, he had doubts about whether universities are in a 
strong position to delineate their boundaries with government. In fact, universities 
stood in 'a very fragile position' and 'are quite vulnerable to changes in the legal 
context'. He said, 
.. for example, the debate going on at the moment about the QAA external quality 
assurance. I don't think this will happen, but it is quite possible for the 
government to say: 'the QAA makes a new proposal for external quality assurance 
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arrangement from 2001. We don't like what the institutions are doing; we will 
require them to do the following.' The government could do that; it is within its 
power. There is a sense that if the universities did not do things which the 
government likes, then there will always be a possibility that the government will 
step in and make change. (Dean 1) 
For the case in Taiwan, most interviewees also doubted that there were opportunities for 
universities to negotiate and bargain with the government and their society, given that 
heavy government regulation and complex laws were dominant in conditioning their 
decision-making. Several interviewees also expressed their disappointment and claimed 
that instead of negotiation and bargaining, universities in Taiwan tended to 'make a 
compromise' with external actors in their environment. 
With regard to external agencIes, there was one point mentioned only by English 
interviewees. The latter indicated the increasing importance of the relationship between 
universities and students, and questioned the fact that ' external agencies' in the 
interview schedule definition seemed to exclude students. The point was made that, in 
England, now that home students pay more, then the relationship between universities 
and students has changed. One university secretary (Sec. 1) said that students now 
could always say to the universities, 'We pay more; therefore, we are customers.' As a 
consequence, one interesting phenomenon - students going to court to sue their 
universities - was going to become more common, and as another university secretary 
(Sec. 2) predicted, possibly prevalent. The latter interviewee (Sec. 2) also used this 
example to indicate that challenges to university autonomy might not be necessarily 
derived from government's attempt to achieve change, but from changes in conventions. 
He continued, 
'" it is not unusual now for the students who fail the exam, try to appeal internally 
and rush off to court and say, 'I have being cheated by the university. I should get 
a high degree.' This is getting more common ... in the UK... The law hasn't 
changed in that respect, but the convention is changing because the world is 
getting complicated, not like the place we used to be. You could imagine that 30 
years ago if a student tried to get a judicial review about the school examination, 
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everyone would look at that student and think that he might be crazy. (Sec. 2) 
The third general point concerned the question, which several interviewees raised, of 
just how accurate the description of the reality in the definition was. The researcher, in 
effect, posited: ' after the contracts being set, the university exercise its autonomy within 
the contracts to self-govern its affairs.' One pre-1992 university registrar gave practical 
examples to demonstrate how constraining of autonomy it would be, to operate under a 
lot of contracts and their sub-contracts, and, at the same time, how interfering might 
external agencies be, in controlling how universities delivered those contracts. Given 
that, one question, that is, whether university still had any autonomy at all, immediately 
posed itself. He commented, 
.. , in practice contractual autonomy would be a more constrained notion than it 
might appear. With just one contract between the funding council and the 
university for provision of general teaching, research and service, you may have 
contractual autonomy in the broad sense. But we 've got a whole stream of little 
contracts and conditions, which individually constrain our autonomy. Secondly .. 
the funding council and the QAA start to control how we operate. .. On the one 
hand we got the funding council saying: 'you must bring each year 500 scientific 
students to graduation '; but on the other hand we got the QAA saying: 'you must 
do it in the following explicit processes '. (Reg. 3) 
The views of one national university president (Pres. 1) in Taiwan also echoed the 
accounts above. He questioned whether there was a free space left for universities to 
practise self-government, within all sorts of ' contracts', set up by a very interventionist 
government and an interfering context which did not trust universities' capacity to 
govern themselves. If the answer was 'no' or 'little', then universities were m a 
contractual position, but might not be in an autonomous position. 
It was understandable that universities should question how much room was left for 
them to exercise their autonomy. However, constructive views were also given. For 
example, one pre-1992 registrar argued that if universities, 
.. . can create other means, they will earn greater autonomy through greater 
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financial freedom . It is up to them to earn their contractual autonomy. No one 
will give it to them. If you want to get back the feeling of the autonomy we had in 
the '60s. we have to go out to earn the money to do it. (Reg. 3) 
This argument may not be completely accepted by other interviewees, particularly those 
in Taiwan, who tended to argue that autonomy, which could be enhanced, much 
depended on the good will of the government. Nevertheless, several interviewees in 
Taiwan did reflect that now was the time for universities to prove, to the government 
and the society in general, that they had the capacity for self-discipline and self-
government. But if universities did not do so now, 'they would lose more in the future. 
and the good will of the government would never come' , as a dean in a national 
university (Dean 2) warned. 
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Chapter 9 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter aims to bring the main findings together, and interpret them in conjunction 
with theoretical explorations regarding university autonomy and its relationship with 
funding. Thus, the chapter has two aims. They are, first, to examine both how far the 
research questions of this study have been answered, and how far the arguments of the 
thesis have been supported; and, second, to draw conclusions from this study, and to put 
forward implications for further study. 
The following main findings will be presented and reviewed. First, those findings 
regarding the practice of university autonomy in both countries, suggest that there are 
some inconsistencies between the questionnaire results and the interview results, and, 
between them both and some evidence in the literature. Second, the findings also cast 
doubt on the view that more funding, government or non-government, would bring 
about greater autonomy. Third, the findings regarding the applicability and usefulness 
of the concept of 'Contractual Autonomy' suggest a need for further thought. 
9.1 The Practice of University Autonomy in England and in Taiwan 
Understanding of the practice of university autonomy is, the researcher would argue, 
clearly extended by the empirical findings of this study. Before entering into 
investigations of differences between, or indeed inconsistencies in, the findings, and 
investigations of differences between the findings of this study and some others in the 
literature, it would be useful to summarise the empirical findings, and this is done 
below. 
The quantitative findings indicate that staff in the universities in England, whether pre-
1992 or post-1992, thought that English universities remain in an autonomous state, 
except in a few areas, such as determining the number of home undergraduates, 
undergraduate tuition fees, and, the salary scale of academic staff. They also revealed 
that staff in the universities in Taiwan, whether national or private, thought that 
Taiwanese universities have been granted greater decision-making powers in the 
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academic area and the area of appointment of academic staff. The results suggest that 
universities in England still have a greater proportion of key areas of university affairs 
which they could decide for themselves and less areas under external regulation, than 
those in Taiwan, even though they show that autonomy in Taiwan has increased in a 
majority key areas of university affairs. 
The quantitative results are enhanced by qualitative explorations, which reveal intrinsic 
differences in the practice of university autonomy between England and Taiwan, in the 
following three areas. First is the background against which university autonomy is 
considered to be an issue. Second, the restrictions imposed on universities, in the two 
countries, are different in nature. The third difference lies in the views about the main 
threats or challenges to university autonomy, held by interviewees. Also, the qualitative 
explorations detect subtle differences between pre-1992 and post-1992 universities in 
the case of England. It must also be said that there appear to be certain inconsistencies 
between the qualitative explorations and certain quantitative findings. 
In England, the most noticeable difference was that the views of pre-1992 university 
interviewees tended to be philosophic and idealistic about the practice of university 
autonomy, but those of post-1992 ones tended to be pragmatic about it. In the views of 
the latter, differences in the degree of university autonomy were not necessarily related 
to university origin, but more related to institution's financial situation. The second 
difference was in views regarding the main challenges to university autonomy in 
practice. While increases in arguably-unnecessary bureaucratic procedures were 
identified as the main threat to university autonomy by interviewees of the pre-1992 
universities, those of the post-1992 universities showed acceptance of the reality, by 
arguing that government actions were nothing to do with university autonomy. Some, 
however, did recognise themselves to be in a situation, where there was autonomy, but 
where the room to exercise it was constrained. 
In Taiwan, the reality of the practice of university autonomy was more pessimistic in its 
manifestations in qualitative findings, than in quantitative ones. This was more evident 
in national universities than in their private counterparts. Staff of the former noted that 
if lack of capacity for self-discipline and self-reflection among their members continues, 
universities might miss their opportunity to claim self-government. However, 
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interviewees In universities, national and private, tended to believe that whether 
university autonomy could be enhanced, or not, very much depended upon the good will 
of the government and society in general. 
Reflecting on the main findings, there are two significant issues which should be noted. 
First, while certain inconsistencies are found between quantitative and qualitative 
findings in both countries, it would be unwise to interpret them simply as data 
inconsistency. On the contrary, they give rise to certain insights into the study of, and 
the practice of, university autonomy itself. Second, in order to build a bridge, some 
inconsistencies between the empirical findings of this study and certain arguments in the 
literature, need to be addressed. The latter concern the sense of loss of university 
autonomy of pre-1992 universities (for example, Griffith, 1990; Millar, 1992; Russell, 
1993; Eustace, 1994), the sense of gain of university autonomy of post-1992 
universities (for example, Becher and Kogan, 1992), and the implication of the advent 
of mass higher education for university autonomy (for example, Premfors, 1980; 
Halsey, 1992; Scott, 1995). 
9.1.1 Inconsistencies between Quantitative and Qualitative Findings 
In England, while few quantitative differences are found between pre-1992 and post-
1992 universities, except in the perception of change in university autonomy over the 
past ten years, there are some qualitative contrasts between them, in the views of the 
nature of, and the main challenge to, university autonomy. These contrasts between pre-
1992 and post-1992 universities should not be overemphasised, since it was not possible 
to include all English universities, and their senior staff in this investigation. However, 
these contrasts are important because they have two implications. 
First, it is recognised that, while university autonomy is a multi-dimensional concept, 
there is an inevitable distance between the measurement of university decision-making 
powers as one dimension of practice of university autonomy, and the qualitative 
exploration of the exercise of these powers. In other words, both the aspects of having 
powers, and of having the room to exercise them, should be studied in understanding 
the practice of university autonomy. While the quantitative findings suggest that pre-
1992 and post-1992 universities have more or less similar 'decision-making powers', it 
would prove problematic if these findings were directly interpreted as pre-1992 and 
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post-1992 universities having more or less similar 'autonomy' in practice. This is 
because certain qualitative contrasts between them, were detected. While such a -
problematic - interpretation has been made, in the existing literature, in this study the 
researcher has striven not to tread in their footsteps! This is the issue that invites more 
reflections upon the results derived from those studies (for example, Jadot, 1981; 
McDaniel, 1996) which interpret universities' decision-making powers as the whole 
extent of university autonomy. Instead, the results, obtained from the measurement of 
decision-making powers which universities have in practice, can only be treated as part 
- not the whole - of an expression of the practice of university autonomy. The results 
cannot justify any claim that the extent of decision-making powers is 'autonomy itself'. 
The warning, given by Jadot (1981), that it is not sufficient to seek to understand 
university autonomy by merely examining their legal framework, since there exists a 
considerable gap between legal and effective autonomy, is important. However, such a 
gap may also exist in different measurements of effective autonomy, too. Therefore, 
even though this is in part an empirical study, the results from different approaches do, 
the researcher would argue, enhance understanding of the practice of university 
autonomy. 
Second, the researcher notes that interviewees' interpretations of their perceptions 
concerning the practice of university autonomy are inevitably linked to their past 
experiences and personal current positions. Comparatively speaking, the 'burden' of 
bureaucratic procedures for pre-1992 university interviewees are 'increasing', but this 
may not be thought to be the case by post-1992 interviewees, for two reasons. First, for 
the latter groups, the present accountability requirements of national agencies are mild 
(Brennan and Shah, 1994), if they are compared with the past contexts in which they 
operated. Second, the findings show continuity of different attitudes towards 
government actions as between pre-1992 and post-1992 universities (former 
polytechnics). In respect of government policy during the 1980s, as Williams (1995b) 
observes, 'there began a period of considerable hostility between universities and 
government', but the polytechnics' and colleges' response was 'more in line with the 
aspirations of government' (p. 14). Moreover, the views of an interviewee who is a 
registrar may be different from that of a university secretary or a planning manager. 
There is not a single explanation. Perceptions are paramount. The research findings of 
this study support the belief of some academics, like Murphree (1977) and Caston 
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(1992), that there is no absolute university autonomy, but relative autonomy. However, 
while Caston argues that relative autonomy exists in 'a process of continuous bargaining 
between university and its society', the findings of this study, to some extent, support 
the researcher in claiming that relative autonomy also exists as a construct of people's 
perceptions of such a process. 
In the case of Taiwan, while both quantitative and qualitative findings show few 
differences between national and private universities, quantitative findings contrast with 
qualitative ones. While, quantitatively, 'positive' results are obtained, for example, 
suggesting that university autonomy has increased in many aspects of university affairs, 
the qualitative findings include the views of some staff who have reservation on this, or 
even believe the opposite. For example, the interview data concerning the practice of 
university autonomy are full of 'concerns and worries more than appreciation' . 
Regarding these sharp contrasts, it would be inappropriate to put them in the bed of 
Procrustes and try to shrink quantitative findings or stretch qualitative ones, in order to 
make results consistent. In this case, on the contrary, the positive quantitative 
perspective of the practice of university autonomy cannot deny the validity of the rather 
pessimistic qualitative dimension of it, or vice versa, since both of them are evident in 
reality. 
Indeed, quantitative findings suggest that the universities in Taiwan have been granted 
certain decision-making powers. The results are also consistent with the existing 
literature. With the changing government-university relationships since 1994, and 
comparison with the past, it is reasonable to have positive results, such as university 
autonomy having increased. However, disappointing phenomenon occurring, and 
failures in practising those newly granted powers on campus, tend to mask the 
promising perspective of university autonomy. Thus, the researcher has rather 
pessimistic qualitative findings. 
The first implication for the case of England, above, is also applicable to the case of 
Taiwan. However, the existence of these sharp contrasts supports the researcher in 
claiming that, not only is there a distance between university decision-making powers as 
measured 'in action', so to speak, and the qualitative exploration of the implementations 
of these powers, but also that the distance may be large, as the case of Taiwan suggests. 
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While a quantitative approach has its own strength, in offering an overall picture of 
university autonomy, it cannot escape its limitations in terms of the difficulty which it 
has in detecting subtle but profound differences in each case. This is particularly true in 
Taiwan, where the practice of university autonomy involves other, complicating, 
factors, which are not evident to a quantitative investigation. 
What is fundamental and central to the above discussions is the concept of university 
autonomy itself. As autonomy should be 'contextually and politically defined' (Neave, 
1988a), neither quantitative nor qualitative approaches can be claimed to be 
comprehensive, but their findings do, when taken together, enhance the understanding 
of the practice of university autonomy. Likewise, the discussions in 9.1.2 also provide 
some significant insights into the practice of university autonomy, by building a bridge 
between these empirical findings and the findings in the earlier literature. 
9.1.2 Building a Bridge between Empirical Findings and Literature 
In England, there are two aspects of the inconsistencies between empirical findings of 
this study and literature, which deserve discussion. The first aspect is that, 
inconsistently with the findings in the literature (for example, Griffith, 1990; Millar, 
1992; Russell, 1993; Eustace, 1994), the empirical findings of this study suggest little 
sense of loss, or erosion, of university autonomy, in pre-1992 universities. It is not the 
purpose, here, to deny the validity of academics' claim. Instead, such an inconsistency 
reminds the researcher of an important point, that is, the sense of loss may not necessary 
involve a real loss in the given powers that the survey mainly measured. These results 
strengthen the observation of the researcher, made in Chapter 4, after reviewing of 
Farrant's conclusion (1987), that even though the powers of the university remain intact, 
the room for the university to exercise those powers had become limited, and external 
pressures had become harder to ignore. The sense of loss of university autonomy can 
be manifested in a subtle way, such as the perception of changing govemment-
university relationships, discussed in Chapter 6. However, if this is the case, one 
question immediately arises, that is, why do the findings of this study not suggest any 
regrets, about changes in the practice of university autonomy, among the respondents 
from pre-1992 universities? 
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There might be two reasons for the absence of such regrets. The first reason considers 
the timing of this empirical study. It was conducted in the first half of 1998, when 
changes in the context to higher education were not so dramatic as those occurring 
during the 1980s and the early 1990s. During the latter period, the impacts of new 
funding and quality assurance mechanisms, seem to have hit the morale of pre-1992 
universities hard, and, spontaneously, these new impacts were interpreted as a signal of 
'the end of autonomy' (Brennan and Shah, 1994). However, it is suggested that the 
passage of time gradually makes such a forcefully disappointing interpretation fade 
away. University staff seem to have accepted the new reality, and to have come to 
perceive the earlier changes as constructive, perhaps paving the way for an easier 
acceptance of the later changes of which staff were aware when responding to the 
questions of this study. This suggestion can be established by one empirical study 
which looked inwards, and the findings, too, of this study, regarding external context. 
In the study of Bargh and her colleague, on changes in the culture of university 
governance, some evidence that 'the appeal of corporate models seem to have been 
qualified by the old academic culture' (p. 172) was provided. In this study, for example, 
a pre-1992 registrar emphasised that 'if we want to get back the feeling of the autonomy 
we had in the '60s, we have to go out to earn the money to do it'. 
The second reason might be, it should be admitted, a lack of inclusion of 'genuine' 
academics (without administrative responsibilities) in the interviews. It appears true 
that individual academics tend to be more critical about government actions and the 
changes in university autonomy than university managerial teams, to which most of the 
respondents of this study belonged. However, academics' views may not necessarily 
stay pessimistic about changes in government-university relationships and in university 
autonomy. In the literature, certain examples can be found. Tapper and Salter, in 1992, 
asked whether 'the time has come to abandon the notion that universities, including 
Oxford and Cambridge, are really autonomous' (p. 63). Latter, in 1995, they argued 
that in recent years autonomy in British universities has not 'disappeared, but 'has been 
reformulated', and they argued, particularly, that the abolition of the tenure system gave 
universities greater institutional autonomy in the employment of their staff, and in 
related matters. 
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In contrast to the story evident in pre-1992 universities, the second aspect of 
inconsistency is that the empirical findings of this study do not suggest much sense of 
gain of university autonomy in post-1992 universities. There might be two reasons to 
explain this. First is a suspicion that the scale of the sense of gain in autonomy of post-
1992 universities has not been properly measured. Research on autonomy of higher 
education public sector was scarce. Their autonomy was assumed to be restricted 
because this sector was financially controlled by the LEAs and academically monitored 
by the CNAA. Thus, after their incorporation in 1988 and becoming universities in 
1992, people assumed that they gained autonomy financially and academically. In fact, 
the findings of this study support the latter assumption, that their autonomy has 
increased in certain areas, including those relating to the awarding of degrees, 
determining broad research priorities, appointment of vice-chancellor, drawing up 
arumal budgets, and allocation budgets within university. 
However, one aspect, which has been neglected, is that public sector higher education 
had an autonomous side, while the aspect of its tight control (Becher and Kogan, 1992) 
was always emphasised in the literature. Scott's observation (1995) and the findings of 
this study support this. Scott (1995) observes that, although former polyteclmics were 
state institutions, they often enjoyed 'considerable autonomy, in terms of governance 
and academic affairs'. Corresponding to the observation of Scott, the findings of this 
study reveal that the polytechnics remained autonomous, during the 1980s, in certain 
areas such as setting examinations and student assessments, 
establishing/merging/discontinuing departments/faculties/group studies, and 
determining internal administrative structures. 
The other reason is related to the financial situation the post-1992 universities face. 
Their gains in autonomy were neutralised by financial stringency. Although this is not 
particularly emphasised in the literature, it is clear in the findings of this research. In 
the views of several post-1992 university interviewees, they found themselves in a 
situation where they do not have many opportunities to argue for something different 
from that which national agencies require them to follow, being as they are, very 
dependent upon government funds. 
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Interestingly, if the researcher accepts that the present financial situation conditions how 
post-1992 universities exercise their autonomy, and arguably makes them pragmatic and 
realistic about university autonomy, the question then arises of whether it could be 
argued that pre-1992 universities tend to be philosophic and idealistic about university 
autonomy, because they occupy a more healthy financial situation. 
Noting increasing external demands over universities, certain authors, like J adot (1981), 
Caglar (1993), and Kerr (1995), tend to claim that the degree of autonomy depends, not 
only upon how much room for self-government is left to a university, but also upon how 
much ability a university has to fulfil its missions. Although the researcher does not 
have direct empirical evidence to prove that pre-l 992 universities have more ability to 
fulfil their mission than their post-1992 counterparts, it cannot be denied that pre-1992 
universities have had more opportunities and privileges than post-1992 ones to 
accumulate their 'academic capital', in the words of Slaughter and Leslie (1997), before 
increasing government intervention came into the university system. 'Peace makes 
people soften', the words of the film of "Anna and the King", can be used to describe 
financially and academically better-off positions which have made pre-1992 universities 
feel 'no immediate threat' and 'soften', becoming more philosophic and idealistic about 
university autonomy in practice. 
It is a different story, however, for the post-1992 universities, which were not lucky 
enough to have had the 30-year long 'golden age', in the words of Williams (1995b, p. 
3), generously financed by government and with less control, of their pre-1992 
counterparts. Now they also have to cope with diverse requirements from national 
agencies. These situations might make them pragmatic and realistic about university 
autonomy in practice, with the thought of institutional viability constantly in mind. 
Finally, it should be noted that such contrasts in views of university autonomy may not 
necessarily be seen only as between pre-1992 and post-1992 universities, but they may 
also occur between institutions within given groups. As Scott (1995) argues, within 
their respective groups, it is a misunderstanding to assume that universities are 
'essentially homogeneous' (p. 43). In 5.3.1, for example, the funding pattern of several 
pre-1992 universities shows their degree of dependence upon government funding 
similar to that of their post-1992 counterparts. 
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From the accounts above, it can be seen that the nature of differences in university 
autonomy between pre-1992 and post-1992 university has been changing, since the 
latter gained the title of university and degree-awarding power, as a result of the 1992 
Act. In the past, the difference involved differences in legal power, but now this may 
not be a distinction which needs to be made or at least emphasised, because, after 1992, 
the differences in autonomy of pre-1992 and post-1992 universities seem blurred, 
theoretically and empirically, in terms of universities' power. However, differences can 
be seen in the scope which universities, no matter whether pre-1992 or post-1992, have, 
to exercise their power. Thus, measurement of the room the pre-1992 and post-1992 
universities have to exercise their legal power, will come close to being a measurement 
of the reality of the practice of university autonomy. 
In Taiwan, however, the inconsistencies between the findings of this study and literature 
do not show as sharply and manifestly as in England. This is primarily because, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, of the lack, in Taiwan, of literature regarding the idea and 
practice of university autonomy. Even though there are some studies (e.g. Lee, 1995; 
Daun, 1997), they concentrate on the examination of what powers universities have 
been legally granted. On the other hand, in practice, university autonomy has been 
actively exercised only after the second half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, several 
findings are worth discussing. 
The first issue to address is the question of why the researcher was urged during the 
interviews to pay attention to what kind of university deserves autonomy. What does 
the emergence of this issue imply after university autonomy had gained its legal 
protection by the University Act in 1994? This may be related to the timing of the 
empirical research, which occurred at a time when university senior staff were frustrated 
with chaotic consequences of having practised autonomy on campus. If this empirical 
research had been done earlier, say, during the period 1994 and 1995, when the changes 
in university autonomy and the government-university relationship had just begun, then 
their positive effects would have reasonably been anticipated by universities, and quite 
possibly the results would have been very different from those which the researcher 
found. However, after having experienced certain difficulties and encountered negative 
events in the process of practising university autonomy, university staff had come to 
realise that more things should have been done in order to ensure that university 
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autonomy, or power, can be 'properly' exercised and used. The findings remind the 
researcher, again, that research on university autonomy should note that there is a 
considerable gap between legal and effective autonomy. 
The second finding concerns the difference in what is seen as the mam threat to 
university autonomy as between national and private universities. The staff from the 
former emphasised lack of the capacity for self-discipline of internal members, as a 
possible key threat to university autonomy, to a higher degree than did staff of private 
universities. The staff from the latter, by contrast, lay blame on the MOE and 
government detailed regulations. This finding can be illuminated by observation of the 
difference in governance culture between national and private universities in Taiwan, set 
out in Chapter 3. After central government control starts to step back, the mixed models 
(bureaucratic, political and collegial) of governance become apparent, but with different 
impacts in national universities and private ones. For example, the political model and 
the collegial model, which are widely exercised at the disciplinary and institutional level 
in national universities, are less influential in private universities, where the latter have 
their own boards of trustees, and stronger managerial teams for achieving effective and 
efficient deployment of resources. Given such circumstances, national universities are 
more vulnerable to dangers and conflicts caused by competing and contradictory 
interests among academics, as reflected in their views of the practice of university 
autonomy, than are their private counterparts. As they had seen the dangers and 
conflicts involved, the advocacy of stronger self-discipline and self-restraint by national 
university interviewees echoes Russell (1993) and Kerr (1995) warning that any lack in 
university's self-scrutiny and self-restraint may risk the return of external scrutiny or 
greater external restraints. 
As far as private universities are concerned, the scale of stepping down of the 
government is still limited, at least not great as the universities had originally 
anticipated. While they still feel that the MOE or government regulations stand in the 
way of their development, it is impossible for them not to lay blame on the government. 
However, is this the whole picture? Behind the scene of detailed legislation and 
regulation, the lack of trust on the part of government towards the way in which private 
universities run their business, is evident. The issue of trust in government-university 
relationships has been elaborated by academics, such as Russell (1993) and Trow 
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(1996). There always exists a reminder that 'trust is a two-way process ', and that 
universities have their own central contributions to make to that trust, which must 
include keeping up their standards of teaching and scholarship (Russell, 1993, p. 100), 
and showing their capacity properly to manage their finances . However, on the side of 
government, there is also a reminder from Trow (1996), who indicates that, ironically, 
'the more severe and detailed are accountability obligations, the less can they reveal the 
underlying realities for which the universities are being held accountable' (p . 313). 
During the interviews in Taiwan, the researcher was told of a case in which a private 
university ' successfully' beat its peer competitors, and obtained a very large MOE 
subsidies, only, later, to be revealed as a cheat. Manipulation of staff figures and 
production of a fake report were revealed. This case reflects the reality that, when 
higher authorities have accountability policies, the lower ones will come up with 
'strategies' to play the game. The issue of trust and accountability is easy to discuss, 
but the balance between them is hard to locate. 
The empirical findings of this study do, in some measure, extend the understanding of 
the practice of university autonomy. The empirical differences between England and 
Taiwan strengthen the comparative analysis which was made in the preceding chapters. 
Two issues raised earlier, call for further discussion. First, the advent of a mass system 
of higher education is considered as one of the background, context, factors to the 
emergence of university autonomy as an issue in both England and Taiwan, but its 
effects on university autonomy show themselves differently in the two cases. In 
England, particularly in the pre-1992 university, autonomy is reported as being 
constrained by the advent of the mass system, but in Taiwan, it is reported as being 
enlarged by it. In the interviews, government actions were being taken in England, 
reflecting government aIL'(iety on university quality and standards after the system 
expansion, and comprising more elaborate control mechanisms. The question of 
university autonomy is raised. However, in Taiwan, interview data indicate that 
university autonomy was given with the advent of a mass system, simply because the 
MOE was no longer able to manage and control higher education institutions, now over 
100 in number, as it had done before. This contrast is important because it suggests that 
the advent of a mass higher education system has different implications for university 
autonomy, and, more interestingly, because it illustrates two sides of arguments which 
are articulated among academics. 
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Halsey (1992) argues that autonomy for institutions, freedom for individuals and 
financial independence, have been undermined by government actions in the drive 
towards expansion (p. 270). Scott (1995) argues that elite systems, historically, enjoy a 
high degree of autonomy, while mass systems, inevitably, attract political attention and 
interference. No doubt the accounts given by Halsey and Scott fit the experience of 
British higher education. However, they may not explain the experience in Taiwan, 
where universities, no matter in an elite or a mass system, usually encounter political 
attention and interference. The empirical evidence from Taiwan lends some support to 
the observation of Premfors (1980), that the exploding growth of higher education 
systems forces measures of decentralisation in relatively centralised systems since 
systems become progressively unmanageable if day-by-day authority continues to rest 
with the central agency. This is more evident in private universities than in their 
national counterparts, since the former have been given greater discretion to use their 
own resources such as the investment in the market, and other financial areas, since 
1999. Establishment of private universities in the near future will be a matter of 
registration, which will replace the current policy, of detailed review in line with 
national economic planning, and of formal approval from the MOE. 
Second, the differences between England and Taiwan m the nature of restrictions 
imposed on universities in exercising their autonomy also deserve discussion and 
exploration of its implications regarding the relationship between university autonomy 
and funding. The room for universities in Taiwan to exercise their legal powers is 
reported as being restricted by detailed legislation and regulations which had nothing to 
do with, at least at the stage in question, whether they receive government funding. 
Such restrictions reinforce what interview data revealed earlier - whether the practice of 
university autonomy can be enhanced depends to a great degree upon the good will of 
government. 
However, the room for universities in England to exerClse their legal powers has 
changed, though one factor that became evident earlier in the twentieth century - being 
recipients of government funding - still remains important today. Previously the scope 
for the exercise of autonomy was enhanced by government funds, but now it is 
restricted when they choose to receive government funding which, more and more, links 
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funding to perfonnance. The existence of the University of Buckingham is a reminder 
for other universities of a dilemma between receiving public funding and maintaining 
autonomy from the government. This restriction is also observed by many academics' 
warning against universities' heavy dependence upon government funding. However, 
this study does not have any intention to conclude that being a recipient of government 
funding absolutely becomes the 'Achilles' heel' of university autonomy in England. 
While this may be the case for some universities, others still need government funding 
to strengthen their institutional viability, and the rest of 'Achilles' body'! These views 
in the next section are supported, particularly by post-1992 university interviewees. 
Through comparing the difference in the nature of restriction, is it appropriate to draw a 
temporary conclusion that, while funding has a chance to help universities in England to 
enhance their autonomy in practice, it has little possibility, at least not now, to do the 
same to universities in Taiwan? Indeed, the discussions in 9.2 not only offer reflections 
upon this conclusion, but also present other unexpected results which strengthen the 
arguments of this thesis. 
9.2 Doubts regarding Relationships between Funding and University Autonomy 
The questionnaire findings show that respondents in both countries, but particularly in 
England, thought, on the majority of aspects of autonomy, that autonomy had nothing to 
do with whether universities raise their own income or not. However, fundamental 
differences were found in the interviews. Although the results of interviews in England 
did not directly confinn the argument that the more funding universities can get, the 
greater autonomy they will have, they revealed that universities still had a possibility of 
doing what they wanted to do, and engage in more independent actions, if they had 
'free-money'. By contrast, the interview results in Taiwan revealed little possibility of 
having so-called 'free money' under the heavy regulations and laws in place, and of 
doing something different from that which government required them to do, even 
though they had their own resources. The interviewees in Taiwan thought that the 
positive link - more funding, greater autonomy - could be expected in the West, where 
governments trust their universities, rather than in the East, where governments are 
accustomed to close control of their universities. 
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The evidence of this research on the relationship between university autonomy and 
funding indicates that funding, whether government or non-government, is never by 
itself the creator of greater autonomy, but that its degree of influence on university 
autonomy, depends on: 1) its magnitude and criticality for institutional viability, 2) 
conditions attached to it, and 3) relations between government and university. These 
conditions appear, with different weights, in England and in Taiwan. While the first two 
conditions appeared predominant in England, the last condition is highly visible in 
Taiwan. From the accounts above, two issues require further development: 1) the 
amount of funding, and 2) the legal and administrative position. 
9.2.1 The Amount of Funding 
Although the empirical findings do not give any strong ground to deny the possibility, 
they do suggest a doubt, that more funding, whether government or non-govenunent, 
brings about greater autonomy. Quantitatively, in respect of a majority of key areas of 
university affairs, respondents from universities in both countries thought that they did 
not have the possibility of reducing external control by raising their own income. The 
interview data, in 8.3.2, offered several insights to explain this, such as the belief, by 
staff, that some areas of university affairs are simply not at all related to how much 
income universities can raise. They also suggest that if the questionnaire question had 
been based on a premise that universities had 'huge endowments' or 'free money', 
rather than on universities having to 'raise university income', then the answer would 
have been more positive, to the effect, if not that universities could even reduce external 
control, then at least to the effect that universities could do many other things. 
Academics have argued that institutional autonomy is enhanced or protected through 
diversifying university funding bases (for example, Archer, 1984; Caglar, 1993; 
Goedegeburre, et aI., 1994), and that the third-stream sources of funding represent true 
financial diversification and provide institutions with discretionary money (Clark, 
1998). However, the empirical findings of this study lend some support to the 
arguments in Chapter 5, stressing a need for more reflection before any acceptance is 
made, of such arguments. 
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Likewise, among academics, there is no consensus on the effect of alternative sources of 
funding or non-government funding on the operation of institutions. For example, if the 
observation of Slaughter and Leslie (1997) that alternative sources of funding 'often 
carry stipulations' is true, how can the third-stream sources of funding, as Clark (1998) 
argues, provide institutions with 'discretionary' money? Perhaps, the observation of 
Scott (1995), that 'the nature and purpose of non-state funding have not been properly 
analysed' (p. 88), may partly explain these divergent views. In fact, the arguments of 
Slaughter and Leslie, or of Clark, are clearly not matters to be declared, dogmatically, 
'right' or 'wrong', but invite further debates and challenges. The results in this thesis 
challenge them, in two ways. 
First, the results of this study show that university interviewees in England recognise 
that all sorts of funding, government or non-government funding, come with some sorts 
of constraints or demands on universities. Some interviewees, particularly from pre-
1992 universities, argue that universities should attract more non-government funding in 
order to achieve more and be able to undertake more independent actions, even if their 
autonomy is not enhanced. However, some interviewees, particularly from post -1992 
ones, defend government funding by arguing that, in fact, it represents less interference 
than funding from industry and overseas student fees, and offers financial security 
which allows universities to plan ahead. The results suggest that such a standard 
interpretation - the more government funding, the less autonomy universities have, or, 
the more non-government funding, the greater autonomy universities have - may not be 
necessarily reliable. Government and non-government funds seem to have equal 
chances of being, or not, so-called 'free money', enlarging universities' areas of 
discretion. 
Second, given that nearly all funding comes with demands and constraints of some sort, 
it is an interesting phenomenon to hypothesise a situation in which universities try to 
free themselves from governmental control by looking elsewhere for funding. 
Paradoxically, by doing so, they may enter into another realm of external control. Such 
a hypothesis, if supported by evidence, would lend some support to the arguments of 
Levy (1994) that 'autonomy from the state does not mean autonomy from all external 
control' (p. 254). The market was identified as one of these controls during the 
interview. 
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In Chapter 5, the funding patterns in universities in England are suggested to be more 
diverse than those in Taiwan. Now, the empirical results also suggest that the 
proportion of key areas of affairs on which universities can decide for themselves, is 
higher in England than in Taiwan. Bringing these two together, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that there is an association - the more diversified the funding of universities, the 
greater autonomy which they have. However, this is not the purpose of this study to 
promote such a link, particularly after clarifying the relationship between university 
autonomy and funding by considering the nature of funding as one of being bound by 
conditions. On the contrary, the case of Taiwan is a counter-example, which suggests 
that even where university funding is seemingly diversified, it is by no means clear that 
this promotes greater university autonomy. A clear example is seen in the case of 
national universities, which have joined the UDFF scheme, and have started to generate 
their own income from a number of sources, and diversify their funding bases. As a 
consequence, the implementation of the UDFF only made national university staff 
realise that universities' efforts in diversifying funding would not change anything 
fundamental in relation to autonomy. These expressions in Taiwan lead logically to the 
next theme. 
9.2.2 The Importance of Context: The Legal and Administrative Position 
The interview results in Taiwan reveal the difficult experiences that private universities 
have encountered, and national universities have started to encounter, in using their 
earned income, given that usage of the latter has been prescribed in regulation and 
legislation. In addition to drawing attention to these difficulties, several interviewees in 
Taiwan stressed that, in their opinion, universities in the West are trusted by their 
governments, even though they are funded by governments, but that universities in the 
East are heavily regulated by their governments, even though they are not funded by 
governments. Thus, it is believed that more funding bringing about greater university 
autonomy has been more evident in the West than in the East. 
It is noteworthy that issues relating to universities' earned income and related 
interviewees' assumptions, so important in the case of Taiwan, did not appear as key 
issues in the case of England. This observation becomes a critical point for the 
researcher to look for something else, besides the amount of funding, which may playa 
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key role in enhancing understanding of the relationship between university autonomy 
and funding. With empirical support, this 'something' can be identified as the 
relationship between government and university. Leaving aside vague points regarding 
what is the "West" and what is the "East", and how reliable assumptions are, the results 
in the case of Taiwan reveal part of the context by which understanding of the 
relationship between university autonomy and funding may be arrived at. Thus, these 
results in particular have some significant implications for this study as a whole. 
First, they reinforce the arguments, made in the previous chapters and in 9.l.2, that 
whether university autonomy in Taiwan can be enhanced, depends a great deal on 
government-university relationships, and, at the moment, the latter are more decisive 
than the matter of resources. In cases like Taiwan, that seems to imply a need for direct 
de-regulation of financial and personnel control. However, the arguments of 
Goedegeburre et al. (1994) that de-regulation 'does not necessarily lead to increased 
institutional autonomy' may hold good for the situation which Taiwan may encounter 
after de-regulation. A relationship of trust, held by government towards universities, is 
expected to be established in the long run. As Trow (1996) argues, trust is 'the basis of 
the very large measure of autonomy' of universities, 'which are able to raise substantial 
sums of private money, or which are funded by governments which voluntarily delegate 
much of their power over the institutions' (p. 311). Then, based on the trusting 
relationship, the matter of resource may have some detennining role in enhancing 
institutional autonomy. 
Second, the researcher inevitably asks why this missing link - context - has, to a 
relatively large degree, been ignored in the literature regarding the relationship between 
university autonomy and funding. Several things may have contributed to this absence 
of debate. First, the arguments regarding the relationship between university autonomy 
and funding have been less seriously backed up with empirical tests, and are notoriously 
simplified in the application of the payer-piper theory, or the principal-agent problem, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. Second, current changes in the funding pattern of universities 
cause misinterpretation or exaggeration of the effects of funding, partiCUlarly non-
government funding. The factor of funding always plays the role as a necessary, but not 
a sufficient, condition, in realising university autonomy. It would have been 
unconvincing had Clark (1998) taken diversified funding, and certain consequences, as 
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an indicator of being entrepreneurial, as a basis on which to argue that universities can 
recover their lost autonomy. Instead, Clark (1998) admits that diversified funding, 
alone, 'can hardly make a significant difference' (p. 145). It appears as one of Clark's 
five essential elements which universities should have for their entrepreneurial 
transformation. Third, the contextual factors contributing to enhancing university 
autonomy are dynamic, not fixed, so that the assumption of the existence of a direct 
caL4sal link between funding and university autonomy, becomes questionable. 
Meanwhile, other possible ways in which universities can be granted greater autonomy -
such as by the good will of the government, as Musselin (1996) argues in the case of 
French higher education, and as the case of Taiwan suggests - are ignored. 
Last, but not least, the context has been implicitly indicated by Neave and van Vught 
(1994, p. 292) in the review of limited freedom to generate income in certain state 
control systems of higher education. In that review, 'state control systems' equates to 
what the present study sees as 'context'. This observation justifies the researcher in 
generating a new hypothesis, that diversifying funding bases, or attracting alternative 
sources of funding, in the state control systems (or continental model), may not have 
effects on university autonomy as directly as do those in the state supervising systems 
(or Anglo-Saxon model). In the latter, a positive link between funding and autonomy, is 
often treated given. However, in the state control systems, universities have many 
things to deal with before they can claim such a link. Although the limitations of these 
two models - state control model and state supervising model, have been discussed in 
Chapter 6, their value in providing a conceptual and analytical tool cannot be denied. 
The justification for a new hypothesis is further strengthened by the subtle analysis of 
Clark's study - 'Creating Entrepreneurial Universities: Organizational Pathways of 
Transformation' (1998), which explores the transformation process of five case-studies 
- University of Warwick (England), University of Strathclyde (Scotland), University of 
Twente (The Netherlands), Chalmers University of Technology (Sweden), and 
University of Joensuu (Finland). In the first two case-studies, where institutions have 
independent legal status, their efforts in generating third-stream income can have 
manifestly contributed to enhanced institutional autonomy. The third case-study does 
not have such an advantage, because state constraints stand in the way; as Clark notes, 
the provisions of Dutch public law do not allow universities to undertake 
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entrepreneurial activities. It proves more difficult for the institutions in the last two 
case-studies to generate their funding as they want, while they remain as public 
university, as, where the Swedish and Finnish governments provide funding, national 
rule books govern university operations. Bravely, Chalmers University of Technology 
left its public status behind, and opted to be a 'foundation university', which in return 
provides it more space for independent operation. The last case-study, Joensuu, had to 
propose and obtain 'approval' from the Ministry of Education in Finland to become a 
pilot institution with 'lump-sum budgetary arrangements' before starting their 
entrepreneurial transformation. 
Generating and using the second and third-streams funding can thus be considered 
natural to the first two case-studies. However, this is not the case in the last three case-
studies, where the universities have to do something explicitly outside their national 
norms, before they can increase their independence by increasing their income. They 
have to get around state constraints by opting for independent status, or, obtaining 
explicit and special government approval. The analysis here is a reminder that the 
extent of the effect of funding on institutional autonomy, in a given case, is always 
relative to context of the case. 
Finally, it is necessary to deal with the apparent reality, that the matter of context seems 
not to carry the weight in England that it does in Taiwan. Certain interviewees in 
England take the view that, at the current stage of their development, having the status 
of legal corporations, universities are allowed to do every action that is permissible 
within their legal framework. For example, one pre-1992 university registrar said, 'on 
staff appointment, this is the area where we have an absolute freedom; and, on finance, 
we are largely free ... we are sufficiently autonomous to make a profit and keep it'. The 
argument of this study is that the relationship between university autonomy and funding 
should be interpreted in the context of government-university relationships. The 
question arises, how is this manifested in England? Two observations may throw some 
light on this question. 
First, the government-university relationship as a condition, always exists, and will 
always show some effects. However, the effects may not necessarily always be 
negative or constraining. Government actions, like granting universities independent 
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legal status and allowing them to generate their own income, have had effects other than 
constraining. The fairly recent past experience for universities in England, with 
generous government financial support and with fewer government demands than 
elsewhere or at other times, proved an enhancing one. For example, the universities in 
England in the three decades before the 1980s enjoyed, as Russell (1993) observes, a 
more amicable government-university relationship than they had had for most of their 
history. Such a circumstance made it possible for universities during that period to 
'escape' the inherent contradiction between accepting government funds and 
maintaining their autonomy, and also to modify the adage to 'he who pays the piper 
does not insist on calling the tune' (Williams, 1995a, p. 183). It is conceivable that the 
arguments like 'the higher the proportion of university income that comes from non-
government sources, the greater their freedom of action' (UGC, 1984), or 'true 
institutional autonomy can only be guaranteed by financial autonomy, which requires 
that the institution is not over-dependent upon anyone funder' (Tight, 1992), were not 
born out by the then experience. Even if they had been put forward during that time, 
they would have been brushed aside by the universities as being UIU1ecessary warnings -
as one Chinese adage puts it, 'Chi Jen Yo Tein'. 
Second, the government-university relationship in England can be seen transformed 
from being implicit towards being explicit, as analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. As many 
English academics, like Tasker and Packham (1990), Becher and Kogan (1992), Russell 
(1993) and Scott (1995), observe, the government has become more dominant in 
defining the government-university relationship, and has imposed more and more 
elaborate control systems. Thus, the researcher contends that, when examined in some 
detail, over time, England does not stand as a counter-example against the thesis of this 
study. Instead, the interviews regarding recent government actions provide some 
evidence that the context, that is, the government-university relationship, will be 
increasingly rather than decreasingly influential as a factor in the relationship between 
university autonomy and funding in England. Furthermore, given recent developments, 
through the Institute for Learning and Teaching (ILT) in Higher Education, there may be 
greater explicit government involvement in the setting and! or validation of 
qualifications of the people universities will appoint. Maybe through the QAA there 
will develop some control of the curriculum, as in the QAA's pilot study in History and 
Chemistry. In a sense, these requirement will limit institutional freedom to appoint 
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staff, and it will threaten autonomy when universities are told what they should teach. 
Given such circumstances, perhaps the time has come to question whether it is still 
helpful for universities to avoid attempted government interference, reduce certain 
government interventions, through generating alternative sources of funding. 
Furthermore, the nature of the government-university relationship reveals itself in the 
idea of university autonomy. The observation of Lockwood (1987) that the idea of 
autonomy is 'normally used to refer to the extent of a university's freedom to use public 
resources in ways in which it thinks best' remains relatively true in certain countries, 
and England is one of them. Regarding powers, such as that of borrowing money, 
taking more UK undergraduates and charging top-up fees, and the like, most 
universities in England chose not to exercise them, because they received government 
funds, but not because they did not have those powers 
However, it is clear that Lockwood's observation is far from fitting the experience of 
Taiwan, where the idea of university autonomy, that is, the nature of the government-
university relationship, lies outside the area of debate on 'the extent of a university's 
freedom to use public resources in ways in which it thinks best'. Unlike in England, the 
nature of restrictions imposed on universities in Taiwan was neither a matter of any 
choice for the universities, nor was it anything to do with whether universities received 
public funds or not. However, the situation is not fixed for ever. One can foresee that, 
if the government in Taiwan carries out its pledges to de-regulate the higher education 
system, and to put more trust in universities, then the weight of the amount of funding 
on university autonomy may become more evident. However, it must be admitted that 
both the government's occasional inappropriate involvement in university affairs, and 
the universities' failures in practising autonomy, reported in this study, militate against 
the foreseeable situation becoming reality. 
At the beginning of this study, it was argued that resource dependence theory can only 
serve as a partial interpretation of the relationship between resources and autonomy, 
since it tends to over-emphasise the fact that resource-providers have 'the capacity of 
exercising great power over' resource-receivers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), or to 
simplify the relationship as in the phrase 'he who pays the piper calls the tune' 
(Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Also, the linear sequence created by resource-dependence 
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theory is doubtful. However, here, at the end of the study, having discussed the amount 
of funding and looked for the possible missing element in understanding the 
relationship between university autonomy and funding, one immediate and critical 
question should be asked - whether what the researcher has argued is a reprint of 
resource-dependence theory? 
This study does indeed have certain areas of overlap with resource-dependence theory. 
For example, the attention to the amount of funding corresponds to three major criteria, 
proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), in determining the extent of the importance of 
resources to organisational operation and survival. However, there are several cogent 
points on the basis of which one can reject the claim that all government-university 
relationships can be summarised as resource-dependence theory. First, regarding the 
theory itself, the accounts of Pfeffer and Salancik that while an environment is 'dense 
with organisations and interest groups with a variety oflaws and norms', discretion over 
resources given to focal organisations is rarely absolute, call the given relationship 
between resource-provider and resource-receiver into question. They imply that the 
relationship between resource-provider and resource-receIver is also influenced by 
'organisations and interest groups with a variety of laws and norms'. These 
organisations and interest groups may not be resource-providers, nor may relationships 
be resources-related. Second, while government may not be a resource-provider to 
universities, the former can still be a powerful actor in shaping government-university 
relationships. In the present study, the case of Taiwan is an example. The government 
can exercise its stick without offering a carrot. Thus, resource-dependence relationships 
between government and universities indicate a part of the reality of government-
university relationships. Third, observed carefully, the effects of resource-dependence 
relationships can be seen to be built up on the basis of government-to-university 
relationships, but not vice versa. When government policies and regulations on higher 
education are relaxing, resource-dependence relationships between government and 
university may tum out to be a facilitative factor in the realisation of university 
autonomy. 
Thus, the possible links between university autonomy and funding do not occur in a 
vacuum, but their interaction is dynamic, and influenced, and then shaped, by 
government-university relationships in a given country. The cases of Taiwan and 
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England, to different extents, demonstrate why this study argues that the relationship 
between university autonomy and funding should be interpreted in the context of 
government-university relationships more generally, and of the context of the idea of 
university autonomy in that country. 
9.3 Further Thoughts on the Concept of 'Contractual Autonomy' 
Chapter 4 has presented the rationale for using the idea of 'contractual autonomy' which 
is derived from the idea of 'university as institution', separate from 'traditional 
autonomy' which is derived from the idea of 'university as idea'. The discussion in 9.1 
suggests that autonomy may prove to be more limited in reality than in the abstract. 
While universities can claim their traditional autonomy, the autonomy they really 
exercise may not appear the same. With increasing public demands on universities, the 
extent of the difference between the two realms cannot be hidden as ever, while the 
university cannot 'justify itself in terms of the idealist notion of the university . . . which 
in essence argues that the university should not be held accountable by any other but 
itself' (Melody, 1997, p. 75). The changes between two realms which universities may 
face are more likely to be different from case to case, and dynamic over time, in terms 
of institutional capabilities and context. 
Quantitative data revealed an interesting contrast: universities thought that they had 
decision-making power on a majority of university affairs, but, meanwhile, they also 
thought that some of them were under certain degree of external regulation, though 
universities in England were in a position of having greater autonomy, than those in 
Taiwan. Qualitatively, there were mixed responses towards the term and definition of 
'Contractual Autonomy', in three aspects. First, 'contract' gave an impression of 
something which must be written, formal, time-fixed, and legally-binding. The second 
respect involved questioning the existence of 'negotiation' while the two parties 
(universities and external agencies) were not equal, and the latter were powerful. The 
third respect concerned the question of whether the reality is, in effect, that 'after the 
contracts being set, the university exercise its autonomy within the contracts to self-
govern its affairs.' Nevertheless, more constructive views were given by several 
interviewees, who tended to argue that universities were obliged to earn their 
'autonomy'. But 'how'? The answers given vary according to the perspective of those 
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giving the answer. 
The summary above provides important insights on the applicability and usefulness of 
the concept of 'contractual autonomy'. First, the findings provide little evidence to 
support the argument, made in Chapter 4, that 'contractual relationship' and ' contractual 
autonomy' have existed as long as universities have existed as institutions. Instead, 
' contractual relationship' is identified as a recent development. The findings indicate a 
recognition, as many scholars (for example, Neave and van Vught, 1991; Berdahl, 1990; 
Ferris, 1992; and, Scott, 1995) observe, that universities, more and more, have 
contractual relationships with government and non-government agencies. Apart from 
this, the case of England highlights the increasing importance of the contractual 
relationship with students, which has been reinforced in England by the new policy of 
home students paying tuition fees since 1998. This view is a manifestation of the 
argument of Neave (1988a) that university autonomy is 'contextually' defined. The 
changes in the context in which universities in any given country operate have infused 
themselves into the meaning of university autonomy. Scott (1995) uses an impressive 
term 'near-exclusive relationship' to describe the relationship universities in England 
used to have with the funding council, research councils, and LEAs which paid tuition 
fees on behalf of students, and a single parent ministry, the DES. Now, such 'a near-
exclusive relationship ' is hard to maintain, and has to include students, local 
communities, industry, and the markets abroad. Also, Clark (1998) observes that 'when 
only one young person in 20 sought university training, most people most of time did 
not think about what the university was doing and what it could do for them ... (now) 
virtually everyone can demand some involvement or relationship (with the university), . 
Scott's description and Clark's observation indicate that the contexts in which 
universities exist, and in which universities should engage with potential opportunities -
and indeed contract with people and agencies - are more complicated, and contain more 
uncertainty, than in the past. 
Second, the first impression of the word 'contract', for example, that it must be written 
or legal-binding, causes more concern among interviewees, although most of them 
recognise that universities exercise their autonomy within certain boundaries. In fact, 
legally, written contracts represent only one form of contract. Contracts, legally, 
includes promises, oral or written. Thus, the first impression among our interviewees 
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may not be completely accurate in relations to the true nature of contract. It does, 
however, support the original contention of this study that the word' contractual' should 
be used, instead of 'contract'. As Musselin (1996) clarifies, while 'contracts' in the 
context of this study, do not fulfil legal and economic definitions of contracts which are, 
for example, to 'be concluded between parties that are free and equal', the contracts of 
this study are 'in a way more a symbolic contract than a real one' (p. 12). However, 
such a symbolic contract, or an unwritten one, can, sometimes, have as substantial a 
power as a real, in affecting the behaviour of a university, as the case of Taiwan 
exemplifies. 
Third, when the resulting 'agreements' are thick with detailed sub-contracts, rather than 
involve a single Rousseauesque contract, in the words of Scott (1995), the question of 
how constrained such autonomy might be, arises. It seems reasonable to assume that if 
universities have a single Rousseauesque contract, they will have a greater degree of 
autonomy than if they have been bound to a series of contracts and sub-contracts. In 
fact, this is not always the case. The case of Taiwan is an example of how constraining 
the practice of university autonomy might be. Article 1 of the University Act states, 
'Academic freedom of a university shall be protected and it (university) shall enjoy 
autonomy to the extent provided by law.' Literally, this Article, as a single 
Rousseausque contract, seems to grant universities greater autonomy. From the 
research findings, unfortunately, 'to the extent provided by law' in practice ends up as 
an irony because the room for a university to manoeuvre is so limited under the 
presence of heavy regulation and laws. 
Fourth, contracts entail negotiations, but the latter do not necessarily mean 'direct and 
explicit involvement' of each party in the contracts. Often, universities claim that the 
contracts with goverrunents do not entail negotiations because the latter is a powerful 
party. However, the actions of the latter are also restricted by the Parliament, or by 
national constitutions and legislation, or, the society by large, which, indirectly, 
represent universities in their negotiation with goverrunents. For example, leaving aside 
its weak implementation, Article 1 of the University Act in Taiwan, which is protecting 
academic freedom and university autonomy, should have had effective power to restrict 
the government in issuing their administrative regulations. The interpretation of the 
legislative provisions can also open a chance for universities to negotiation. The 
231 
financial memorandum, for example, in England, is also identified as a contract, whose 
terms are also confined to the level that nothing in it ' shall require the institution to act 
in a manner which could cause it (the university) to lose it charitable status or 
which would be inconsistent with its charter and statutes ' (HEFCE Circular 15/97). 
Finally, it is essential to ask whether contracts contradict autonomy. Legally, contracts 
grant both contractees and contractors ' autonomy' because both sides are not bound by 
the other party, but bound by the terms of their contracts. Thus, 'contractual autonomy' 
can be accepted. In the case of a university, the term 'contractual autonomy' does not 
necessarily mean that the university has a lot of autonomy or has little autonomy. 
However, it is an expression of the reality that the university can always exercise its 
autonomy within certain frameworks and boundaries, which vary from case to case. 
Thus, the purpose of proposing the concept of 'contractual autonomy' is to argue that 
universities still have to assume their own responsibilities if they want to enlarge their 
'contractual autonomy', even though the existing frameworks are very restrictive in 
nature. The question of 'how universities can enlarge their 'contractual autonomy'?' is 
actually equivalent to asking 'how can universities as institutions earn their autonomy, 
while they have already claimed their autonomy as idea?' Clark (1998) argues that only 
universities 'can take essential actions', though system organisers can help to clear the 
way by reducing state mandates and manipulating broad incentives (p. 136). These 
'essential actions' can be effected in many ways, suggested in the literature, such as 
'generating more alternative sources of income' or 'demonstrating their worthiness for 
public funding to strengthen the continuity of government's financial contribution', and 
so on. However, Clark's arguments may ignore cases, like Taiwan. The latter case is a 
reminder that, if system organisers outside the universities are willing to clear the way, 
by, for example, reducing state mandates and providing broad incentives, then the 
beneficent consequences of universities' taking essential actions, can be enhanced. 
9.4 Implications and Conclusions 
This thesis began with an interest in understanding relationships between university 
autonomy and funding, and academic arguments on this issue. It gradually became 
clearer to me that these relationships are usually, though erroneously, reduced to a linear 
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sequence - the greater the government funding, the less the university autonomy, or, the 
greater non-government funding, the greater the autonomy, or the like. Certain 
arguments appear to seize upon superficial phenomena for support, and appear less than 
complete. The motivation for a deeper exploration is derived from my spontaneous 
doubts about the adequacy of these linear arguments for explaining the experience of 
higher education in Taiwan. The researcher started to wonder 'What's wrong with 
Taiwan' rather than being 'smart' enough to jump directly to the question, 'What may 
be missing in these arguments?' 
An extensive literature review helped re-direct the focus of this research and helped me 
realise that there were elements missing, in these arguments, and that the elements 
needed to be identified. The exploration of relevant issues, including university 
governance, the idea of university autonomy, funding, and government-university 
relationships, have been set out at length in the preceding chapters. There is no 
intention to repeat all the arguments again here. They form a solid foundation for an 
argument that the relationship between university autonomy and university funding of a 
given country, cannot be understood simply in terms, either of the resource dependence 
perspective, or of a judgement of the degree of university autonomy in the light of 
funding mechanisms. Instead, any agenda for understanding or comparing the 
relationship between university autonomy and funding across countries must be 
constructed, and results of investigation interpreted, in the light of government-
university relationships, and of the idea of university autonomy. If this is not done, then 
conclusions which posit a direct relationship between university autonomy and funding, 
should be treated with caution and with reservations. 
The results of the empirical studies give concrete form to the arguments of this thesis. 
Through discussions of the empirical findings in conjunction with theoretical 
explorations, understanding of the relationship between university autonomy and 
funding is advanced. The comparisons between England and of Taiwan are not limited 
to establishing and describing factual differences between them, but seek to establish 
links between what has been observed empirically, and the respective contexts of the 
two countries, and seek then to relate 'relationship or even patterns of relationship to 
each other' (Schriewer, 1990). Although government-university relationships and the 
idea of university autonomy have been identified as missing elements in arguments in 
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the literature regarding the relationships between university autonomy and funding, it 
would be imprudent to conclude that universities having the same context may be 
assumed to enjoy the same autonomy. Such a conclusion proves fragile by the existence 
of many paradoxical examples. 
In England, while all universities share the same current context, they clearly do not 
become the same, and, while they have freedom to generate their income, some of them 
are still heavily dependent upon government funding. The context can be seen as 
providing a basic framework; however, what universities build on this context proves 
varied and complex. At this point, the resources that universities can draw upon, 
become critical. It should have been noted that, in the context of higher education, 
resources imply not only funding, but also include staff, students, academic reputations 
and institutional characteristics, as well as university's opportunities and ability to 
respond to them. The differentiation which results from variation in the above 
characteristics, may occur beyond the demarcation between pre-1992 and post-1992 
universities. 
In Taiwan, a differentiation in government-university relationships between national and 
private universities, is developing. In the past, under heavy regulation and legislation, 
and thick political ideology, the system of higher education was characterised by 
uniformity. Fortunately, in my view, the context is changing. De-regulation, as the 
government has pledged, is beginning to differentiate private universities from national 
universities. The former are being expected to develop their individual niches after they 
are given a greater discretion over use of their own money. As far as national 
universities are concerned, it is not clear, whether the govemment's proposal to grant 
them the status of corporation - which is argued as a way to enhance university 
autonomy - will create a new opportunity. However, some doubts, about the effects of 
this proposal on enhancing university autonomy, are inevitable. 
On the basis of this research, and reflections upon it, certain implications for further 
study are put forward. Finally, in concluding this thesis, it is proposed that reflection is 
needed, on the issue of how universities earn and assert their autonomy, particularly in a 
context influenced by post-modernist doubts on the position of universities. 
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This study supports irreducible values, in adopting both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to understand the practice of university autonomy, and the latter's 
association with funding. With regard to implications for further study, or a follow-up 
study, there is a need to re-examine the 37 key areas of university affairs covered in the 
research instrument. Though these 37 key areas of university affairs are extensive, it 
can be argued that individual areas should have different weights, depending on the 
perceptions, of university staff, of each area's importance in relation to university 
autonomy in practice. If further research can do a preliminary survey to rank areas of 
university affairs in order to giving different weights, as suggested, the results of the 
research as a whole will be more convincing. 
Second, the measure of university autonomy should be multi-dimensional. In this study, 
the questionnaire covers at least three aspects: 1) university's decision-making power; 
2) whether key affairs are thought to be under external regulation; and 3) changes in 
university autonomy. Interview perspective is the fourth dimension. The efforts on 
these aim to overcome the inevitable distance between the measure of decision-making 
power universities have, and the room for universities to exercise those powers in 
practice. Thus, how to measure the room for universities to exercise their legal powers, 
and universities' abilityt~ fulfil their mission, though difficult, deserve further 
exploration in enhancing the understanding of uni versity autonomy in practice. 
Third, besides 'genuine' academics, key people from government or national agencies, 
to be included in the interview is needed, if access to such people can be obtained, and 
research resources are available. Such an inclusion will provide an important 
counterbalance to the universities' commentaries on the present boundaries between the 
government and the university. 
Fourth, use of a comparative basis for study, is confirmed as valuable. Such a basis 
facilitates balance of view, countering any unwarranted 'absolutely certainties' of view. 
Comparison is a valuable way of thinking, which fosters both testing of researchers' 
pnor assumptions, and enriching researchers' concept heuristically through 
acknowledgement and addressing of unexpected findings . 
While post-modernist thinking recognises 'fragmentation, dispersal, discontinuity and 
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plurality as common features of the social world' (Morley, 1999, p. 43), the latter 
characteristics are unsettling and undermining the continuity, certainty and tradition of 
knowledge and truth on which universities could claim their position, privileges, and 
university autonomy. The proliferation of knowledge and ' socially distributed 
knowledge' (Scott, 1995) have made universities lose ' their monopoly over the 
definitions as to what is to count as knowledge' (Barnett, 2000, p. 35). 'Truth' itself 
appears problematic in a post-modernist society, and is certainly not something over 
which universities can claim a monopoly, or even, now, over which they are necessarily 
accepted as being authoritative. In this sense, it is understandable that certain 
academics should argue that 'the attenuated university ' (Cowen, 1996) has arrived, or 
even that ' the death of the university' has occurred. However, such arguments usually 
ignore that the 'idea' of the university has been already a plural, not singular, one, 'ever 
changing, always adapting to new circumstances' (Smith and Webster, 1997). The roles 
and missions of universities are multiplying. 'The expanding university' ( Barnett, 
2000) is observable. Universities are still thought of as something with which the 
outside world wants to have connection, as seen, for example, in the emergence of 
virtual 'universities' or the 'university ' for industry. 
It is something of a paradox that post-modernist thinking undermines the previous firm 
framework underpinning universities, but it also infuses certain energising elements into 
universities' spirit challenging their 'taken-for-granted' rationality or prejudiced 
attitudes towards their claim for academic freedom and university autonomy. The 
relationships between a post-modernist society and the university are well described in 
the conclusion of Smith and Webster, who say, 
Intellectuals in the university can act, to borrow from Auden, as an 'affirming 
flame ' for the cultural life of a society. To ensure the flame burns brightly, the 
wider society needs must keep its distance while supply ing the fuel. (Smith and 
Webster, 1997, pp. 112-113) 
Post-modernist thinking challenges, but strengthens, the importance of university 
autonomy to a society, and its practice. With more self-reflection and self-criticism, 
universities can prove themselves as entities which 'know best how to manage their 
own business' (Russell, 1993), and consequently how 'to best serve society' (Tight, 
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1992). Diverse funding, in this thesis, is not identified as a sufficient condition to 
enhance university autonomy. Behind the diverse funding, however, there is an 
important message which merits attention. That is, as Williams (1992a) argues, that a 
university with several funding sources 'is likely to be active in seeking out funds'. 
This brings in positive effects on university characters. Universities become more 
willing to assert to the outside world that they are 'better prepared to cope with the 
confusing complexity and rising uncertainty characteristic' of the environment (Clark, 
1998). Universities' assertive willingness to bridge themselves to the environment will 
win themselves public confidence, beyond gathering money, staff and students. 
No country in the world 'has a government which does not retain some control over its 
universities' (de Moor, 1993, p. 61), since, as Salter and Tapper (1994) argues, 'no state 
can afford to leave its higher education system to its own devices' (p. 18). 
Nevertheless, it is believed that governments in civilised societies know how to value 
university autonomy; albeit that they usually have their dilemmas to deal with, given 
that resources are limited, and that the ideology that university education provides the 
manpower which the nation economy requires is prevailing. 
This study concludes with reflections rather than recommendations. The rationale is 
that the study has not set out to show strategies that universities must take, or to solve 
any problems standing between government and universities. Instead, it has aimed to 
clarify certain existing arguments, which are usually treated as given, in the literature, 
and to enhance understanding the relationship between university autonomy and 
funding. I hope and trust that those aims have been achieved. 
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Appendix 1 Interpretation No. 380 of the Council of Grand Justice 
When the Legislative Yuan reviewed the submission of the Enforcement Rules of 
University Act delivered by the MOE which revised according to the new revised 
University Act, the legislators suspected the certain rules in the Enforcement Rules of 
University Act, not only beyond its mother law (that is the University Act), but also 
against the Articles of our Constitution. Therefore, the legislators delivered an appeal 
for a uniform interpretation regarding to the availability of the university autonomy on 
course decision. The Interpretation on May 26, 1995 is summarised as follows. 
The lecture freedom referred to the Article 11 of the Constitution of Republic of China 
is designed to protect academic freedom. If we consider the nature of university 
education, academic freedom shall include freedom of research, freedom of teaching, 
and freedom of learning. It is also provided in Paragraph 2, Article 1 of the University 
Act, "Academic freedom of a university shall be protected and it shall enjoy autonomy 
to the extent provided by laws." The scope of autonomy shall mean direct involvement 
with crucial academic matters with respect to research and teaching. While the 
University Act does not prescribe how the curriculum of a university should be 
designed, it should fall within the scope of university autonomy because it is related to 
freedom of teaching and of learning, which are clearly crucial academic matters. But 
Article 162 of the Constitution provides, "All public and private educational and 
cultural institutions in the country shall, in accordance with law, be subject to State 
supervision." Thus, the supervision on the autonomy of university shall not only be 
conducted within the scope prescribed by law, but also shall comply with Article 23 of 
the Constitution, the so-called principle of statutory reserve. Unless otherwise specified 
in statutory law, the design of mandatory courses should comply with the foregoing 
principle of university autonomy. Under Paragraph 3, Article 23 of the Enforcement 
Rules for University Act, "Common mandatory courses for each university shall be 
made by the Ministry of Education through inviting all relevant persons of each 
university for discussion." Since the University Act does not authorise the Ministry of 
Education to invite all relevant personnel of each university for a discussion of common 
mandatory courses, the said Enforcement Rule should not contain the restrictions which 
are not provided by the University Act. Further, the second sub-paragraph of Paragraph 
1 of the same provides that "those who fail in the examination of common mandatory 
courses shall not graduate." The provision essentially imposes restrictions for 
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graduation requirements, as such the common courses substantially constitute a 
restriction for graduation. According to Articles 23 and 25 of University Law, Articles 
2 and 3 of the Diploma Law, the conditions of graduation fall within the scope of 
university autonomy. Therefore, the second sub-paragraph, Paragraph 1, Article 23 of 
the Enforcement Rule is contradictory to the provision of University Act, and the 
enactment of Paragraph 3 of the same has not been authorised by the University Act. 
As these provisions are violating the Constitution, they shall become null and void as of 
the date of promulgation of this Interpretation and no later than one year after the date 
hereof. 
The scope of protection should be extended to other important academic activities. As 
long as the academic activities are related to exploration on studies and discovery of 
truth such as the formation of research motive, presentation of research project, 
organization of research personnel, allocation of budget, presentation for result of 
research, etc. should not only be protected, but also be given the opportunities to enjoy 
the provision of social resources. The activities in connection with teaching and studies, 
including design of curriculum, design of subjects, content of teaching, credential 
evaluation, rules for examination, freedom of selection of department and courses, and 
student autonomy, should all be protected. In addition, internal organisation of a 
university, employment of teachers, and evaluation of qualification all fall within the 
scope of university autonomy, and external interference should be prohibited. While the 
legislative intent of Articles 4, 8, 11, 22, and 23 of the University Act and first sub-
paragraph, Article 3 of the Private School Law is that a university should be subject to 
State supervision, competent authority of education should avoid involving with the 
matters which are protected by academic freedom when it performs its right of 
administrative supervision. The design and arrangement of university curriculum 
should be dealt with by each university under the principle of university autonomy and 
academic responsibility. 
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Appendix 2 Academics' Formulations on the Contents of University Autonomy 
Academics Highlights 
Ashby (1966) Essential ingredients of university autonomy: 
1) Freedom to select staff! students and to determine the 
conditions under which they remain in the university; 
2) Freedom to determine curriculum content and degree 
standards; 
3) Freedom to allocate funds (within the amount available) across 
different categories of expenditure. (Ashby, 1966, p. 296) 
D. C. Levy (1980) The contents of university autonomy are defined operationally as 
university control (self-rule) over the following components: 
1) Appointive aspect: hiring/ promoting/ dismissal of professors; 
selection! dismissal of deans, rectors/ other administrative 
personnel; and the terms of employment. 
2) Academic aspect: access to the university; career selection; 
curriculum offering and course instruction; degree 
requirements and authorisation; and academic freedom. 
3) Financial aspect: determination of who pays; funding level; 
funding criteria; preparation and allocation of university 
budget; and accountability. 
The Carnegie Survey aims to explore 'effective authority' for making decisions 
Survey in Higher between higher education and the state/ This survey is of three 
Education (1982) main aspects of decision-making: 1) academic, 2) personnel-
related, and 3) administrative. 
Olaf C. McDaniel The 19-indicator questionnaire assesses the relationship between 
(1996) governments and HEls, and the degree of university autonomy in 
75 countries/ The 19 indicators are derived from five main areas: 
1). Financial policy, 2). General aspects of management, 3). 
Education (the issues of course content and supply), 4). Personnel 
policy, and 5). Student policy. 
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Appendix 3 Thirty-seven Key Areas of University Affairs 
A. The academic dimension includes: 1) undergraduate entry qualifications, 2) number 
of (UK) undergraduates, 3) selecting postgraduate entrants, 4) numbers of 
postgraduates, 5) setting exams and student assessment, 6) setting degree standards 
and criteria, 7) awarding the degree, 8) structure of academic courses, 9) contents of 
individual courses, 10) adding/discontinue undergraduate programs, 11) adding/ 
discontinue postgraduate programs, 12) broad research priorities, 13) direction of 
specific research projects, 14) ownership of copyrights, and 15) ownership of other 
intellectual property rights. Under this dimension, there are three sub-dimensions 
proposed as follows: student recruitment (items 1-4), teaching (items 5-11), and 
research (items 12-15). 
B. The appointive dimension includes: 16) appointment of vice-chancellor/ principal, 
17) appointing academic staff, 18) promotion of academic staff, 19) dismissal of 
academic staff, 20) appointments of deans and department heads, 21) appointment 
of registrar, 22) appointment of personnel director, and 23) appointment of finance 
director. 
C. The financial dimension includes: 24) drawing up annual budgets, 25) allocation 
budgets within university, 26) setting level of undergraduate tuition fees, 27) setting 
up university company, 28) borrowing money from capital market, 29) determining 
price of commercial teaching, and 30) determining price of research contracts/ 
projects, 31) determining salary scales of academic staff, 32) determining salary of 
individual academic staff and 33) setting annual income generation targets. 
D. The organisational development dimension includes: 34) defining mISSIOn and 
objective of institution, 35) drawing up strategic development plans, 36) 
establishing! merging! discontinuing departments/ faculties/ group studies, and 37) 
determining internal administrative structure. 
260 
Annendix 4 Questionnaire 
April 1998 
University Autonomy and Its Relationship with Fundine Questionnaire 
• This Questionnaire is part of a study on university autonomy and its association with funding. 
• Please enclose the completed Questionnaire in the stamped addressed envelope and return it, if possible, by 31 st July. If you are willing to 
be interviewed, please can you put your name and telephone number or e-mail address at the end of Questionnaire. 
• If you wish to receive a summary of the results from England and Taiwan, please write your name & address on the back of Questionnaire. 
• The information you supply in this survey will be treated in strict confidence and presented as grouped data in any report. 
• Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
Ms Li-chuan Chiang (E-mail: cllppsn@ioe.ac.uk) 
Professor Gareth Williams (E-mail: g.williams@ioe.ac.uk) 
Institute of Education, University of London 
Part One: Institutional Backeround Details (Please Tick as Aoorooriate) 
1. To which group does your university belong? 0 Pre-1992 0 Post-1992 
2. Its Legal Instrument: 0 Royal Charter 0 Act of Parliament 0 Other ...... ......... ... .................. . ........ . 
3. Sources ofIncome (1996-7): 0 HEFCE ..... (%) 0 Research Councils ..... (%) 0 Tuition Fees ..... (%) 
o Business & Industry ...... (%) 0 Overseas Student Fees ..... (%) 0 Others ...... (%) 
Part Two: The Guidelines for Completillg the Questionnaire 
There are Four Sections and an Appendix (Back Page) each corresponding to blocks of columns. 
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Section (I): Please Ti~J<: one Box which corresponds most closely to the decision-making situation in your University. 
Entirely within University: Initiation, process of decision-making and final approval are all in control of the university 
Largely within University: At least one of the 3 stages is significantly influenced by an outside agency. 
Shared or Mixed: There are significant inputs from both inside and outside the university and both have effective power of veto over the decision. A decision is also 
'shared' if in some cases it is made by the university and in others it is determined externally. 
Largely External: External authority has formal powers to initiate a decision making process or to give final approval but is subject to some influence from University. 
Entirely External: The whole decision process is determined by an external agency or agencies. 
Section (II): Please indicate the form of any significant external regulation: 
LegaU administrative regulations: Statutes, government regulations, etc. 
Financial regulations: Significant conditions imposed by HEFCE, the Research Councils, etc. on any relevant fmancial allocation. 
If the item is neither under leg aU administrative nor financial form of regulations, please tick "Other" and please explain in the Appendix. 
Section (III): Please tick as appropriate "Does your University have the possibility of significantly reducing external control in this area by 
raising its own income? For example, can it recruit additional undergraduates and charge them fees?" 
Section (IV): Please tick as appropriate "Has autonomy with respect to each item changed in your University during the past ten years?" 
, 
(Example) Section (I) Section (II) Section (III) Section (IV) 
Does your University have Has autonomy changed in 
The Following Items the possibility of your University during the 
Decided by? Form of External Influence significantly reducing past 10 years? 
Entirely Largely Shared or Authority external control in this area 
within within or Largely Entirely by raising its own income? 
(Please Tick ,.,;, as Univ. Univ. Mixed External External Legal/ Finan- Other None/ Yes No Don't Know/ No 
Appropriate) Admini- cial Don't Not Applicable Increase Decrease Change 
strative Know 
1. Undergraduate Entry .,; .J .,; .,; 
Qualifications 
2. Number of UK .,; .,; .J .,; 
Undergraduates 
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Part Two: Section (I) Section (II) Section (III) Section (IV) 
Does your University have Has autonomy changed in 
The Following Items the possibility of your University during the 
Form of External Influence significantly reducing Decided by? past ten years? 
Entirely Large ly Shared or Authority external control in this area 
within within or Largely Entirely by raising its own income? 
(Please Tick ".y" as Univ. Un iv. Mixed External External Legal! None! No 
Appropriate) Adrnini- Finan- Don ' t Don't Know! Increase Decrease Change 
strative cial Other Know Yes No Not Applicable 
1. Undergraduate Entry 
Qualifications 
2. Number of UK 
Undergraduates 
3. Selecting Postgraduate 
Entrants 
4. Number of Postgraduates 
5. Setting Exams & Student 
Assessments 
6. Setting Degree Standards 
and Criteria 
7. Awarding the Degree 
8. Structure of Academic 
Courses 
9. Contents of Individual 
Courses 
10. Adding/ Discontinue 
Undergraduate programs 
11 . Adding/ Discontinue 
Postgraduate programs 
12. Broad Research Priorities 
------- - - - - - -- -
-
--
Note: 1. Univ.: University; External: External Agencies Including Funding Council, Research Councils, DfEE, Governmental Agencies and Non-governmental Agencies. 




Part Two: Section (I) Section (II) Section (III) Section (IV) 
Does your University have Has autonomy changed in 
The Following Items the possibility of your University during the 
Decided by? Form of External Influence significantly reducing past ten years? 
Entirely Largely Shared or Authority external control in this area 
within within or Largely Entirely by raising its own income? 
(Please Tick "...J" as Univ. Univ. Mixed External External Legal! None! No 
Appropriate) Admini- Finan- Don't Don't Know! Increase Decrease Change 
strative cial Other Know Yes No Not Applicable 
13. Direction of Specific 
Research Projects 
14. Ownership of Copyrights 
15. Ownership of Other 
Intellectual Property Rights 
16. Appointment of Vice-
chancellor/ Principal 
17. Appointing Academic 
Staff 
18. Promotion of Academic 
Staff 
19. Dismissal of Academic 
Staff 
20. Appointment of Deans & 
Department Heads 
21. Appointment of Registrar 
22. Appointment of Personnel 
Director 
23. Appointment of Finance 
Director 
24. Drawing up Annual 
Bud~ets 




Part Two: Section (I) Section (II) Section (III) Section (IV) 
Does your University have Has autonomy changed in 
The Following Items the possibility of your University during the 
Decided by? Form of External Influence significantly reducing past ten years? 
Entirely Largely Shared or Authority external control in this area I 
within within or Largely Entirely by raising its own income? 
(Please Tick ".";,, as Univ. Univ. Mixed Externa l External Legal! None/ No 
Appropriate) Admini- Finan- Don't DOll't Know/ Increase Decrease Change 
strative cial Other Know Yes No Not Applicable 
26. Setting Level of 
Undergraduate Tuition Fees 
27. Setting up University 
Companies 
28. Borrowing Money from 
Capital Market 
29. Determining Price of 
Commercial Teaching 
30. Determining Price of 
Research Contracts/ Proiects 
31. Determining Salary 
Scales of Academic Staff 
32. Determining Salary of 
Individual Academic Staff 
33. Setting Annual Income 
Generation Targets 
34. Defining Mission & 
Objectives of Institution 
35. Drawing up Strategic 
Development Plans 
36. Establishing! Merging/ 
Discontinuing Departments/ 
Faculties/ Group Studies 









(Continued 1) ~ Please Make Any Explanatory Comments about Any of Your Responses on the Back Page. Thank You Very Much. ~ 
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Appendix 
Please Make Any Explanatory Comments about Any of Your Responses Here 
Groups Comments 
Group One: (Item 1-4) 
Student Recruitment 
Group Two: (Item 5-11) 
Structure Contents of Quality of 
Teaching & Research 
Group Three: (Item 12-15) 
Research Management 
Group Four: (Item 16-23) 
Staff Appointments 
Group Five: (Item 24-33) 
Financial Management 
Group Six: (Item 34-37) 
Academic & Organisational 
Development 
Would you be willing to be interviewed in connection with this survey? 
< > Yes; Name: 
E-mail Address & Tel No: 
< >No. 
If you wish to receive a summary of the results from England and Taiwan, please 
write your name & address here. 
Name: 
Address: 
~Thank You Very Much for Your Precious Time and Co-operation. 
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Appendix 5 Interview Schedule for England 
Date: 17 July 1998 
Dear Mr. A, 
I will meet with you to discuss your completed questionnaire further and talk with you 
on the issue of university autonomy and its association with funding. Besides, in this 
study, one of major tasks is to redefine university autonomy. After an extensive 
literature review, the definition-- 'Contractual Autonomy', has been proposed in my 
study. I will very much appreciate if you can give me some comments on this 
definition and its usefulness. I have outlined a general schedule which we can follow 
to act as a guideline for the interview. I also would like to reconfirm with you about 
the length of interview which will go 50 minutes to one hour. 
Part I: Some questions on the completed questionnaire. 
Part II.: 
1. In your view, why is the culture of university autonomy strong in British 
universities? 
2. In your view, what is the main challenge to university autonomy now and in the 
future? What is possibly a feasible way to protect university autonomy? How much 
does funding can help the university to enhance its existing autonomy? 
3. Can you briefly let me know which sources of funds enhance and which possibly 
put the autonomy of your University under threat? 
4. Can we talk about the financial memorandum between the HEFCE and your 
University? What impact does it bring on internal decision-making and on university 
autonomy? 
5. How do you see the relationship between contractual obligations to funders, 
university autonomy and academic freedom? 
6. What is the main consideration while your university deciding the following 
matters: 
1). student recruitment; 
2). structure of courses and teaching quality; 
3). research quality; 
Li-Chuan Chiang Tel No: 0171- 2627144 <cllppsn@ioe.ac.uk> 
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4). staff appointment; 
5). strategic financial management; and 
6). organisational development? 
7 . Is it appropriate to use the term 'Contractual' to describe the relationship between 
the university and the outside agencies, whatever government or private? According 
to the contractual relationship to redefine university autonomy as 'Contractual 
Autonomy'(its definition as following) , is it applicable to describe the autonomy your 
University can enjoy? 
The Definition of Contractual Autonomy 
A university is always operated within a set of ' contracts', whatever in explicit and formal or 
implicit and informal form. Autonomy is a relative, not an absolute concept. Neave (1988) 
argues that autonomy is contextual and political defined. With the changing relationship 
between the university and outside agencies, it is time to redefine university autonomy. 
(Neave, 1988; Tapper & Salter, 1995) Obviously on the financial aspect, the contractual 
relationship is gradually recognised. (Berdahl, 1990; Ferris, 1992) But in fact university 
autonomy is also exercised within a set of contracts; besides the financial contracts, they 
include the legal and social contracts. 
'Contractual Autonomy' means that the university and the parties involved in the contracts 
achieve the agreements through bargaining and negotiation. After the contract being set, the 
university exercises its autonomy within the contracts to self-govern its affairs. The degree of 
autonomy will dependent upon how much room is left for the university for negotiation and 
how much capability of the university to meet the requirements of the contracts. ' Contractual 
Autonomy' fluctuates as the relationship between the university and outside agencies 
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Appendix 6 Interview Schedule for Taiwan 
Date: 17 Sep. 1998 
Dear Mr. A, 
I will meet with you to discuss your completed questionnaire further and talk with you 
on the issue of university autonomy and its association with funding. Besides, in this 
study, one of major tasks is to redefine university autonomy. After an extensive 
literature review, the definition-- 'Contractual Autonomy', has been proposed in my 
study. I will very much appreciate if you can give me some comments on this 
definition and its usefulness. I have outlined a general schedule which we can follow 
to act as a guideline for the interview. I also would like to reconfirm with you about 
the length of interview which will go 50 minutes to one hour. 
Part I: Some questions on the completed questionnaire. 
Part II.: 
1. In your view, why is university autonomy important for the development of the 
university in Taiwan? 
2. In your view, what is the main challenge to university autonomy now and in the 
future? What is possibly a feasible way to protect university autonomy? How much 
does diversification of funding can help the university enhance autonomy? 
3. Can you briefly let me know which sources of funds enhance and which possibly 
put the autonomy of your University under threat? 
4. How do you see the changing government-university relationship? Does the MOE 
adopt a supervisory, rather than a managing, role in dealing with university affairs? 
5. What is the main consideration while your university deciding the following 
matters: 
1). student recruitment; 
2). structure of courses and teaching quality; 
3). research quality; 
4). staff appointment; 
5). strategic financial management; and 
6). organisational development? 
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7. Is it appropriate to use the term 'Contractual' to describe the relationship between 
the university and the outside agencies, whatever government or private? According 
to the contractual relationship to redefine university autonomy as 'Contractual 
Autonomy'(its definition as following) , is it applicable to describe the autonomy your 
University can enjoy? 
The Definitioll or COlltractual Autollomy 
A ulliversity is always operated within a set of ' contracts ' , whatever in explicit and fonnal or 
implicit and infonnal fonn . Autonomy is a relative, not an absolute concept. Neave (1988) 
argues that autonomy is contextual and political defined. With the changing relationship 
between the university and outside agencies, it is time to redefine university autonomy. 
(Neave, 1988; Tapper & Salter, 1995) Obviously on the financial aspect, the contractual 
relationship is gradually recognised. (Berdahl, 1990; Ferris, 1992) But in fact university 
autonomy is also exercised within a set of contracts; besides the financial contracts, they 
include the legal and social contracts. 
'Colltractual Autollomy' means that the university and the parties involved in the contracts 
achieve the agreements through bargaining and negotiation. After the contract being set, the 
university exercises its autonomy within the contracts to self-govern its affairs. The degree of 
autonomy will dependent upon how much room is left for the university for negotiation and 
how much capability of the university to meet the requirements of the contracts. 'Contractual 
Autonomy' fluctuates as the relationship between the university and outside agencies 
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